.

Holly is a shareholder in the firm's Professional Liability Department where she focuses on Florida director & officer disputes in not-for-profit condominium and other community associations. These disputes include Fair Housing Act (FHA) claims, condo disputes under Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, and homeowners’ association disputes under Chapter 720. Holly has strong defense experience at every level including pre-suit and for actions filed before various governmental agencies, as well as in state and federal courts.

Holly's practice is also focused on a variety of employment disputes. Holly has defended multiple employment discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims at all levels including disability and racial discrimination claims before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

Further, Holly has also handled a variety of consumer financial services litigation and compliance matters. She has additionally been involved in a range of other civil litigation matters including breach of contract issues, commercial disputes and real estate actions.

Holly received her juris doctor from Hofstra University School of Law after majoring in Economics and English at Florida International University. She is admitted to practice law in the states of Florida, New York, and New Jersey, and enjoys reading all manner of fiction.

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Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

The Listing Agreement Controls in Real Estate Commission Dispute Between Broker and Seller

May 7, 2026

Carmona Realty Group, LLC, a licensed real estate broker, pursued a commission after procuring multiple offers at or above the listing price for a Miami property, but the seller repeatedly rejected or ignored those offers while attempting to increase the price outside the written listing agreement. The parties had executed an exclusive right of sale listing agreement setting the price at $499,500 and providing for a 5% commission. Although the seller later signed separate “instructions to agents” imposing additional requirements such as appraisal contingencies, inspection attachments, and deposit conditions, those instructions were never signed by the broker and were not referenced in the listing agreement. After at least seven offers were presented, including full-price or above-list offers, the seller declined to proceed, citing varying reasons including furniture inclusion, shutters, and financing terms, while also informally seeking a higher price. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the seller, holding that the “instructions to agents” were not incorporated into the listing agreement and could not be used to defeat the broker’s entitlement to a commission. Applying Florida contract principles and the statute of frauds, the court emphasized that modifications to a listing agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties, and that mere contemporaneous documents lacking mutual assent and cross-reference do not become part of the contract. The court further found that the broker satisfied its obligation by producing ready, willing, and able buyers on the agreed terms, and that the seller’s later-asserted justifications did not negate the broker’s right to compensation. This decision underscores the importance of real estate brokers and professionals ensuring that all material terms and conditions are clearly incorporated into the listing agreement itself, as well as documenting all communications when sellers reject conforming offers for reasons outside the contract.

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Florida Legislative Update: Proposed E&O Insurance Requirement for Home Inspectors

February 5, 2026

New Florida legislation, if enacted, would require licensed home inspectors to maintain errors and omissions (E&O) insurance as a condition of licensure. While Florida has long regulated the home inspection profession, the state has historically not required professional liability insurance for inspection errors or omissions. Florida home inspectors are regulated under Part XV (titled “Home Inspections”), of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes. Section 468.8322, Florida Statutes, currently requires licensed home inspectors to maintain commercial general liability insurance of at least $300,000, but it does not require home inspectors to carry E&O insurance. Without a statutory requirement, Florida home inspectors have had the ability to voluntarily acquire E&O insurance. According to a 1994 study conducted by the Florida House of Representatives, only 30% of responsive licensed home inspectors carried E&O insurance. When inspection disputes and litigation regarding home inspection errors arise, this often leads to other real estate professionals paying the price. As a result, buyer’s agents, listing agents, real estate companies, title agents/companies, and brokers often find themselves defending various claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, a failure to disclose material information, and related allegations that are premised on inspection issues. When an inspector lacks E&O insurance, plaintiffs’ counsels tend to view the inspector as a limited recovery source and, instead, pursue the insured real estate professionals, whose E&O policies provide a clearer path to recovery. Even where the professionals had no control over the inspection itself, they often incur substantial defense costs simply by being named in a lawsuit as a related. In practice, this dynamic often shifts inspection-related liability away from the inspecting professional and toward transaction participants with mandatory E&O coverage. Florida Senate Bill 360 (2026), titled “Home Inspectors,” has been introduced to the senate as of January 13, 2026, and is currently under committee consideration. Bill 360 provides an update to Section 468.8322, Florida Statutes, so that licensed home inspectors will be required to maintain both a commercial general liability policy and an E&O policy in the amount of $500,000 per policy. If enacted, it would take effect July 1, 2026. A statutory E&O requirement for home inspectors could materially alter the litigation landscape. With mandatory professional liability coverage, home inspectors would be more likely to be named as primary defendants in claims arising from inspection errors or omissions. Florida’s consideration of an E&O insurance mandate for home inspectors reflects growing attention to professional liability within residential real estate transactions. For real estate professionals, the proposal signals a potential rebalancing of inspection-related risk and underscores the importance of continued risk management practices, even as responsibility for inspection errors is more squarely aligned with the professionals who perform them. Legal Update for Real Estate E&O – February 2026, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact MEDeSatnick@mdwcg.com.

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Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

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The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

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Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.