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Case Law Alerts

Are websites “public accommodations” subject to the rigors of the ADA?

Juan Carlos Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.

July 1, 2021

by Holly M. Hamilton

The plaintiff, a long-time Winn-Dixie customer, is legally blind and uses screen reader software which vocalizes webpages and their contents for him. Winn-Dixie operates a website to advertise its products and services.

The Eleventh Circuit noted that Winn-Dixie only offers sales in its physical stores and not through its website. The plaintiff sued Winn-Dixie after his screen reader software was unable to access the Winn-Dixie website.

At first, Florida’s Southern District Court denied Winn-Dixie’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The lower court determined that websites are subject to the ADA if a plaintiff shows a sufficient “nexus” between the website and physical premises. Then, after a bench trial, the lower court ruled that Winn-Dixie’s website violated the ADA and imposed related injunctions to Winn-Dixie regarding its accessibility and employee training.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case back to the district court. The Eleventh Circuit considered whether websites are places of public accommodation under the ADA. Applying the plain language of the statute, the court found that “public accommodations” include certain lodging, restaurants, bars, theaters and grocery stores. Physical, tangible places only are listed in the statute. Websites and other intangible places are not listed in the statute and, thus, are not public accommodations subject to the ADA. Then, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the Winn-Dixie website, since it is not a place of public accommodation, otherwise violates the ADA as an “intangible barrier.” The court answered this question in the negative and reasoned that the visually impaired not being able to access the Winn-Dixie website does not create a barrier to accessing the goods, services, privileges or advantages of Winn-Dixie’s physical store.

 

Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.