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Brian T. Byrne

Portrait of Brian T. Byrne

Brian is a member of the Casualty Department and focuses his practice primarily on auto and premises liability. He graduated from Seton Hall University with a B.A. in Political Science. Subsequently, Brian earned his J.D. from Pace University School of Law in 2016.

During law school, Brian was a member of the Pace Law Review and competed in the Prince Evidence Moot Court Competition. Brian also interned with the Morris County Prosecutor’s Office and completed a judicial externship with the Honorable Vincent L. Briccetti, a U.S. District Court judge in the Southern District of New York.

Following law school, Brian served as a law clerk to the Honorable Charles E. Powers, Jr., J.S.C. in the Bergen County Superior Court, Civil Division. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Brian was an associate at a general practice law firm where he focused primarily on defending public entities under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act as well as employment litigation matters. 

    • The Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University (J.D., magna cum laude, 2016)
    • Seton Hall University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2012)
    • New Jersey, 2017
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2018
    • “In a Clash Between Public Policy and Statutory Interpretation, the Appellate Division Rules the Negligence Claim of an Allegedly Intoxicated Motorist Is Not Barred,” Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023
    • "Lost in a Maze of Character Evidence: How the Federal Courts Lack a Cohesive Approach in Applying Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) in Drug Distrubtion Cases," 36 PACE L. REV. 624 (2016)

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

In a Clash Between Public Policy and Statutory Interpretation, the Appellate Division Rules the Negligence Claim of an Allegedly Intoxicated Motorist Is Not Barred

September 1, 2023

Key Points:  In assessing the applicability of a defense to a negligence claim on the grounds that the plaintiff was intoxicated, the dispositive issue is whether the plaintiff was adjudicated guilty of DWI.  A recent New Jersey Appellate Division decision creates a bright-line test and avoids the need for courts to resolve competing contentions as to whether a plaintiff was legally intoxicated.  In a case where there is an indication that the plaintiff may have been driving under the influence, a search of the municipal court records should be conducted to reveal whether the plaintiff was adjudicated guilty of DWI.  There is clearly a strong public policy against driving while intoxicated (DWI) in New Jersey. Despite this, a recent Appellate Division decision brought to the forefront the issue of whether a motorist who was allegedly intoxicated at the time of the accident could be precluded from bringing a negligence claim despite not being adjudicated guilty of DWI.  N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) states: “[a]ny person who is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, operating a motor vehicle in violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50, [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a],[1] or a similar statute from any other jurisdiction, in connection with an accident, shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of the accident.” In the recently published case of Castano v. Augustine, 291 A.3d 295 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2023), the plaintiff was operating his motorcycle after having been drinking at three different bars. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ tractor trailer exited a convenience store onto the roadway, causing him to strike the truck’s bumper and sustain injuries. At times during his deposition testimony, the plaintiff admitted to being “drunk” at the time of the accident. At other times, he equivocated that he only had alcohol in his system. He did admit to having been drinking approximately 20 minutes before the crash. The police responded to the scene of the accident, but no summonses were issued to the plaintiff for any motor vehicle offenses, including DWI. Blood was drawn from the plaintiff at the hospital, and the defendants’ expert extrapolated that the plaintiff had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) that was well in excess of the legal limit of .08 at the time of the accident.  The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred because he was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. The plaintiff contended that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that, since he had not been adjudicated guilty of DWI, his claim was not barred. The Law Division judge denied the motion for summary judgment and found that the plaintiff’s intoxication was a material issue of fact.  The Appellate Division granted the defendants’ leave to appeal the order denying the motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court had misapplied the law, mistakenly concluding that there was a dispute as to plaintiff’s BAC level. The Appellate Division affirmed the motion judge’s ruling, finding that the statutory language was plain and unambiguous and required a conviction or guilty plea to DWI to bar a negligence claim. While the Appellate Division accepted the premise that New Jersey had a strong public policy against drunk driving, it held that the legislature chose to limit the “draconian measure” of barring a claim for personal injury only to those litigants who had actually been adjudicated guilty of DWI.  The Appellate Division also noted that, while the parties had competing contentions as to whether the plaintiff’s BAC was in excess of the legal limit, by denying a cause of action only to those who had been adjudicated guilty of DWI, the legislature avoided the need for courts to resolve disputed facts as to whether a plaintiff was actually legally intoxicated. The court reasoned that applying the plain language of the statute would permit the early dismissal of motor vehicle accident claims that the legislature had found to have no cause of action.  The Appellate Division’s decision creates a bright-line rule for whether a plaintiff’s negligence claim will be barred for driving while under the influence at the time of the alleged accident. By requiring that the plaintiff be adjudicated guilty of DWI in order for the negligence claim to be precluded, the court’s decision narrows a potential defense for an auto liability case. This decision also simplifies the issue and eliminates the need for courts to resolve competing arguments as to whether a plaintiff was actually under the influence at the time of the accident. A simple review of the municipal court records will reveal whether the plaintiff was adjudicated guilty and whether the statutory bar to a negligence claim can be asserted by the defendant.  *Brian is an associate in our Roseland, New Jersey, office. He can be reached at 973.618.4142 or BTByrne@mdwcg.com.     Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.