.

Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Florida Appeals Court Rules Defendant’s Proposal for Settlement Was Neither Ambiguous nor Designed to Extinguish Separate, Future or Pending Claims

Infinity Auto Insurance Company v. Miami Open MRI, LLC, Fla. 3d DCA, No. 3D24-0945, June 4, 2025

June 1, 2025

by Seth B. Altman

In a continuation of protracted litigation between Infinity Auto Insurance Company and Miami Open MRI, LLC, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s denial of Infinity’s motion for attorney’s fees. The dispute centered on whether Infinity’s proposal for settlement (PFS), rejected by Miami Open, met the clarity and specificity required under Florida law to trigger a fee award under section 768.79. Although the trial court had found the PFS invalid, the appellate court disagreed, concluding that the proposal—when read in full—was sufficiently clear and unambiguous and did not improperly attempt to extinguish future or unrelated claims. The court remanded the matter with instructions to award Infinity its attorney’s fees.

Infinity Auto Insurance Company, the appellant, appealed the trial court’s denial of its motion for attorney’s fees. The motion, which was based on Miami Open MRI, LLC’s rejection of Infinity’s PFS, was filed after the Third District Court of Appeal’s earlier ruling in Infinity Auto Insurance Company v. Miami Open MRI (Infinity 1), 361 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). That ruling reversed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment for Miami Open and remanded the matter to the trial court, directing the trial court to grant summary judgment for Infinity and to conditionally grant Infinity’s motion for appellate fees, subject to a determination pursuant to section 768.79. The trial court, however, found the PFS to be invalid.

The question on this appeal was whether the PFS was “sufficiently clear and definite” so Miami Open could “fully consider the proposal” and whether the PFS extinguished any pending or future claims arising from this case (citing Allen v. Nunez, 258 So. 3d 1207, 1211 (Fla. 2018)). The provision at issue was paragraph 8 of Infinity’s PFS which read:

This proposal for settlement is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the Defendant. The Defendant accordingly reserves any and all rights and defenses it may have in this case and any and all other actions or lawsuits now or hereafter pending relating to the claim which forms the basis for this lawsuit, and payment would accordingly be made under such reservation of rights if this proposal is accepted. Instead, this proposal is being made in an effort to resolve the case and avoid future costs and fees.” (Emphasis added.)

Paragraph 4 of the proposal, which the District Court also discussed, clearly and unambiguously stated that the PFS was to resolve any and all claims “that were or could have been brought in this case (emphasis added) by Plaintiff”… “as set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint.”

Miami Open’s response to the motion for fees claimed that the PFS was invalid because it was defective. It claimed it “lacked the required particularity and specificity; fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 1.442 and Fla. Stat. 768.79; contains conflicting provisions; impermissibly seeks to extinguish related claims and causes of action; and is ambiguous and vastly overbroad.” Infinity replied that Miami Open was “nit-picking”; Paragraph 4 limited the PFS to “just this case” and paragraph 8, read in its entirety and in conjunction with the other provisions of the PFS, was a standard reservation of rights and clarified the PFS was not an admission of liability.

The court held that paragraph 8, when read as a whole, particularly in conjunction with paragraph 4, was not ambiguous nor required future claims to be extinguished. First, the court noted, and the parties agreed at trial level and on appeal, that paragraph 4 unambiguously released only the claims raised (or that could have been raised) in the underlying lawsuit. Second, the court held that a common sense reading of paragraph 8 provides that if Miami Open brought a claim in the future, the PFS would not extinguish any of Infinity’s rights or defenses. Paragraph 8 was a reservation of rights, not an extinguishment of future claims. Additionally, it was not ambiguous where there were no other pending cases between the parties. Read as a whole, the PFS sought to extinguish only Miami Open’s claims as set forth in the complaint, and Paragraph 8 was merely a reservation of rights. As such, the court reversed the denial of the motion for fees and remanded the case with instructions to grant Infinity’s motion for attorney’s fees. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – June 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.