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Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Case Law Update

Legal Update for Special Education Law – October 2025

October 1, 2025

by Christopher J. Conrad

Federal Court Remands IDEA Case for Reconsideration of Compensatory Education

Mobley v. Laboratory Charter School, 2025 WL 2621303 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2025)

A federal district court found that a school denied a student a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under the IDEA but remanded the case for further consideration of compensatory education. While the Hearing Officer had ordered the school to fund independent evaluations, he denied the parent’s request for compensatory education. On appeal, the court ruled that the Hearing Officer erred in failing to consider the “hour-for-hour” remedy, even though it was not expressly requested, and directed him to either apply that approach or provide a detailed explanation for its rejection.

The plaintiff’s child, I.W.M., attended Laboratory Charter School for 3rd grade and the first half of his 4th grade year. He was diagnosed with autism, an emotional disturbance and other health impairments. Consequently, he was identified for special education and related services under the IDEA. The parent claimed that Lab Charter denied I.W.M. a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), contesting the results of two separate evaluations (including one by an outside provider) and alleging that the two IEPs developed for him were inadequate. 

The parent filed for due process, seeking compensatory education (premised upon a “make whole” theory), programmatic changes to the IEP, and a prospective educational placement in another educational setting at Lab Charter’s expense. 

At the hearing, Lab Charter presented witnesses who testified that I.W.M. was promptly identified as a student who required special services and that the IEPs developed for him as a result of the evaluations were appropriate and provided a FAPE. 

Following the hearing, the Due Process Hearing Officer found for the parent, in part, concluding that Lab Charter denied I.W.M. a FAPE. As a remedy, the Hearing Officer ordered Lab Charter to fund independent educational evaluations for I.W.M. However, he denied the parent’s request for compensatory education and a prospective placement. In particular, the Hearing Officer concluded the record was devoid of facts to justify either “make whole” or “hour-for-hour” relief; thus, the parent did not meet her burden to establish entitlement to compensatory education. 

The parent appealed to federal court, seeking to overturn the denial of her request for compensatory education as well as enforcement of the directive for Lab Charter to fund the evaluations. The parent and the school filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. 

On appeal, the federal district court denied Lab Charter’s motion in its entirety and granted the parent’s motion in part. The court agreed with the Hearing Officer’s finding that I.W.M. was denied a FAPE. The court also found, however, that the Hearing Officer erred in not considering the “hour-for-hour” approach to compensatory education, even though it was not specifically requested by the parent, noting: “It is not unusual for hearing officers to award ‘hour-by-hour’ compensatory education where the ‘make whole’ approach is not supported.” Mobley, 2025 WL 2621303 at *23. The court further reasoned: 

Here, the Hearing Officer has not discussed his reasons for denying ‘hour-for-hour’ compensatory education. He merely states that ‘[a]bsent facts supporting either theory, I now conclude that the Parent did not meet her burden of proof in establishing an entitlement to compensatory education relief.’ … This conclusory statement does not provide this reviewing Court with sufficient reasons why the ‘hour-for-hour’ theory of relief does not apply here.

Ibid.
    
As a result, the court remanded the case to the Hearing Officer to reconsider his conclusion to reject the “hour-for-hour” approach or to explain in more detail why this form of compensatory education was not an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. 

The court also ordered Lab Charter to pay for the evaluations as previously directed. 
     
The takeaway: Due Process Hearing Officers have broad discretion to award compensatory education if there is a finding of a denial of a FAPE. Even if the parent does not specifically request application of the “make whole” or “hour-for-hour” approach (or neither), because compensatory education is an equitable remedy, Hearing Officers may award compensatory education and apply either approach if the facts of the case warrant the relief. 


 

Legal Update for Special Education Law – October 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.