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Defense Digest

In a Clash Between Public Policy and Statutory Interpretation, the Appellate Division Rules the Negligence Claim of an Allegedly Intoxicated Motorist Is Not Barred

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023

September 1, 2023

by Brian T. Byrne

Key Points: 

  • In assessing the applicability of a defense to a negligence claim on the grounds that the plaintiff was intoxicated, the dispositive issue is whether the plaintiff was adjudicated guilty of DWI. 
  • A recent New Jersey Appellate Division decision creates a bright-line test and avoids the need for courts to resolve competing contentions as to whether a plaintiff was legally intoxicated. 
  • In a case where there is an indication that the plaintiff may have been driving under the influence, a search of the municipal court records should be conducted to reveal whether the plaintiff was adjudicated guilty of DWI. 

There is clearly a strong public policy against driving while intoxicated (DWI) in New Jersey. Despite this, a recent Appellate Division decision brought to the forefront the issue of whether a motorist who was allegedly intoxicated at the time of the accident could be precluded from bringing a negligence claim despite not being adjudicated guilty of DWI. 

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) states: “[a]ny person who is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, operating a motor vehicle in violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50, [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a],[1] or a similar statute from any other jurisdiction, in connection with an accident, shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of the accident.”

In the recently published case of Castano v. Augustine, 291 A.3d 295 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2023), the plaintiff was operating his motorcycle after having been drinking at three different bars. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ tractor trailer exited a convenience store onto the roadway, causing him to strike the truck’s bumper and sustain injuries. At times during his deposition testimony, the plaintiff admitted to being “drunk” at the time of the accident. At other times, he equivocated that he only had alcohol in his system. He did admit to having been drinking approximately 20 minutes before the crash. The police responded to the scene of the accident, but no summonses were issued to the plaintiff for any motor vehicle offenses, including DWI. Blood was drawn from the plaintiff at the hospital, and the defendants’ expert extrapolated that the plaintiff had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) that was well in excess of the legal limit of .08 at the time of the accident. 

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred because he was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. The plaintiff contended that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that, since he had not been adjudicated guilty of DWI, his claim was not barred. The Law Division judge denied the motion for summary judgment and found that the plaintiff’s intoxication was a material issue of fact. 

The Appellate Division granted the defendants’ leave to appeal the order denying the motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court had misapplied the law, mistakenly concluding that there was a dispute as to plaintiff’s BAC level. The Appellate Division affirmed the motion judge’s ruling, finding that the statutory language was plain and unambiguous and required a conviction or guilty plea to DWI to bar a negligence claim. While the Appellate Division accepted the premise that New Jersey had a strong public policy against drunk driving, it held that the legislature chose to limit the “draconian measure” of barring a claim for personal injury only to those litigants who had actually been adjudicated guilty of DWI. 

The Appellate Division also noted that, while the parties had competing contentions as to whether the plaintiff’s BAC was in excess of the legal limit, by denying a cause of action only to those who had been adjudicated guilty of DWI, the legislature avoided the need for courts to resolve disputed facts as to whether a plaintiff was actually legally intoxicated. The court reasoned that applying the plain language of the statute would permit the early dismissal of motor vehicle accident claims that the legislature had found to have no cause of action. 

The Appellate Division’s decision creates a bright-line rule for whether a plaintiff’s negligence claim will be barred for driving while under the influence at the time of the alleged accident. By requiring that the plaintiff be adjudicated guilty of DWI in order for the negligence claim to be precluded, the court’s decision narrows a potential defense for an auto liability case. This decision also simplifies the issue and eliminates the need for courts to resolve competing arguments as to whether a plaintiff was actually under the influence at the time of the accident. A simple review of the municipal court records will reveal whether the plaintiff was adjudicated guilty and whether the statutory bar to a negligence claim can be asserted by the defendant. 

*Brian is an associate in our Roseland, New Jersey, office. He can be reached at 973.618.4142 or BTByrne@mdwcg.com.

 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.