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Case Law Alerts

Supreme Court to Decide Pair of Mental Health Procedures Act Cases, Outlining the Contours of Claims Against Treatment Providers.

Matos v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., No. 192 MAL 2023; and Wunderly v. Saint Luke’s Hosp., 369 MAL 2023

October 1, 2024

by Shane Haselbarth

“One of the purposes of the Mental Health Procedures Act is to provide limited protection from civil and criminal liability to mental health personnel and their employers in rendering treatment in this unscientific and inexact field.” Farago v. Sacred Heart Gen. Hosp., 562 A.2d 300, 304 (Pa. 1989) (citing 50 P.S. § 7114). Every so often, a tragic incident breaks through the bulwark of Pennsylvania’s intermediate, error-correcting courts, calling out for resolution by the High Court. Matos and Wunderly are two such currently pending cases.

Matos v. Geisinger involves a situation in which an individual with a record of psychiatric issues submitted himself for voluntary inpatient examination at two treatment centers but was not accepted for treatment at either. He, shortly thereafter, murdered his girlfriend, whose estate now claims the treatment providers were grossly negligent under the MHPA. The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether evidence that treatment has been formally initiated (rather than just considered) is a condition for the exposure to liability under the MHPA for voluntary treatment as it has been ruled to be for involuntary treatment. See 314 A.3d 512 (Pa. 2023) (allocatur grant).

Wunderly v. St. Luke’s Hospital involves a situation of a residential patient who experienced pressure-related skin breakdown and deterioration of existing wounds. Following the patient’s death, the estate claims that medical negligence led to his demise. In defense, the treatment providers assert the patient was admitted to the facility for mental health treatment on an involuntary basis under Section 302 of the MHPA, and, therefore, the ancillary medical treatment given to this mental health patient brings any liability claim within the strictures of the MHPA. The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether the Superior Court erred in affirming the dismissal of the case or, instead, whether the MHPA does not apply to the case at all. See 310 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2023) (allocatur grant).

Mental health treatment is often its own reward, and something many of us might rather not have a role in. But the General Assembly has enshrined in law a strict and strong policy of “assuring the availability of adequate treatment to those who are mentally ill.” Leight v. University of Pittsburgh Physicians, 243 A.3d 126, 130 (Pa. 2020) (citing 50 P.S. § 7102). The Supreme Court is again called upon to guide the bench, bar, and emergency department on the contours of civil liability for treatment providers for those suffering from mental illness. Matos and Wunderly will help define the rights and responsibilities of all involved in this inexact and sometimes thankless field. These are definitely two cases to keep an eye on. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.