.

Robin B. Snyder

Director, Health Care Department

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RBSnyder@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Robin B. Snyder

Robin is the Director of the firm's Health Care Department, and is responsible for the day-to-day operations and supervision of our health care attorneys. She is also a member of the firm's Board of Directors. From 2003 – 2017, Robin served as the Managing Attorney of the firm’s Moosic office.

Robin concentrates her practice in the defense of medical malpractice for physicians, nurses, hospitals, dentists and long term-care facilities. Her past litigation experience also includes defending school civil rights cases, which gives Robin a unique perspective in handling mental and behavioral health cases. Throughout her 29-year career with Marshall Dennehey, Robin has tried more than 40 cases to verdict, including medical malpractice and civil rights cases. As a seasoned litigator, Robin has served as a coach for the firm's Mock Trial program, providing guidance and mentorship to young attorneys as they hone their litigation skills.  

Following graduation from The Pennsylvania State University in 1987, Robin worked with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and attended law school at Widener University School of Law in Wilmington, Delaware.

Robin is an elected associate member of the American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA), a national association of experienced trial lawyers and judges that works to enhance the civil trial jury system. She is admitted to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as well as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1993)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.A., 1987)
    • Pennsylvania, 1993
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Health Care (2023-2027)
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, 2022-present
    • Lackawanna County Bar Association - Board of Directors, 2016-2018; Civil Rules Committee, 2015-2018
    • Represented a hospital-based laboratory and its pathologists in an alleged misdiagnosis of breast cancer case. As a result of the diagnosis, which was interpreted as ductal carcinoma in situ, plaintiff underwent a lumpectomy and removal of lymph nodes resulting in mobility limitations and radiation which damaged her breast. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the laboratory and its pathologists. 
    • Obtained a defense verdict after a nine-day trial in Wayne County, Pennsylvania. The 52-year-old plaintiff presented to the emergency department with chest pain and stroke-like symptoms. She was administered 25 mg Phenergan IV in her hand, twice, and when her symptoms resolved and the MRI was clean, she was discharged. She returned two days later complaining of swelling in her hand and was diagnosed with infiltration. She claimed she developed Complex Regional Pain Syndrome and that she was disabled and unable to continuing working. Phenergan carries a Black Box warning that subcutaneous injection or perivascular extravasation may cause necrotic tissue. The jury found that the doctor, nurse and hospital did not breach the standard of care.
    • Tried a First Amendment political retaliation/freedom of association case in which she represented a school district. Plaintiffs alleged they suffered economic loss as a result of their political activities in supporting board members who ultimately lost the election. More significantly, plaintiffs alleged the retaliation occurred because they were friends with one another. Although we lost the case, after filing post-trial motions, the judge ordered a new trial, agreeing that his charge incorrectly implied that plaintiffs had a protected right of association for the purely social aspects of their relationships. We ultimately settled the case.
    • Successfully secured summary judgment in a case where plaintiff, a student at the University of Scranton/Wyoming Valley Healthcare System School of Nurse Anesthesia, was placed on academic probation and dismissed from the university. His complaint contained four causes of action, which were all dismissed: 1) breach of contract; 2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 3) denial of due process; and 4) tortious interference with contract. Plaintiff appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed.
    • Involved in a major case involving alleged abuse of seven minor autistic students. Through their parents, they claimed they were assaulted by their teacher in violation of their constitutional rights, resulting in post-traumatic stress disorder. Represented the school district where the alleged abuse occurred and its administrators. Successfully had the 14th Amendment claim against the individuals dismissed. The school district had an indemnification clause in its contract with the entity that employed the teacher, and, ultimately, the case settled for multi-millions, none of which was paid by the school district.
    • Navigating Medical Malpractice: Insights into Pennsylvania’s Legal Landscape, Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry Healthcare Summit, Harrisburg, PA, May 22, 2024
    • A Comparison of the Damages Awarded and Key Issues in Various Healthcare Jurisdictions, ILG360º London Annual Conference 2023, March 15, 2023
    • Business and Practice of Law Post-COVID-19: How Will It Change?, Pennsylvania Bar Association webinar, November 11, 2021
    • Civil Litigation Updates in COVID-19 Litigation – Where Do We Stand One Year Later?, Marshall Dennehey Webinar, May 2021
    • Telehealth and Documentation in the Time of COVID-19: Information and Best Practices to Protect Patients and Clinicians webinar, April 23 and May 14, 2020 

Thought Leadership

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Legal Updates for Health Care Liability

Medical Malpractice Venue Rule Overturned

August 26, 2022

By Order dated August 25, 2022, effective January 1, 2023, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania amended Pennsylvania’s venue rule, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006, by deleting Rule 1006(a.1), which provided that medical malpractice actions must be filed “only in a county in which the cause of action arose.” Although this Rule change will not take effect until January 1, 2023, it will significantly change where many medical malpractice actions are filed. The effect of deleting Rule 1006(a.1) is to make medical malpractice actions subject to the same venue standards that apply to all other types of cases, which may be filed where (in relevant part) a defendant may be served, the cause of action arose, or a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose. Yesterday's Rule change will significantly expand the counties in which medical malpractice actions may be filed, with an expected increase in certain counties, primarily Philadelphia. This change eliminates a centerpiece of the Supreme Court’s own tort reform effort 20 years ago. By Order dated January 27, 2003, the Court promulgated Rule 1006(a.1) requiring medical malpractice actions to be filed only where the cause of action accrued. The result was a significant decline in medical malpractice filings statewide. The Order accompanying the Rule change states: “This Order shall be processed in accordance Pa.R.J.A. 103(b), and shall be effective January 1, 2023.” This language likely means that the amendment to Rule 1006 will apply to actions filed on or after January 1, 2023, regardless of when the cause of action accrued. When the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 1006(a.1) in 2003, the effective date applied to filings, and this Rule change likely will apply the same way. When Rule 1006(a.1) was promulgated in 2003, many plaintiffs rushed to file their medical malpractice actions before the Rule change took effect. We will likely now see the reverse trend: plaintiffs will wait until on or after January 1, 2023, to file new actions in venues that they view as more favorable. Finally, in addition to Rule 1006(a.1), there is a statute—42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101.1(b)—that requires medical malpractice actions to be filed where the cause of action arose. However, that statute was declared unconstitutional in North-Central Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers v. Weaver, 827 A.2d 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), on the basis that venue is a matter for the Supreme Court, not the legislature. Yesterday’s Order suspends any statute that is inconsistent with Rule 1006 as amended, so it is likely that the amended Rule, not the statute, will govern venue in medical malpractice cases beginning on January 1, 2023.   Legal Update for Health Care Liability - August 26, 2022, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments,and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Result

$1.09 Billion Products Liability Verdict Overturned

In this products liability crashworthiness case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Philadelphia jury verdict of $1.09 billion, the largest verdict ever overturned by a PA appellate court.  The court ordered a new trial based on deficient jury instructions, clarified important aspects of crashworthiness law, and confirmed that so-called standard jury instructions may be incompatible with Pennsylvania law. 

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Result

Statutory Employer Immunity Upheld

In this construction accident case that resulted in a $5 million verdict, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Statutory Employer Doctrine, which immunizes general contractors and other contractors on construction sites when certain elements are satisfied.

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Result

$19 Million Medical Malpractice Verdict Overturned

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court vacated $10 million of a $19 million verdict in post-trial motions and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the remaining $9 million on appeal.