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Robin B. Snyder

Director, Health Care Department

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Portrait of Robin B. Snyder

Robin is the Director of the firm's Health Care Department, and is responsible for the day-to-day operations and supervision of our health care attorneys. She is also a member of the firm's Board of Directors. From 2003 – 2017, Robin served as the Managing Attorney of the firm’s Moosic office.

Robin concentrates her practice in the defense of medical malpractice for physicians, nurses, hospitals, dentists and long term-care facilities. Her past litigation experience also includes defending school civil rights cases, which gives Robin a unique perspective in handling mental and behavioral health cases. Throughout her 29-year career with Marshall Dennehey, Robin has tried more than 40 cases to verdict, including medical malpractice and civil rights cases. As a seasoned litigator, Robin has served as a coach for the firm's Mock Trial program, providing guidance and mentorship to young attorneys as they hone their litigation skills.  

Following graduation from The Pennsylvania State University in 1987, Robin worked with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and attended law school at Widener University School of Law in Wilmington, Delaware.

Robin is an elected associate member of the American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA), a national association of experienced trial lawyers and judges that works to enhance the civil trial jury system. She is admitted to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as well as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1993)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.A., 1987)
    • Pennsylvania, 1993
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Health Care (2023-2026)
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, 2022-present
    • Lackawanna County Bar Association - Board of Directors, 2016-2018; Civil Rules Committee, 2015-2018
    • Represented a hospital-based laboratory and its pathologists in an alleged misdiagnosis of breast cancer case. As a result of the diagnosis, which was interpreted as ductal carcinoma in situ, plaintiff underwent a lumpectomy and removal of lymph nodes resulting in mobility limitations and radiation which damaged her breast. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the laboratory and its pathologists. 
    • Obtained a defense verdict after a nine-day trial in Wayne County, Pennsylvania. The 52-year-old plaintiff presented to the emergency department with chest pain and stroke-like symptoms. She was administered 25 mg Phenergan IV in her hand, twice, and when her symptoms resolved and the MRI was clean, she was discharged. She returned two days later complaining of swelling in her hand and was diagnosed with infiltration. She claimed she developed Complex Regional Pain Syndrome and that she was disabled and unable to continuing working. Phenergan carries a Black Box warning that subcutaneous injection or perivascular extravasation may cause necrotic tissue. The jury found that the doctor, nurse and hospital did not breach the standard of care.
    • Tried a First Amendment political retaliation/freedom of association case in which she represented a school district. Plaintiffs alleged they suffered economic loss as a result of their political activities in supporting board members who ultimately lost the election. More significantly, plaintiffs alleged the retaliation occurred because they were friends with one another. Although we lost the case, after filing post-trial motions, the judge ordered a new trial, agreeing that his charge incorrectly implied that plaintiffs had a protected right of association for the purely social aspects of their relationships. We ultimately settled the case.
    • Successfully secured summary judgment in a case where plaintiff, a student at the University of Scranton/Wyoming Valley Healthcare System School of Nurse Anesthesia, was placed on academic probation and dismissed from the university. His complaint contained four causes of action, which were all dismissed: 1) breach of contract; 2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 3) denial of due process; and 4) tortious interference with contract. Plaintiff appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed.
    • Involved in a major case involving alleged abuse of seven minor autistic students. Through their parents, they claimed they were assaulted by their teacher in violation of their constitutional rights, resulting in post-traumatic stress disorder. Represented the school district where the alleged abuse occurred and its administrators. Successfully had the 14th Amendment claim against the individuals dismissed. The school district had an indemnification clause in its contract with the entity that employed the teacher, and, ultimately, the case settled for multi-millions, none of which was paid by the school district.
    • Navigating Medical Malpractice: Insights into Pennsylvania’s Legal Landscape, Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry Healthcare Summit, Harrisburg, PA, May 22, 2024
    • A Comparison of the Damages Awarded and Key Issues in Various Healthcare Jurisdictions, ILG360º London Annual Conference 2023, March 15, 2023
    • Business and Practice of Law Post-COVID-19: How Will It Change?, Pennsylvania Bar Association webinar, November 11, 2021
    • Civil Litigation Updates in COVID-19 Litigation – Where Do We Stand One Year Later?, Marshall Dennehey Webinar, May 2021
    • Telehealth and Documentation in the Time of COVID-19: Information and Best Practices to Protect Patients and Clinicians webinar, April 23 and May 14, 2020 

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Health Care Liability

Medical Malpractice Venue Rule Overturned

August 26, 2022

By Order dated August 25, 2022, effective January 1, 2023, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania amended Pennsylvania’s venue rule, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006, by deleting Rule 1006(a.1), which provided that medical malpractice actions must be filed “only in a county in which the cause of action arose.” Although this Rule change will not take effect until January 1, 2023, it will significantly change where many medical malpractice actions are filed. The effect of deleting Rule 1006(a.1) is to make medical malpractice actions subject to the same venue standards that apply to all other types of cases, which may be filed where (in relevant part) a defendant may be served, the cause of action arose, or a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose. Yesterday's Rule change will significantly expand the counties in which medical malpractice actions may be filed, with an expected increase in certain counties, primarily Philadelphia. This change eliminates a centerpiece of the Supreme Court’s own tort reform effort 20 years ago. By Order dated January 27, 2003, the Court promulgated Rule 1006(a.1) requiring medical malpractice actions to be filed only where the cause of action accrued. The result was a significant decline in medical malpractice filings statewide. The Order accompanying the Rule change states: “This Order shall be processed in accordance Pa.R.J.A. 103(b), and shall be effective January 1, 2023.” This language likely means that the amendment to Rule 1006 will apply to actions filed on or after January 1, 2023, regardless of when the cause of action accrued. When the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 1006(a.1) in 2003, the effective date applied to filings, and this Rule change likely will apply the same way. When Rule 1006(a.1) was promulgated in 2003, many plaintiffs rushed to file their medical malpractice actions before the Rule change took effect. We will likely now see the reverse trend: plaintiffs will wait until on or after January 1, 2023, to file new actions in venues that they view as more favorable. Finally, in addition to Rule 1006(a.1), there is a statute—42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101.1(b)—that requires medical malpractice actions to be filed where the cause of action arose. However, that statute was declared unconstitutional in North-Central Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers v. Weaver, 827 A.2d 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), on the basis that venue is a matter for the Supreme Court, not the legislature. Yesterday’s Order suspends any statute that is inconsistent with Rule 1006 as amended, so it is likely that the amended Rule, not the statute, will govern venue in medical malpractice cases beginning on January 1, 2023.   Legal Update for Health Care Liability - August 26, 2022, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments,and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.