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Sheri-Lynn C. Corey-Forte

Portrait of Sheri-Lynn C. Corey-Forte

Sheri Corey-Forte is a member of the firm’s Casualty Department where she focuses her practice on the areas of general, rideshare, and premise liability, as well as automobile liability. Prior to joining the firm, Sheri handled a wide variety of cases involving Admiralty and Maritime claims in state and federal courts throughout Florida, as well as employment, civil rights, discrimination, and commercial litigation on behalf of Florida governmental agencies.

As a South Florida native, Sheri began her legal pursuit in high school by attending a Pre-Law and Public Affairs magnet program. Sheri continued her pursuit by earning her Bachelor of Science in Legal Studies at Nova Southeastern University in Fort Lauderdale. Shortly after graduating, Sheri went on to earn her J.D. from Nova Southeastern University’s Shepard Broad Law Center. 

Outside of the office, Sheri enjoys spending time with her husband and their three daughters. Together they spend time traveling to new cities and countries and acquainting themselves with other cultures and traditions.  

Sheri is admitted to practice in the state of Florida and in the United States District Court for the Southern and Middle Districts of Florida.

    • Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law (J.D., 2014)
    • Nova Southeastern University (B.S., 2010)
    • Florida, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2017
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2017
    • CALI Award for Excellence in Civil Pre-Trial Practice
    • Broward County Bar Association
    • Federal Bar Association
    • Florida Bar Association
    • Florida Supreme Court Qualified Arbitrator

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On App: Good to Go! Off App: No Bueno! How Rideshare Companies Are Defeating Vicarious Liability in Florida

June 1, 2025

Key Points: Innovative technologies being utilized by rideshare companies are raising their chances of defeating vicarious liability claims in Florida and throughout the United States. In Campo v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2025 WL 15388, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals affirmed a motion for summary judgment in favor of Uber after the court was presented with evidence that the former Uber driver was “off app” at the time of the accident. Florida, along with many other jurisdictions throughout the country, has seen a dramatic uptick in the amount of litigation involving rideshare and food delivery companies, such as Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash. While the increasing number of rideshare and food delivery drivers on the roads has certainly contributed to the dramatic surge in litigation, plaintiff firms have also become increasingly daring in the nature of their allegations against these companies. However, the innovative technologies being utilized by these gig economy companies are raising their chances of defeating vicarious liability claims in Florida and throughout the United States. A recent Florida case demonstrates exactly this scenario.  In Campo v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2025 WL 15388 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 2, 2025), Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals affirmed a motion for summary judgment in favor of Uber after the court was presented with evidence that the former Uber driver was “off app” at the time of the accident. The plaintiff, as personal representative of the estate of Arlevys Molina, brought claims against Uber and Orlando Baez Castillo, a former Uber driver, in a wrongful death action after a tragic accident in Molina’s driveway. The plaintiff argued that Uber was vicariously liable for Castillo’s negligent acts as Castillo was acting within the course and scope of his purported employment with Uber at the time of the accident.  Uber moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Castillo was not logged in to the Uber application at the time of the accident and, in fact, had not logged on to the Uber application for nearly five months. In support of its summary judgment, Uber attached internal data records, amongst other things, showing that Castillo was not logged in to the application at the time of the accident nor had he logged in to the Uber application in months. Castillo also attested several times that he was logged out of the application and driving his personal car when the accident occurred.  After reviewing the evidence, the trial court granted summary judgment in Uber’s favor, finding that the record evidence demonstrated that Castillo was not logged in to the Uber application at the time of the accident. Thus, it held that Uber could not be held liable for conduct outside the scope of any alleged employment because “[w]hen a driver goes offline, it is analogous to a traditional worker ‘clocking out’ or being ‘off the clock.’”  The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Uber and argued that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether Castillo was logged in to the Uber application on the day of the accident. In support of her argument, the plaintiff argued that Castillo had two cell phones in his vehicle at the time of the accident and could have been using the Uber application on one of the two phones. The plaintiff, however, offered no evidence and nothing more than speculation for this assertion.  Despite being presented with this speculative argument, the appellate court ultimately agreed that the trial court had correctly considered all of the record evidence in the case and had correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Uber. The appellate court reiterated that all of the record evidence conclusively showed that Castillo was logged off of the Uber application for months and was driving his own vehicle at the time of the accident. As a result, Uber could not be held vicariously liable for Castillo’s negligent actions.  The Campo case demonstrates that obtaining and utilizing the innovative technology available to companies in the gig economy space can be vital to the effective and early resolution of these cases. In rideshare cases, do not forget to inquire as to whether the driver was “off app” at the time of the accident.  *Sheri-Lynn is a member of our Casualty Department and works in our Fort Lauderdale, FL office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Insurance Journal

Florida High Court Tapped Brakes on Dangerous Instrumentality Liability

December 26, 2023

Floridians concerned about liability when sharing their automobiles with children or friends can relax a bit after the Florida Supreme Court’s recent ruling on the state’s long-standing dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Its decision in Emerson v. Lambert, SC 2020-1311 (Fla. Nov. 16, 2023), once again limits the doctrine.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.