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Timothy J. Hartigan

Portrait of Timothy J. Hartigan

Timothy provides legal counsel to insured individuals and corporations who are defendants in claims arising in the areas of premises liability, product liability, construction defects, and auto liability. Tim also represents homeowners sued for alleged failure to disclose pre-sale conditions of their homes to buyers, a practice area referred to as real estate sellers disclosure liability. He has defended claims on behalf of companies in slip and fall cases, manufacturing design and defect cases, and failure to warn cases. 

Tim has litigated multiple construction defect matters in Philadelphia and surrounding county courts involving stucco/ EIFS coated structures and water intrusion, both as the stucco contractor and on behalf of other trades. Stucco/ EIFS issues have also been involved in many of the seller's disclosure cases he has litigated. He has handled mold litigation that were contained within larger construction-defect related claims.

Tim's significant experience in this area has allowed him to develop a working familiarity with residential construction techniques and related liability issues. He has litigated more general construction defect issues, including building code compliance on behalf of general contractors performing casualty remediation on existing structures.

To date, Tim has tried roughly a dozen cases to verdict in state and federal courts in Pennsylvania. Hundreds more have been handled to a successful conclusion through public and private arbitration forums. Tim regularly serves as an arbitrator on cases in both Montgomery and Delaware Counties.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Tim was an associate at the law firm of Kelly, McLaughlin and Foster, after working at the law firm of Margolis Edelstein. At both firms, Tim primarily handled premises liability and automobile liability matters for the insurance company clients' policyholders. Tim also maintained a solo practice focusing exclusively on automobile and casualty subrogation for nearly eight years for over a dozen different insurance company clients.

Tim is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School and Rutgers School of Law. He was the recipient of the American Jurisprudence Award for Achievement in the study of Torts while matriculating at Rutgers School of Law.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 1992)
    • The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania (B.S., 1982)
    • Pennsylvania, 1992
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1993
    • Montgomery County Bar Association, 2005 - Present
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association, 1992 - Present
    • "The (Rarely Heard) Other Voice In The Courtroom," Defense Digest, 2004
    • "Limit Those Claims: Applying the 'Gist of the Action Doctrine' to Remove Negligence, Fraud, Common Law Contribution and Indemnification Claims," Defense Digest, 2008
    • Panelist, Pennsylvania Bar Institute Continuing Legal Education program, Philadelphia's Compulsory Arbitration Program, 2001
    • Represented owner of deer fencing company sued by independent contractor whose assistant was injured when a tension cable being used in the installation of a deer fence system snapped and lacerated the plaintiff's face and eyes. Established that plaintiff himself was the cause of the cable snapping and subsequent injuries. Defense verdict.
    • Defense verdict in novel negligence/premises liability case. Defended a night club which had hired an off-duty state constable as a security guard who shot and killed a pedestrian who had just pulled a handgun and fired into a crowd of people on a busy city sidewalk. Two bystander plaintiffs alleged they were struck by bullets fired by the constable's weapon. Jury apparently agreed with our position that the decedent created a public hazard and that the constable's response was necessary and appropriate. We also argued that there was no proof that the bystanders were struck by bullets from the constable's weapon. We established that at least two other weapons were discharged during the situation and there were more bullets and bullet fragments present than could be accounted for by the known weapons. One bystander did not have the bullet removed from his body, and the bullet which struck the other bystander passed through her body and was not identified from those recovered at the scene.
    • Represented seller of home accused by plaintiff of failure to disclose numerous of prior incidents of water intrusion. Conceded a single incident of water intrusion, which occurred post execution of agreement of sale and which was thought to have been repaired. Asked the jury to find for the plaintiff in the amount of approximately $2,000 for repairs related to that incident. Jury returned verdict of $2,500 for plaintiff.
    • Represented plumbing contractor joined by home builder as an additional defendant in numerous construction defect cases commenced against builder by homeowners. Successfully raised "The Gist Of The Action Doctrine" as a complete bar to claims for contribution and indemnification by builders. Five claims dismissed on motions in Chester County Court of Common Pleas. Two more claims pending in Delaware County Court of Common Pleas.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.