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Robin B. Snyder

Director, Health Care Department

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Portrait of Robin B. Snyder

Robin is the Director of the firm's Health Care Department, and is responsible for the day-to-day operations and supervision of our health care attorneys. She is also a member of the firm's Board of Directors. From 2003 – 2017, Robin served as the Managing Attorney of the firm’s Moosic office.

Robin concentrates her practice in the defense of medical malpractice for physicians, nurses, hospitals, dentists and long term-care facilities. Her past litigation experience also includes defending school civil rights cases, which gives Robin a unique perspective in handling mental and behavioral health cases. Throughout her 29-year career with Marshall Dennehey, Robin has tried more than 40 cases to verdict, including medical malpractice and civil rights cases. As a seasoned litigator, Robin has served as a coach for the firm's Mock Trial program, providing guidance and mentorship to young attorneys as they hone their litigation skills.  

Following graduation from The Pennsylvania State University in 1987, Robin worked with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and attended law school at Widener University School of Law in Wilmington, Delaware.

Robin is an elected associate member of the American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA), a national association of experienced trial lawyers and judges that works to enhance the civil trial jury system. She is admitted to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as well as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1993)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.A., 1987)
    • Pennsylvania, 1993
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Health Care (2023-2027)
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, 2022-present
    • Lackawanna County Bar Association - Board of Directors, 2016-2018; Civil Rules Committee, 2015-2018
    • Represented a hospital-based laboratory and its pathologists in an alleged misdiagnosis of breast cancer case. As a result of the diagnosis, which was interpreted as ductal carcinoma in situ, plaintiff underwent a lumpectomy and removal of lymph nodes resulting in mobility limitations and radiation which damaged her breast. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the laboratory and its pathologists. 
    • Obtained a defense verdict after a nine-day trial in Wayne County, Pennsylvania. The 52-year-old plaintiff presented to the emergency department with chest pain and stroke-like symptoms. She was administered 25 mg Phenergan IV in her hand, twice, and when her symptoms resolved and the MRI was clean, she was discharged. She returned two days later complaining of swelling in her hand and was diagnosed with infiltration. She claimed she developed Complex Regional Pain Syndrome and that she was disabled and unable to continuing working. Phenergan carries a Black Box warning that subcutaneous injection or perivascular extravasation may cause necrotic tissue. The jury found that the doctor, nurse and hospital did not breach the standard of care.
    • Tried a First Amendment political retaliation/freedom of association case in which she represented a school district. Plaintiffs alleged they suffered economic loss as a result of their political activities in supporting board members who ultimately lost the election. More significantly, plaintiffs alleged the retaliation occurred because they were friends with one another. Although we lost the case, after filing post-trial motions, the judge ordered a new trial, agreeing that his charge incorrectly implied that plaintiffs had a protected right of association for the purely social aspects of their relationships. We ultimately settled the case.
    • Successfully secured summary judgment in a case where plaintiff, a student at the University of Scranton/Wyoming Valley Healthcare System School of Nurse Anesthesia, was placed on academic probation and dismissed from the university. His complaint contained four causes of action, which were all dismissed: 1) breach of contract; 2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 3) denial of due process; and 4) tortious interference with contract. Plaintiff appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed.
    • Involved in a major case involving alleged abuse of seven minor autistic students. Through their parents, they claimed they were assaulted by their teacher in violation of their constitutional rights, resulting in post-traumatic stress disorder. Represented the school district where the alleged abuse occurred and its administrators. Successfully had the 14th Amendment claim against the individuals dismissed. The school district had an indemnification clause in its contract with the entity that employed the teacher, and, ultimately, the case settled for multi-millions, none of which was paid by the school district.
    • Navigating Medical Malpractice: Insights into Pennsylvania’s Legal Landscape, Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry Healthcare Summit, Harrisburg, PA, May 22, 2024
    • A Comparison of the Damages Awarded and Key Issues in Various Healthcare Jurisdictions, ILG360º London Annual Conference 2023, March 15, 2023
    • Business and Practice of Law Post-COVID-19: How Will It Change?, Pennsylvania Bar Association webinar, November 11, 2021
    • Civil Litigation Updates in COVID-19 Litigation – Where Do We Stand One Year Later?, Marshall Dennehey Webinar, May 2021
    • Telehealth and Documentation in the Time of COVID-19: Information and Best Practices to Protect Patients and Clinicians webinar, April 23 and May 14, 2020 

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Health Care Liability

Medical Malpractice Venue Rule Overturned

August 26, 2022

By Order dated August 25, 2022, effective January 1, 2023, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania amended Pennsylvania’s venue rule, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006, by deleting Rule 1006(a.1), which provided that medical malpractice actions must be filed “only in a county in which the cause of action arose.” Although this Rule change will not take effect until January 1, 2023, it will significantly change where many medical malpractice actions are filed. The effect of deleting Rule 1006(a.1) is to make medical malpractice actions subject to the same venue standards that apply to all other types of cases, which may be filed where (in relevant part) a defendant may be served, the cause of action arose, or a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose. Yesterday's Rule change will significantly expand the counties in which medical malpractice actions may be filed, with an expected increase in certain counties, primarily Philadelphia. This change eliminates a centerpiece of the Supreme Court’s own tort reform effort 20 years ago. By Order dated January 27, 2003, the Court promulgated Rule 1006(a.1) requiring medical malpractice actions to be filed only where the cause of action accrued. The result was a significant decline in medical malpractice filings statewide. The Order accompanying the Rule change states: “This Order shall be processed in accordance Pa.R.J.A. 103(b), and shall be effective January 1, 2023.” This language likely means that the amendment to Rule 1006 will apply to actions filed on or after January 1, 2023, regardless of when the cause of action accrued. When the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 1006(a.1) in 2003, the effective date applied to filings, and this Rule change likely will apply the same way. When Rule 1006(a.1) was promulgated in 2003, many plaintiffs rushed to file their medical malpractice actions before the Rule change took effect. We will likely now see the reverse trend: plaintiffs will wait until on or after January 1, 2023, to file new actions in venues that they view as more favorable. Finally, in addition to Rule 1006(a.1), there is a statute—42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101.1(b)—that requires medical malpractice actions to be filed where the cause of action arose. However, that statute was declared unconstitutional in North-Central Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers v. Weaver, 827 A.2d 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), on the basis that venue is a matter for the Supreme Court, not the legislature. Yesterday’s Order suspends any statute that is inconsistent with Rule 1006 as amended, so it is likely that the amended Rule, not the statute, will govern venue in medical malpractice cases beginning on January 1, 2023.   Legal Update for Health Care Liability - August 26, 2022, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments,and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.