.

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Updates from the Pennsylvania Department of Education

Legal Update for Special Education Law – June 2024

June 1, 2024

by Teresa O. Sirianni

Commonwealth Court voids Pennsylvania Department of Education’s newly imposed Age-Out Plan for failure to implement it in accordance with Pennsylvania Laws.*
PSBA, Inc., et al. v. Dr. Khalid N. Mumin, Secretary of Education of the Pa. Dept. of Ed., et al., 2024 WL 2195545 (Pa. Cmwlth. May 16, 2024)

On May 16, 2024, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court issued an en banc decision granting the petitioners’ Application for Summary Relief and denying the Pennsylvania Department of Education’s (PDE) cross Application for Summary Relief. In its petition, the petitioners asserted that the PDE illegally implemented a new regulation requiring Pennsylvania Local Educational Agencies (LEA) to provide a Free and Appropriate Education (FAPE) until a student’s 22nd birthday—rather than through the end of the school term in which the student reaches 21 years of age—otherwise known as the “Age-Out Plan.” More specifically, the petitioners—the Pennsylvania School Boards Association (PSBA) and three school districts across Pennsylvania—alleged the PDE did not follow the required rulemaking procedures to implement the new Age-Out Plan, which would have included public and timely notice prior to implementing the regulation. Without timely notice of the new Plan, the petitioners, including PSBA members, could not budget to account for the new, additional services to eligible students and, in turn, were required to educate students with unbudgeted funds. The lack of timely notice made the petitioners also ineligible for related funding. The Commonwealth Court sided with the PSBA and the school districts, finding that the New Age-Out Plan was a binding regulation with the effect of law, thus requiring the PDE to promulgate it in accordance with applicable Pennsylvania laws. Finding that the PDE did not do so, the Commonwealth Court ruled that the New Age-Out Plan was void ab initio and unenforceable.

The underlying facts giving rise to the cross petitions were largely stipulated by the parties. In July 2023, a student, through his parents, filed a class action complaint in the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania alleging that the PDE’s Age-Out Plan violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by prematurely cutting off special education services of 21-year-old students. On August 30, 2023, the PDE entered into a settlement agreement with the student and his parents to end the litigation. In the settlement agreement, PDE agreed, beginning with the 2023–2024 school year, to change its Age-Out Plan expiration from the end of the school year in which a child with disabilities turns age 21 to his/her 22nd birthday. 

The written settlement agreement specifically outlined the terms of the “New Age-Out Plan” providing that: 

  1. the PDE will rescind and cease implementing and enforcing the Age-Out Plan as it exists in its Model Policy at Section 300.101; 
  2. the PDE “has amended Section 300.101” to reflect that the IDEA requires Pennsylvania to provide a FAPE to children with disabilities until their 22nd birthday (New Age-Out Plan); 
  3. immediately upon execution of the settlement agreement, the PDE will implement, publish and enforce the New Age-Out Plan to be effective no later than September 5, 2023; and 
  4. the New Age-Out Plan will apply to all children with disabilities as defined in the U.S. Department of Education’s Regulations including those who turned 21 during or after the 2022–2023 school term. Further, the settlement agreement required the PDE, within 24 hours, to post online and to send a notice letter via several different means of communication to parents of children with disabilities who turned 21 during the 2022-2023 school year of their potential eligibility to re-enroll. 

On August 30, 2023, the PDE also, in accordance with the settlement agreement, immediately revised its Model Policy to reflect the new policy and otherwise followed the terms of the settlement agreement. Importantly, the court noted that the PDE never notified the LEAs before entering into the settlement agreement on August 30, 2023, or before revising its policy, both of which occurred after the LEAs had adopted their budgets and set their taxes on or before June 30 of each year.

The court rejected all of the PDE’s arguments in its cross petition, including that there was no actual controversy since the LEAs had yet to implement the new regulation, that the petitioners lacked standing, and that the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going directly to the Commonwealth Court. In its ruling in favor of the petitioners, the court noted that the petitioners were not challenging the IDEA and were not skirting any of its legal obligations to provide a FAPE to students with disabilities. Rather, the court noted that the petitioners merely sought to have the court declare whether the PDE could implement and enforce the New Age-Out Plan via the settlement agreement instead of complying with Pennsylvania laws that specifically require certain rulemaking procedures, including providing notice to the public of its proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for the public to comment, along with legislative scrutiny. Without such compliance and a “mere six days’ notice” to comply with the New Age-Out Plan, the PDE put the LEAs in the position of having to provide a FAPE to eligible students until their 22nd birthday with unbudgeted funds and to risk losing federal funding for a failure to comply. Accordingly, the court found that the petitioners had a substantial, direct, immediate interest and imminent harm relative to the implementation of the new regulation, thereby declaring the new regulation unenforceable. 

*The PDE has appealed the Commonwealth Court’s ruling invalidating the New Age-Out Plan to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. This appeal remains pending. The appeal effectively stays the Commonwealth Court’s decision pending the outcome in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which means that the New Age-Out Plan remains in full force and effect at this time. 


 

Legal Update for Special Education Law – June 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.