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Case Law Alerts

Ohio Supreme Court: City’s Refusal to Arbitrate Under Last-Chance Agreement Not an Unfair Labor Practice

Ohio Council 8, AFSCMA, AFL-CIO v. City of Lakewood, 2025-Ohio-2052

July 1, 2025

by Jillian L. Dinehart

An employee of the Department of Public Works was on a last-chance agreement when he committed another fault and was terminated. The union demanded arbitration, but the City refused per the terms of the last-chance agreement, which stated that, were the employee to engage in inappropriate workplace behavior, he would be subject to immediate termination without recourse to the grievance or arbitration provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement.

The Supreme Court of Ohio found that the City’s refusal to arbitrate a labor grievance was not an unfair labor practice and, therefore, the State Employment Relations Board did not have exclusive jurisdiction. When a complaint does not allege an unfair labor practice, then the Common Pleas Court may exercise jurisdiction. 

This holding reverses the Eighth District. The Eighth District had found that refusing arbitration substantively interfered with the employee’s collective-bargaining rights and, therefore, fell directly within the scope of the collective-bargaining rights created by R.C. 4117, and were under the exclusive jurisdiction of State Employment Relations Board. 

The Supreme Court of Ohio found that the right to arbitrate exists independently of R.C. 4117. In support, the court referred to R.C. 4117.10(A), which states that if the collective-bargaining agreement provides for a final and binding arbitration of grievances, the parties are subject solely to that grievance procedure. Although R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) requires collective-bargaining agreements to contain a grievance procedure, it does not require these agreements to contain an arbitration provision within the grievance procedure. Therefore, a mandatory arbitration provision is not solely enforceable by the State Employment Relation Board. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.