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Taylor A. Bourguignon

Portrait of Taylor A. Bourguignon

Taylor is a member of the Casualty Department where she represents clients in the matters involving construction injury litigation, automobile litigation, and trucking and transportation litigation. 

Taylor was born and raised on Long Island, before attending the University of South Carolina, where she graduated magna cum laude, with a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice and English. Thereafter, she attended Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law, graduating in 2023. 

While in law school, Taylor was an executive member of the Villanova Law Moot Court Board. Taylor was also part of the Civil Justice Clinic, where she provided legal services to low-income individuals involved in family, housing, and small claim disputes.  

Outside of work, Taylor enjoys staying active through hiking, working out, baking, and traveling.  

Taylor is admitted to practice in the state of New York. 


 

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 2023)
    • University of South Carolina (B.S., 2019)
    • New York, 2024
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2024

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Vetoed New York State Legislation Maintains Status Quo to Favor Out-Of-State Defendants: No Consent to Jurisdiction by Registration

March 1, 2024

Key Points:  Corporation that registers to do business in New York does not necessarily consent to general personal jurisdiction.  Proposed amendment to New York Business Corporation Law § 1301(e) would have overturned that law but was vetoed by the Governor. A recent New York Court of Appeals case held that a corporation registering to do business in New York State does not necessarily mean it consents to general personal jurisdiction in the state. A proposed amendment to New York Business Corporation Law § 1301(e) would have overturned that law. The Bill was vetoed by the Governor, who determined that the change would have overburdened New York courts and deterred foreign corporations from doing business in New York.  Developing case law in both New York state courts and the Supreme Court of the United States has created uncertainty regarding the scope of a court’s jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. The recent veto of a New York Bill, at least temporarily, provides clarity on New York State’s position and protects foreign corporations from being subjected to litigation based solely on their registration to do business in New York.  In general, a defendant can only be sued in a given location if the court has “personal jurisdiction” over that defendant. There are two types of personal jurisdiction: specific and general. First, specific personal jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arose in the state. Essentially, the defendant did something within the state which is the basis of the litigation against it. Second, general personal jurisdiction exists when the defendant does not specifically act within the state, but has sufficient “connections” with the state to be sued there. For a corporate defendant, those connections are generally the place of its incorporation and its principal place of business.  Historically, New York expanded the scope of general personal jurisdiction over a corporation to also include when the corporation is registered to do business with the Secretary of State and consented to service of process. Essentially, when a corporation became licensed to conduct business in New York, it automatically consented to general personal jurisdiction of New York courts. That standard changed in 2021 with the New York Court of Appeals decision Aybar v. Aybar, 37 N.Y.3d 274, 280, 282 (2021).  In Aybar, the court affirmed the appellate court’s decision in Aybar v. Aybar, 169 A.D.3d 137 (2d Dep’t 2019), which had held that an out-of-state corporation’s registration in New York does not necessarily mean it consents to the court’s personal jurisdiction. The court recognized that registering in New York does mean the corporation can be served with a lawsuit there; however, its registration does not per se mean it can be sued there for any cause of action, considering that the corporation may not even have a direct contact with New York State.  This issue was recently addressed in the Supreme Court of the United States in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway, 600 U.S. 122 (2023). The Supreme Court upheld consent by registration, holding that Norfolk Southern was subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania on the basis of being registered in the state. The Mallory case stirred uncertainty as to New York’s opposing views.  Adding to that uncertainty was New York State Senator Michael Gianaris’ proposed amendment to Business Corporation Law section 1301(e). Gianaris’ Bill 7476 would have changed Section 1301 to read:  (e) A foreign corporation’s application for authority to do business in this state, whenever filed, constitutes consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for all actions against such corporation. A surrender of such application shall constitute a withdrawal of consent to jurisdiction. Essentially, this change would have codified the Supreme Court’s Mallory holding into New York law and overruled the effect of Aybar. However, New York Governor Hochul was not ready to support such a change and vetoed Bill 7476 on December 22, 2023. In the memo discussing the Bill’s veto, the Governor stated:  I vetoed substantially similar legislation in 2021 due to the concerns that the proposal would represent a massive expansion of New York’s law governing general jurisdiction, likely deterring out-of-state companies from doing business in New York because it would require them to be subject to lawsuits in the State regardless of any connection to New York. This bill would cause uncertainty for those businesses and burden the judicial system. The Governor’s veto slows down New York’s adoption of the Mallory decision. For the time being, pursuant to the Aybar court’s 2021 decision, corporations are protected from automatically consenting to the general personal jurisdiction of New York courts simply based on registration to do business in the state. However, given the Mallory holding and recent attempts to incorporate consent by registration into the Business Corporation Law, the Aybar ruling may be on very thin ice. Corporations, and their attorneys, should keep a close eye on developments involving the scope of New York personal jurisdiction moving forward.  *Taylor is an associate in our New York City office. She can be reached at (212) 376-6426 or TABourguignon@mdwcg.com.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.