.

Sheri-Lynn C. Corey-Forte

Portrait of Sheri-Lynn C. Corey-Forte

Sheri Corey-Forte is a member of the firm’s Casualty Department where she focuses her practice on the areas of general, rideshare, and premise liability, as well as automobile liability. Prior to joining the firm, Sheri handled a wide variety of cases involving Admiralty and Maritime claims in state and federal courts throughout Florida, as well as employment, civil rights, discrimination, and commercial litigation on behalf of Florida governmental agencies.

As a South Florida native, Sheri began her legal pursuit in high school by attending a Pre-Law and Public Affairs magnet program. Sheri continued her pursuit by earning her Bachelor of Science in Legal Studies at Nova Southeastern University in Fort Lauderdale. Shortly after graduating, Sheri went on to earn her J.D. from Nova Southeastern University’s Shepard Broad Law Center. 

Outside of the office, Sheri enjoys spending time with her husband and their three daughters. Together they spend time traveling to new cities and countries and acquainting themselves with other cultures and traditions.  

Sheri is admitted to practice in the state of Florida and in the United States District Court for the Southern and Middle Districts of Florida.

    • Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law (J.D., 2014)
    • Nova Southeastern University (B.S., 2010)
    • Florida, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2017
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2017
    • CALI Award for Excellence in Civil Pre-Trial Practice
    • Broward County Bar Association
    • Federal Bar Association
    • Florida Bar Association
    • Florida Supreme Court Qualified Arbitrator

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On App: Good to Go! Off App: No Bueno! How Rideshare Companies Are Defeating Vicarious Liability in Florida

June 1, 2025

Key Points: Innovative technologies being utilized by rideshare companies are raising their chances of defeating vicarious liability claims in Florida and throughout the United States. In Campo v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2025 WL 15388, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals affirmed a motion for summary judgment in favor of Uber after the court was presented with evidence that the former Uber driver was “off app” at the time of the accident. Florida, along with many other jurisdictions throughout the country, has seen a dramatic uptick in the amount of litigation involving rideshare and food delivery companies, such as Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash. While the increasing number of rideshare and food delivery drivers on the roads has certainly contributed to the dramatic surge in litigation, plaintiff firms have also become increasingly daring in the nature of their allegations against these companies. However, the innovative technologies being utilized by these gig economy companies are raising their chances of defeating vicarious liability claims in Florida and throughout the United States. A recent Florida case demonstrates exactly this scenario.  In Campo v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2025 WL 15388 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 2, 2025), Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals affirmed a motion for summary judgment in favor of Uber after the court was presented with evidence that the former Uber driver was “off app” at the time of the accident. The plaintiff, as personal representative of the estate of Arlevys Molina, brought claims against Uber and Orlando Baez Castillo, a former Uber driver, in a wrongful death action after a tragic accident in Molina’s driveway. The plaintiff argued that Uber was vicariously liable for Castillo’s negligent acts as Castillo was acting within the course and scope of his purported employment with Uber at the time of the accident.  Uber moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Castillo was not logged in to the Uber application at the time of the accident and, in fact, had not logged on to the Uber application for nearly five months. In support of its summary judgment, Uber attached internal data records, amongst other things, showing that Castillo was not logged in to the application at the time of the accident nor had he logged in to the Uber application in months. Castillo also attested several times that he was logged out of the application and driving his personal car when the accident occurred.  After reviewing the evidence, the trial court granted summary judgment in Uber’s favor, finding that the record evidence demonstrated that Castillo was not logged in to the Uber application at the time of the accident. Thus, it held that Uber could not be held liable for conduct outside the scope of any alleged employment because “[w]hen a driver goes offline, it is analogous to a traditional worker ‘clocking out’ or being ‘off the clock.’”  The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Uber and argued that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether Castillo was logged in to the Uber application on the day of the accident. In support of her argument, the plaintiff argued that Castillo had two cell phones in his vehicle at the time of the accident and could have been using the Uber application on one of the two phones. The plaintiff, however, offered no evidence and nothing more than speculation for this assertion.  Despite being presented with this speculative argument, the appellate court ultimately agreed that the trial court had correctly considered all of the record evidence in the case and had correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Uber. The appellate court reiterated that all of the record evidence conclusively showed that Castillo was logged off of the Uber application for months and was driving his own vehicle at the time of the accident. As a result, Uber could not be held vicariously liable for Castillo’s negligent actions.  The Campo case demonstrates that obtaining and utilizing the innovative technology available to companies in the gig economy space can be vital to the effective and early resolution of these cases. In rideshare cases, do not forget to inquire as to whether the driver was “off app” at the time of the accident.  *Sheri-Lynn is a member of our Casualty Department and works in our Fort Lauderdale, FL office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Insurance Journal

Florida High Court Tapped Brakes on Dangerous Instrumentality Liability

December 26, 2023

Floridians concerned about liability when sharing their automobiles with children or friends can relax a bit after the Florida Supreme Court’s recent ruling on the state’s long-standing dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Its decision in Emerson v. Lambert, SC 2020-1311 (Fla. Nov. 16, 2023), once again limits the doctrine.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.