.

Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

To Read or Not to Read (Insurance Policies)? That Is the Question

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – August 2024

The rule throughout the Commonwealth has long been that an insured’s failure to read the language of an insurance policy does not prohibit them from relying on the representations of an insurance agent in securing insurance. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court first made this finding in Rempel v. Nationwide Insurance Company, Inc., 471 Pa. 404 (1977), where the beneficiary under a mortgage protection life insurance policy alleged the agent of an insurer misrepresented the extent of coverage under the policy. There, the beneficiary/insured admittedly did not read the language of the policy, however, given the complicated nature of the insurance business as well as the trust that one generally has in their insurance agent, the court found it was not unreasonable for a consumer to rely on the representations of her agent. Thus, to an extent, the old adage, “never sign anything before you read it,” does not apply across the board in insurance context. 

Subsequently, in Pressley v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 817 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Super. 2003), the Superior Court further lessened the duty of the consumer by finding an insured was not required to read the policy where they had requested a specific type of coverage and were told by the agent that it would be provided. In such a situation, the duty is on the agent to inform the insured that the policy differs from what was requested if, in fact, that is the case. Where the agent fails to discharge that duty, an insured is under no duty to read the policy to uncover the misrepresentation. Thus, insureds are allowed to presume the coverage they have requested is in place, unless they are told otherwise. Conversely, in matters where an insured received precisely the coverage they requested, courts have consistently enforced the plain language of the exclusions and limitations, despite an agent’s failure to inform the insured of the same. 

The courts’ decisions in this context are all based on the “reasonable expectations of the insured.” In Pennsylvania, the traditional rules with respect to contracts do not always apply in the realm of insurance. Instead of the policy language being the guiding light, even where the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, the reasonable expectations of the insured are controlling. This “reasonable expectation” analysis is to be employed in matters where an insured alleges deceptive practices, whether it be the misrepresentation of the terms of the policy or the issuance of a policy different than that which was requested by the insured. 
    
More recently, however, the protections afforded by the “reasonable expectations” standard and the insured’s lack of a duty to investigate were somewhat eroded. In Palek v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 535 F. Supp. 3d 382 (W.D. Pa., April 4, 2021), the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent misled them regarding the kinds of damages to their in-ground swimming pool that were covered under their homeowners’ insurance policy. In fact, the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent specifically informed them the policy would “cover their in-ground pool in the event the [pool] was damaged from foreseeable types of harm.” After purchasing the policy, the homeowners’ pool suffered damage as a result of hydrostatic pressure, or a “pool pop.” 

In analyzing the homeowners’ claim for justifiable reliance, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania observed the decisions throughout the Commonwealth, noting consumers do not possess a duty to investigate and read the underlying policy where there are allegations of fraud against an insurer or its agent. The Palek court, however, pointed out that, where there are no allegations of fraud, the duty of an insured to read the language of the policy depends on whether it would be unreasonable not to read the policy under the circumstances. As applicable in Palek, the insurer’s agent represented the policy would cover the “foreseeable” damages to the homeowners’ in-ground pool. It was the presence of this vague representation, or qualifier, that triggered the homeowners’ duty to read the language of the policy. The court noted that:

It is objectively unreasonable for a consumer in [the homeowners’] position to rely, without further inquiry, on an unadorned representation that an insurance policy will provide coverage for ‘foreseeable’ types of harm from the simple reason that such a representation says nothing about what is or is not ‘foreseeable.’  

While consumers are provided latitude with respect to their duty to read the language of an insurance policy, that does not permit cart blanche to claim they justifiably relied on the representations of the insurance company or its agents. As Palek establishes, there is a “reasonable under the circumstances” analysis that must be undertaken by the courts on this issue. While insureds may not have a definitive duty to read the policy language, such a duty can arise depending upon the extent and specifics of any alleged representation by the insurer, or its agent, upon which the insured relied. 


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, August 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tgventura@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.