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Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Constitutionality of Sovereign Immunity–Based Damages Cap

Freilich v. Septa, No. 10 EAP 2024, review granted Mar. 11, 2024

April 1, 2024

by Shane Haselbarth

States, including the Commonwealth, enjoy immunity from suit and have since “before the ratification of the Constitution.” Goldman v. Septa, 57 A.3d 1154, 1172 (Pa. 2012) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999)). “Although the American people had rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 715–716 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890) (“The suability of a State, without its consent, was a thing unknown to the law. This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted”)). And so, for quite a long time, it has been understood that “[a] State, without its consent, cannot be sued by an individual; and a court cannot substitute its own discretion for that of executive officers in matters belonging to the proper jurisdiction of the latter.” Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1875).

Pennsylvania’s Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8521–8528, includes both a reassertion of that preexisting immunity, as well as a limited waiver on terms set by the statute. At issue in Freilich v. Septa is the $250,000 cap on damages codified in § 8528(b). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has agreed to answer the questions whether that limitation on recoverable damages violates either the remedies clause or the jury trial clause under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Pa. Const. Art. I, §§ 11 & 6, respectively.

This case has the potential to be a jurisprudential, to say nothing of an economic, earthquake. Repeatedly, Pennsylvania’s appellate courts have reaffirmed the constitutionality of the damages cap, including against similar challenges raised here. Thus, insurers and municipalities alike have allocated risk and fashioned their annual budgets with statutory damages caps baked into the calculus. But now the Supreme Court has granted review of the case, and its decision could potentially upend that important factor in fiscal considerations.

Briefing is expected to proceed throughout the summer, and the court to set the case for argument this fall or early next year. This is definitely a case to keep an eye on. Cf. Snead v. SPCA, 985 A.2d 909, 913 (Pa. 2009) (recognizing that the purpose of the damages cap is to protect government assets—in other words, taxpayer money—from “depletion through multiple lawsuits”) (quoting James J. Gory Mechanical Contracting v. Phila. Housing Auth., 855 A.2d 669, 677 (Pa. 2004)). 


Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.