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Defense Digest

In a Clash Between Public Policy and Statutory Interpretation, the Appellate Division Rules the Negligence Claim of an Allegedly Intoxicated Motorist Is Not Barred

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023

September 1, 2023

by Brian T. Byrne

Key Points: 

  • In assessing the applicability of a defense to a negligence claim on the grounds that the plaintiff was intoxicated, the dispositive issue is whether the plaintiff was adjudicated guilty of DWI. 
  • A recent New Jersey Appellate Division decision creates a bright-line test and avoids the need for courts to resolve competing contentions as to whether a plaintiff was legally intoxicated. 
  • In a case where there is an indication that the plaintiff may have been driving under the influence, a search of the municipal court records should be conducted to reveal whether the plaintiff was adjudicated guilty of DWI. 

There is clearly a strong public policy against driving while intoxicated (DWI) in New Jersey. Despite this, a recent Appellate Division decision brought to the forefront the issue of whether a motorist who was allegedly intoxicated at the time of the accident could be precluded from bringing a negligence claim despite not being adjudicated guilty of DWI. 

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) states: “[a]ny person who is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, operating a motor vehicle in violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50, [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a],[1] or a similar statute from any other jurisdiction, in connection with an accident, shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of the accident.”

In the recently published case of Castano v. Augustine, 291 A.3d 295 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2023), the plaintiff was operating his motorcycle after having been drinking at three different bars. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ tractor trailer exited a convenience store onto the roadway, causing him to strike the truck’s bumper and sustain injuries. At times during his deposition testimony, the plaintiff admitted to being “drunk” at the time of the accident. At other times, he equivocated that he only had alcohol in his system. He did admit to having been drinking approximately 20 minutes before the crash. The police responded to the scene of the accident, but no summonses were issued to the plaintiff for any motor vehicle offenses, including DWI. Blood was drawn from the plaintiff at the hospital, and the defendants’ expert extrapolated that the plaintiff had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) that was well in excess of the legal limit of .08 at the time of the accident. 

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred because he was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. The plaintiff contended that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that, since he had not been adjudicated guilty of DWI, his claim was not barred. The Law Division judge denied the motion for summary judgment and found that the plaintiff’s intoxication was a material issue of fact. 

The Appellate Division granted the defendants’ leave to appeal the order denying the motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court had misapplied the law, mistakenly concluding that there was a dispute as to plaintiff’s BAC level. The Appellate Division affirmed the motion judge’s ruling, finding that the statutory language was plain and unambiguous and required a conviction or guilty plea to DWI to bar a negligence claim. While the Appellate Division accepted the premise that New Jersey had a strong public policy against drunk driving, it held that the legislature chose to limit the “draconian measure” of barring a claim for personal injury only to those litigants who had actually been adjudicated guilty of DWI. 

The Appellate Division also noted that, while the parties had competing contentions as to whether the plaintiff’s BAC was in excess of the legal limit, by denying a cause of action only to those who had been adjudicated guilty of DWI, the legislature avoided the need for courts to resolve disputed facts as to whether a plaintiff was actually legally intoxicated. The court reasoned that applying the plain language of the statute would permit the early dismissal of motor vehicle accident claims that the legislature had found to have no cause of action. 

The Appellate Division’s decision creates a bright-line rule for whether a plaintiff’s negligence claim will be barred for driving while under the influence at the time of the alleged accident. By requiring that the plaintiff be adjudicated guilty of DWI in order for the negligence claim to be precluded, the court’s decision narrows a potential defense for an auto liability case. This decision also simplifies the issue and eliminates the need for courts to resolve competing arguments as to whether a plaintiff was actually under the influence at the time of the accident. A simple review of the municipal court records will reveal whether the plaintiff was adjudicated guilty and whether the statutory bar to a negligence claim can be asserted by the defendant. 

*Brian is an associate in our Roseland, New Jersey, office. He can be reached at 973.618.4142 or BTByrne@mdwcg.com.

 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. 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