.

Sharon M. O'Donnell

Portrait of Sharon M. O'Donnell

Sharon is a highly experienced professional liability attorney who defends private and public entities in a wide array of education law, employment law and civil rights litigation. Her clients range from self-insured corporations, to school districts and other private and public entities insured under errors & omissions, directors & officers, professional liability and employment liability practices insurance policies. 

Sharon has successfully defended some of the most high-profile school district litigation in the state of Pennsylvania. She defends school districts in due process matters brought under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act and related federal and state statutes where a free appropriate public education (FAPE) is typically disputed, or related educational services are challenged relating to both gifted and disabled students. She has defended clients before the Pennsylvania Department of Education and the Pennsylvania Special Education Office for Dispute Resolution. 

In the arena of employment law, Sharon defends claims alleging unlawful discrimination, wrongful termination and retaliation matters involving Title VII actions, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and other similar federal statutes. She has also defended lawsuits brought under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law. She is accustomed to defending employment law clients in actions brought before the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Office of Civil Rights.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1996)
    • King's College (B.A., magna cum laude, 1990)
    • Pennsylvania, 1997
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2005)
    • Harrisburg Style Magazine, December, 2015, "Select Lawyers," (peer rated) in Education and Employment Discrimination Law
    • American Bar Association
    • Dauphin County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Education Law and related statutory and legal updates to various school districts, insurance companies and professional associations, 2005-2015
    • Employment Law and related statutory and legal updates to various school districts, insurance companies and professional associations, 2005-2015
    • Pennsylvania Special Education Law Seminar, National Business Institute, December 2, 2011
    • Lawfully Managing Student Records Without Violating Privacy Rights, National Business Institute, June 6, 2013
    • Hot Topics in Employment Law, Cumberland County Society for Human Resource Managers, 2002
    • "U.S. Supreme Court Pulls the Plug on DOMA and Opens the Floodgates to Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2013
    • "A Judgment that Doesn't Bear Repeating," PBA Civil Litigation Section Newsletter, Civil Litigation Update, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2001
    • "Plaintiff Rues Preclusive Effect of Workers' Compensation Decision in Third Party Tort Action," Defense Digest, June Vol. 6, No. 3, 2000
    • "Pennsylvania Bar Claims for Sexual Assault Where Repressed Memory Delays Commencement of Suit," Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 4, Oct., 1998
    • "Repressed Memory of Sexual Assault Does Not Trigger Discovery Rule," Pittsburgh Legal Journal, Vol. 123, No. 223 Daily Ed., Nov. 25, 1997
    • The School I Deserve, by Jo Napolitano, 2021. Sharon was interviewed and quoted in this book regarding her representation of the subject matter school district.
    • Summary judgment on behalf of an art store chain in a racial discrimination suit over a caricature drawing of a Black woman and her infant son. She, her father and father’s girlfriend, all visitors of a major Pennsylvania theme park, sued the owner of a park kiosk for race discrimination, retaliation and interference under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, alleging that they were drawn with exaggerated and offensive features rooted in harmful racial stereotypes. They also alleged they were kicked out of the park. The kiosk owner argued that while the caricatures might have been poorly drawn, they were not drawn in any manner intended to be offensive, and while they were happy to see the angry father leave their kiosk, the family was not kicked out of the park. The Judge determined on summary judgment that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the plaintiffs on all three claims and dismissed the action.
    • Defense Verdict:  Alleged racial discrimination case brought by a former African American seventh grade mathematics teacher for a suburban Philadelphia school district, who, although tenured, was informed by his union president that he could be terminated after two unsatisfactory performance evaluations.  Having already received one, and with one likely on the way, he chose to resign.  Three months thereafter he read his own name in the local newspaper amongst various racial slurs that had been exchanged between the former superintendent of the school district and its athletic director. A jury found that his separation from his employment was not based upon his race.
    • Defense verdict in favor of public school, administrators and professional staff alleged to have violated civil rights of freedom of speech, written expression and religious expression of students by disciplining them, up to and including expulsion, for protesting a dress code policy.
    • Directed verdict in favor of a public school board sued by a former member, represented by ACLU attorneys, on a theory of a First Amendment violation of free speech, among other claims, which were voluntarily abandoned prior to trial.
    • Defense verdict by a federal jury in favor of a local college in an alleged unlawful retaliation claim where all alleged Title VII race discrimination claims were voluntarily abandoned on the eve of trial.
    • Defense verdict by a county jury in favor of a credit collection agency alleged to have unlawfully withheld salary and commission to a former executive.
    • Defense verdict on ten separate counts of alleged unlawful gender discrimination by a federal jury in a three-week trial.
    • Defense verdict by county jury in favor of a medical professional by a former patient who alleged negligence in performing bilateral reduction mammoaplasties.
    • Summary judgment in a professional negligence action brought against a psychologist alleged to have breached the standard of care when she dated and married the husband of a client within two years of providing the last client service.
    • Summary judgment on various claims, including 42 U.S.C. 1983, brought in a complex federal court action under the Americans with Disabilities Act against a county District Attorney and his professional staff in which exemplary and significant compensatory damages were sought, resulting in an overall satisfactory outcome.
    • Summary judgment for a defendant general practice physician who provided medical care to a prison inmate who alleged First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations against the facility and its medical staff.
    • Summary judgment on behalf of a defendant breast surgeon alleged to have breached the standard of care in performing and following bilateral TRAM flap reconstruction procedures following bilateral mastectomies.
    • Summary judgment for employer of supervisor-employee who sent text-message with racial epithets to subordinate of color in demonstrating that internal investigation and corrective measures were sufficient to eradicate perception of a racially hostile work environment.
    • Mediation resulting in a $250,000 settlement in a professional liability action against an architect alleged to have breached the standard of care where over $1 million in damages were sought for the repair and reconstruction of a commercial property.
    • Mediation resulting in a $50,000 settlement in an action against an acute care facility and anesthesiologist involving alleged wrongful termination of a nurse anesthetist whose wage loss claim alone was $250,000.
    • Mediation resulting in a settlement under six figures in an alleged race discrimination and unlawful retaliation claim brought by a former assistant superintendent of a school district in which the claimed damages, including attorneys fees, exceeded $1 million.

