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Victoria Crawshaw Scanlon

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VCScanlon@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Victoria Crawshaw Scanlon

Victoria is the supervising attorney for the Health Care Liability Practice Group in the Scranton office. She is an experienced litigator with more than 20 years of experience representing physicians, midwives, nurse practitioners, nurses, physical therapists, hospitals, ambulatory surgery centers, skilled nursing facilities, personal care homes, home health care providers and physician practice groups in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Victoria is a proven trial attorney and highly successful negotiator. She also provides risk management services.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey in 2008, Victoria was a partner in the Boston office of a large litigation firm, where she represented health care professionals and entities in malpractice suits and manufacturers in products liability matters. She is a 1998 graduate of Suffolk University Law School. Victoria obtained her undergraduate degree in communications and political science in 1994 from the University of Rhode Island, where she was the 1994 student commencement speaker and captain of the debate team.

Victoria was born in Johannesburg, South Africa. She is a dual citizen of the United States of America and South Africa.

    • Suffolk University Law School (J.D., 1998)
    • University of Rhode Island (B.A., 1994)
    • Massachusetts, 1999
    • U.S. District Court District of Massachusetts, 2002
    • Pennsylvania, 2008
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2011
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants (2023-2027)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Health Care Law; Litigation - Health Care (2025-2027)
    • BV® Distinguished™ by LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell
    • International Association of Defense Counsel (IADC) (2006 Trial Academy, attendee)
    • Massachusetts Super Lawyer Rising Star (2007)
    • Lackawanna Bar Association
    • Massachusetts Bar Association
    • How to Write a Great Report: Malpractice Lawyer’s Perspective, American Roentgen Ray Society (ARRS) Annual Meeting, Pittsburgh, PA, April 12, 2026
    • Legal Update: Advanced Practice Providers, The CHART Institute, webinar, June 18, 2025
    • Legal Update: Advanced Practice Providers, The CHART Institute, webinar, October 24, 2023
    • What a Radiologist Should Know About Medical Malpractice, Department of Radiology at Penn State Hershey Medical School, May 11, 2023
    • Advanced Practice Clinicians in Health Care: What Your Facility Needs to Know, ASHRM 2018 Annual Conference, Nashville, Tennessee, October 8, 2018
    • Mock Depositions: What the Child Psychiatrist Needs to Know Before Sitting in the Hot Seat, The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 64th Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., October 27, 2017
    • Mock Trial: Lessons for Psychiatrists from the Bar and Risk Management, New York-Presbyterian Hospital Child Psychiatry Residency, New York University Child Psychiatry Residency, Weill Cornell Psychiatry Residency Programs, Allied World, August 2017
    • Medical Malpractice Case Study - Suicide and the Defense of a Wrongful Death Claim, Pennsylvania Association of Health Care Risk Management (PAHCRM), Annual Conference, September 9, 2016
    • Ostensible Agency and Corporate Liability Claims: What You Need to Know, Health Care and Health Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 5, 2015
    • Mock Trial: Lessons for Psychiatrists From the Bar and Risk Management, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Annual Meeting, San Antonio, Texas, October 30, 2015
    • Peer Review, Charting Pitfalls/Issues and Anticipated Legal Issues Pertaining to the Electronic Medical Record, Northeast Chapter of the Pennsylvania Association of Nonprofit Senior Services, Continuing Education Conference, April 2009
    • "Enforceability of Nursing Home Arbitration Agreements in Pennsylvania," Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2014
    • Case Law Alerts, contributor, 2010-2012
    • Obtained a defense verdict on behalf a midwife defendant in an alleged failure to properly manage and care for a patient's labor and delivery, resulting in catastrophic injury to her child. Counsel for the minor-plaintiff argued that the pregnancy and labor were high risk and, therefore, it was below the standard of care to use intermittent auscultation (IA) during the second stage of labor. The plaintiff argued that the fetus suffered a catastrophic brain injury during the second stage of labor, resulting in cerebral palsy and daily intractable seizures. The child, six years of age, wheelchair bound and unable to speak or feed himself, will require lifetime supervision and care. The defense argued that the patient's pregnancy remained low risk, and therefore, IA was within the standard of care; that a sentinel event did not occur during the second stage of labor; and that child's brain injury occurred in the days leading up to the hospital admission for labor.

Results

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Medical Malpractice Arbitration Ends in Defense Award

We obtained an arbitration defense award in a medical malpractice case, in which the plaintiff alleged that our radiologist client misread the first of two head CT scans. She claimed that a timely diagnosis of her issue, which turned out to be cerebral venous thrombosis (CVT), would have given her the opportunity for a cure. We successfully argued that the head CT showed what appeared to be a normal anatomical variant, which only identified plaintiff’s CVT diagnosis with additional, more sensitive imaging studies.

Defense arbitration award in a podiatric surgical malpractice case.

The 55-year-old plaintiff underwent tarsal tunnel surgery. She developed post-operative complications, including infection, and required two additional surgeries, including a sural artery flap graft. The plaintiff gained over 100 pounds after the podiatric surgeries and underwent gastric bypass surgery. She alleged it was required as the result of being sedentary from the podiatric surgeries and complications. The plaintiff has significant lower extremity surgical scarring, chronic pain and a gait abnormality. She was never able to return to work. She  alleged that the defendant intentionally kept fraudulent, incomplete and untimely electronic medical records. The defense argued that the podiatric surgeries were indicated and performed within the standard of care, and that the plaintiff developed post-operative complications resulting in the need for additional surgeries due to her own noncompliance—prematurely and repeatedly walking on her surgical foot and getting her surgical dressings wet.

News

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Events

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Speaking Engagement

2026 American Roentgen Ray Society (ARRS) Annual Meeting

April 12, 2026

Pittsburgh, PA

Victoria Crawshaw Scanlon

Firm Highlights

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers and Rising Stars Honorees

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers and Rising Stars Honorees

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

News

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

News

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.