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Seth is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he focuses his practice on representing and defending clients in insurance coverage, and first party property claims and suits made against them. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Seth served as in-house counsel for two separate insurance companies litigating first party property cases, and most recently, he also served as a member of the assignment of benefits and catastrophe (Hurricane) divisions. In addition to defending cases, Seth is also experienced in investigation, where he counseled and instructed his former claims departments in pre-suit matters.

In 2005 Seth received his juris doctor from Albany Law School, where he was an active participant in the Family Court Domestic Violence Clinic and Senior Prize Trials. After graduating from law school, Seth worked as an Assistant District Attorney in the Office of the Orange County, NY District Attorney for nearly a decade. During this time, Seth held positions in the Misdemeanor, General Crimes and Special Victims Units where he tried cases ranging from DWIs to Grand Larcenies to Sexual Assaults. 

Seth moved to Florida in 2015 where he began a new chapter in his legal career, working in the insurance industry, initially representing his insurance carrier employers in coverage disputes and first-party-property-related claims and suits.

    • Albany Law School (J.D., 2005)
    • University of Florida (B.S., 2000)
    • New York, 2006
    • Florida, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida
    • On a Hurricane Irma case, Seth obtained a favorable award in a Court-ordered non-binding arbitration where the arbitrator found Defendant insurer was not liable and awarded the Plaintiff $0 in damages. This helped Defendant obtain a favorable resolution before trial.
    • Seth successfully defended a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment brought by Plaintiff where Plaintiff tried to argue that the necessary cost of tearing out and replacing non-damaged property in order to access plumbing was outside of Defendant's $10,000 Limited Water Damage Coverage Endorsement and Plaintiff should be able to recover in excess of the $10,000 limit.  Defendant had tendered the policy limit prior to commencement of the lawsuit. The court ruled against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant finding that the cost of tear out and replacement was within the policy's endorsement and Defendant's total claim for damages was limited to $10,000. This ruling enabled Defendant to later obtain Summary Judgment against Plaintiff for having tendered the limits prior to commencement of action. Thus, Plaintiff had no cause of action for breach of contract.  
    • Defendant tendered payment for the full amount of invoices with the 90 day statutory period. Unbeknownst to Defendant, Plaintiff prematurely filed a lawsuit prior to Defendant's payment. Plaintiff tried to argue Defendant confessed judgment and Plaintiff's counsel was entitled to attorney's fees. Seth filed a Motion for Sanctions and Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff dismissed the case with prejudice prior to the hearings.

Results

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Summary Judgment Secured in a Contentious Coverage Matter

We were granted summary judgment in a coverage matter. The plaintiff was seeking UM benefits for a policy he had on a car he owned for an accident that occurred when he was operating a motorcycle he owned, but did not insure. The court confirmed that the policy excluded underinsured motorist coverage for the plaintiff’s motorcycle. The issue was that the definition of “motor vehicle” for the other owned motor vehicle exclusion was not specifically provided in the policy. In the PIP coverage, the policy contained an exclusion for motorcycles because the definition said motor vehicles must have four wheels. The plaintiff argued that the same policy said a motorcycle was not a motor vehicle for PIP coverage, but was a motor vehicle for the other owned vehicle exclusion. This was an ambiguity in the policy that should be interpreted against the carrier. The plaintiff had significant injuries that far exceeded the value of the policy. The court upheld both exclusions and followed our argument that the PIP and UM portions of the policy are separate and distinct and that any definition in the PIP coverage did not necessarily apply to the UM coverage. 

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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Third DCA Rules Insurer’s Nominal Settlement Made in Good Faith

October 5, 2026

Citizens Property Insurance Corporation appealed a Miami-Dade trial court’s order denying its motion for attorney’s fees. The motion was filed pursuant to Fla. Stat. 768.79 (2025). Maria and Christopher Suarez (collectively, “Suarez”) sued for breach of contract arising out of a Hurricane Irma claim which allegedly caused damage to their home. Citizens denied the allegations and raised several affirmative defenses including failure to provide prompt notice and failure to provide requested documents.  Citizens served a proposal for settlement (PFS) in the amount of $100 to each plaintiff. Suarez did not accept the proposal. Citizens later filed a motion for summary judgment which the court granted. After judgment was entered in its favor, Citizens filed its motion for entitlement to attorney’s fees. Suarez opposed the motion arguing the offer was not made in good faith. The trial court agreed with Suarez. On appeal, the Third DCA found “the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Citizens' nominal offer was made in bad faith when Suarez's failure to comply with the insurance policy was a reasonable basis for Citizens to offer a nominal settlement amount” Citizens v Suarez, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1687a (2026) (citing § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (2025)); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Lewis Tein P.L., 277 So. 3d 299, 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) "The obligation of good faith merely insists that the offeror have some reasonable foundation on which to base an offer." In its ruling, the DCA rejected the trial court’s reasons for finding a lack of good faith. The first reason the trial court gave was that Citizens did not request any discovery prior to filing its PFS. The DCA found this was irrelevant because the basis for the nominal amount (Suarez’s failure to comply with the policy) was apparent prior to filing suit. “The standard as to whether an offer is made in good faith is whether the insurance company has a reasonable basis for a nominal offer, at the time the offer is made. The focus of the analysis is the substance of the reason given for the nominal offer and not on the timing of the offer itself” (Citizens v Suarez, supra.). The second reason the trial court gave was that the public adjuster’s estimate demonstrated that Citizens had substantial exposure in the case and, therefore, the offer was made in bad faith. The DCA pointed to State Farm Florida Insurance Company v. Laughlin-Alfonso, 118 So. 3d 314, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), a case with analogous facts, in rejecting this rationale. There, the DCA did not afford any weight to the adjuster’s report. Instead, it found that the insured’s failure to comply was a reasonable basis for State Farm to believe its exposure was nominal. Based on the above, the Third DCA reversed the trial court’s order denying Citizens’ motion, finding it was made in good faith and remanded with instructions to grant the motion and set the amount of fees in favor of Citizens.

Daily Business Review

A Unified, Single Claim for Damages Requires Apportionment in a Joint Proposal: What the Decision in 'Trace Elements' Means for Property Insurance Claims

August 6, 2026

Kimberly and Seth, shareholders in the Insurance Services Practice in our Fort Lauderdale office, break down the Florida Supreme Court's decision in 'Trace Elements v. MacKensen' and what it means for property insurance claims in the state. Read the article here.

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Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case