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Behavioral Health Risk & Liability

Litigation in the behavioral health sector can be arduous, with sensitive fact patterns and significant emotional overlay. The attorneys in our Behavioral Health Risk and Liability Practice possess the necessary experience, judgment and analytical skills to help guide these complex matters through trial or proper resolution. We counsel and defend behavioral health facilities and associated entities against professional liability claims in all states in which the firm practices. The focus of representation also includes social workers, nurses, administrators, case managers, technicians, therapists, psychiatrists, psychologists and other mental health professionals.

Our attorneys routinely handle matters involving:

  • Negligence claims following voluntary and involuntary commitments, with claims of medical errors, elopement, emotional/physical/sexual assaults and other improper medical treatment in psychiatric facilities.
  • Civil action claims for neglect and abuse of children in foster care, residential treatment facilities and community placement facilities.
  • Representation of behavioral health professionals in addiction treatment facilities.
  • Administrative law hearings.
  • Legislative hearings.
  • State licensing revocation hearings.
  • Prison health care negligence litigation.
  • Negligent care/treatment litigation on behalf of nursing homes and assisted living facilities
  • HIPAA/HITECH compliance and notifications. 
  • Fraud and abuse claims. 
  • Guardianship appointments in mental health facilities.

Our trial lawyers and appellate team have deep knowledge and an understanding of the intricacies of state mental health statutes, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), CMS requirements and HIPAA requirements, in addition to various other local, state and federal regulations that impact the behavioral health care arena. We also provide counseling in risk management, offering personalized educational discussions aimed at eliminating and minimizing legal exposure related to behavioral health staff interaction with residents, and adherence to state and federal regulations.

Results

Summary Judgment Secured in 10-Year-Old Medical Malpractice Case

We won a very hard-fought motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute in a matter that is now 10 years old. Suzanne won oral argument to dismiss the suit, based on the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute his case, by proving both actual prejudice to the client, a psychologist, and an inexcusable seven-year delay in any activity by the plaintiff. This medical malpractice claim was brought in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, and was related to a psychological evaluation conducted of the plaintiff’s three children, whom he physically and psychologically abused for years.   

Plaintiff’s Claims Barred by Statute of Limitations and Immunity Provisions of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act

The defense prevailed on preliminary objections in Philadelphia County as the court found that the ​case involved a medical malpractice action involving the plaintiff’s allegations of an alleged assault by three patients while the plaintiff was a patient at a behavioral health hospital. In the complaint, the plaintiff pleaded ordinary negligence. Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer were filed by the defendant, raising immunity under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act since there was no claim of gross negligence. After the preliminary objections were filed, the plaintiff attempted to cure the defect in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint, which added allegations of gross negligence and additional facts, in an attempt to support the claim of gross negligence. We again filed preliminary objections, arguing that the allegation of gross negligence was a new cause of action that was now barred by the statute of limitations. Since the amended complaint was filed more than two years after the event at issue and raised a new claim, the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred the claim. We also argued that the amended complaint failed to provide any factual support for gross negligence or willful misconduct and, therefore, the hospital was immune from suit. Plaintiff’s counsel did not file a response in opposition. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas agreed that the new claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the immunity provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

From Bedside to Bar

February 25, 2026

When I was young with asthma, my hero was never a doll or TV character, it was my pediatrician. He made house calls multiple times per day with his black bag, a multidose vial of epinephrine, and a reusable syringe. He quickly taught me how to draw up my own injection, and from that moment I knew I wanted to become a doctor to help save kids’ lives. I studied math, science, and Latin like a religion so I could excel in school. I had finished every AP math and science course that my high school had to offer by the end of my sophomore year, so the school partnered with Penn State to provide me with pre-med courses in the five-year Jefferson-Penn State pre-med/medical school program. In 1976, as an early admission candidate, I was one of very few women to be accepted into that med school program. Keeping in mind that this was the 70s, my parents and guidance counselors instructed me that “girls” are supposed to be nurses, teachers, and secretaries – not doctors. So I transferred to the Diploma Nursing program at Jefferson and managed expenses by working as a manager at an ice cream store in the Gallery. As a nurse in a Pediatric ICU, and then in an Emergency Department (ED), I worked with prominent physicians in numerous specialties. Details matter, especially when working with infants and children, and I have always been a stickler for details. It was my goal to always provide the best care possible, but sometimes even the mightiest efforts were not enough. After one especially tough and heartbreaking incident surrounding the death of a child, a mother came into the ED screaming at us, and eventually filed a lawsuit. We knew we had exceeded the standards of care, so we did not understand why the hospital settled the lawsuit. After the settlement, the Attending of the ED bought me an LSAT book and said “If you want to do more for the profession, go to law school.” So I did. Now, as an attorney, I bring the same meticulous care to my clients that I once brought to my patients. I take an assertive, detail-driven approach to achieving successful outcomes. I remain a Registered Nurse licensed in Pennsylvania and continue to volunteer in disaster-relief when needed. That dual identity—nurse and attorney—shapes how I advocate: with compassion, an understanding of the stress litigation creates, and unwavering attention to detail. My clinical background gives me an invaluable advantage throughout the litigation process, from understanding the medicine to working effectively with my clients, our experts and cross-examining opponents’ experts. Communicating fluently with healthcare professionals across specialties has strengthened my practice and continually reminds me of the pediatrician who once taught me to draw up my own epinephrine injection—an act that set the course for my future.

Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Broadens MHPA Immunity to Include Ordinary Negligence in Physical Care During Involuntary Commitment

January 1, 2026

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently expanded the scope of provider immunity under the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), holding that the statute can shield providers from ordinary negligence claims arising from medical care for physical ailments provided during involuntary commitment. The case arose from a wrongful death and survival action following the death of a patient involuntarily committed for dementia-related aggression who developed severe pressure ulcers. Under 50 P.S. § 7114(a), facilities and practitioners participating in decisions to examine or treat individuals under the MHPA are immune from civil and criminal liability, absent a showing of willful misconduct or gross negligence. As § 114 does not define “treat,” the court looked to Section 104 of the MHPA, interpreting “treatment” to include medical care necessary to maintain “decent, safe, and healthful living conditions.” The court concluded that care for physical conditions is covered when it is coincident to the patient’s mental health treatment, even if the condition did not result from psychiatric care or advance psychiatric recovery. This decision significantly broadens the precedent established in Allen v. Montgomery Hospital, 696 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1997). While Allen provided immunity for physical conditions caused by psychiatric care (such as medication side effects), Wunderly extends that protection to general medical care that simply occurs during the same timeframe as the commitment (such as treatment for pressure ulcers). The dissent warned that the majority’s interpretation risks lowering the standard of care for involuntarily committed patients by immunizing ordinary medical malpractice based solely on commitment status. The dissent argued that the patient’s pressure ulcers arose independently of his mental health condition and should not fall within MHPA immunity.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.