Results

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Employment Law

OSHA’s New Emergency Temporary Standard Suspended for Now

November 18, 2021

Key Dates: Effective Immediately and Until Further Notice Effective November 16, 2021, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration SUSPENDED its November 4, 2021, Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) that requires private employers with 100 employees or more to mandate COVID-19 vaccinations for employees or, alternatively, for those employees who are exempt, to require continued use of face coverings and the need to show weekly proof of a negative COVID test result.  OSHA’s ETS suspension arrived on the heels of several lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the ETS which are now being litigated across the country and will be consolidated for appeal before the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals and are likely making their way, ultimately, to the United States Supreme Court.  For now, at least, it appears that all previously announced deadlines for implementation of the ETS by private employers are suspended. Stay tuned for more updates as this fluid and evolving situation develops.   Legal Updates for Employment Law - November 18, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

Legal Updates for Employment Law

COVID-19 Update: New OSHA Regulatory Standard Mandating COVID-19 Vaccinations for Large Employers

November 11, 2021

Key Compliance Dates: December 6, 2021; January 4, 2022            In June of 2021, OSHA filed its plan and reasoning for a new temporary regulatory standard for large employers (i.e., those with 100 employees or more) for the purpose of enforcing the President’s policy of mandating COVID-19 vaccinations. On November 5, 2021, that new standard became effective. In a nutshell, the Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS), found at 29 C.F.R. §1910, Subpart U, is broken down into five subparts, addressing: Vaccination, Testing and Face Coverings (1910.501), Healthcare (1910.502), Mini Respiratory Protection (1910.504), Severability (1910.506), and Incorporation by Reference (1910.509). The section anticipated to have a ubiquitous reach is the first, relating to Vaccination, Testing and Face Coverings. Indeed, this section requires all employers subject to the ETS have in place a policy that: mandates vaccinations by either Pfizer, Moderna or Johnson & Johnson; exempts the mandate for approved reasons, including medical advice against it, sincerely held religious beliefs against it, or situations where it doesn’t apply at all—such as employees who do not come into contact with co-workers or customers, employees who work in an office space completely closed off from other office spaces, employees who work from home or employees who work outside; and requires that those employees exempt from the ETS wear face coverings at all times inside a building or in a car if on company business accompanying others. It further requires those employees to be tested for COVID-19 every seven days and turn those results into the employer, beginning on January 4, 2022. The ETS also requires employers to track and maintain data and documentation on each employee regarding their COVID vaccination status so that if OSHA must do an investigation based upon a complaint, that information is available for inspection. Importantly, this will require employers to collect and maintain (in a separate confidential medical file) each employee’s proof of vaccination and every COVID-19 test result for those employees who are exempt from the mandate. The ETS further protects “whistleblowers” and creates a standard for non-retaliation for anyone who makes a complaint to OSHA without regard to its merit. The ETS requires the employer to separate a non-compliant employee from the workplace unless and until the employee provides a current, negative COVID-19 test result. Significantly, there is no requirement for the employer to maintain a non-compliant employee on its payroll, nor is there a requirement for the employer to pay for the COVID tests that all exempt employees are required to take beginning in January 2022. While legal challenges to the ETS were fully expected and those lawsuits have already been filed, including one Court of Appeals staying the enforcement of the ETS until the challenge can be fully heard, employers should nonetheless put the necessary measures in place to comply with the ETS requirements now by creating all required policies, assuming that OSHA is successful in defeating the pending challenges. Failure to comply with this mandate could result in significant monetary penalties to employers if OSHA determines that an employer failed to have the required policy in place and also failed to enforce that policy with respect to all of its employees. For more information about how to implement and enforce this ETS in your organization, please contact RKODonnell@mdwcg.com, Chair, Employment Law Practice Group, Marshall Dennehey.   Legal Updates for Employment Law – November 11, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.