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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Fourth District Court upheld that, while the homeowners’ Proposal for Settlement was a joint proposal, there was no need for apportionment to comply with rule 1.442.

Nadja Mackensen and Wolfgang Mackensen v. Trace Elements, Inc., 49 Fla. L. Weekly D1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)

July 1, 2024

by Carolin A. Pacheco

On May 15, 2024, the Fourth District Court of Appeals rendered a decision regarding a prevailing homeowners’ request for attorney’s fees on ground that the Proposal for Settlement (PFS) was valid under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3). The court found that apportionment was not required because of the unified, single nature of the homeowners’ claim for damages.

Notably, the underlying litigation concerned a contract dispute between the homeowners and a professional design company. The homeowners ultimately filed a complaint against the company for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The company counterclaimed for breach of contract and tortious interference with a business relationship. In an effort to resolve the litigation, the homeowners served a PFS on the company, stating they were willing to accept $10,000 in full resolution of the lawsuit. The company rejected the PFS. Ultimately, the subsequent trial resulted in a verdict for the homeowners.

The defendants filed a motion to award attorney’s fees pursuant to rule 1.442(c)(3). The trial court denied their motion, concluding that their PFS constituted a joint proposal for settlement and required proper apportionment under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3).

The Fourth District Court recognized the precedent established Pratt v. Weiss, 161 So. 3d 1268, 1271 (Fla. 2015) and stated that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3) states: “[a] proposal may be made by or to any party or parties and by or to any combination of parties properly identified in the proposal. A joint proposal shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party.” However, in ruling for the homeowners, the Fourth District Court found that they are essentially a unified party with a single claim, and thus, there is no need for apportionment of this PFS. See Hall v. Lexington Ins. Co., 895 So. 2d 1161, 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (if two parties file “a unified, single insurance claim for damages,” apportionment is unnecessary).

The homeowners’ PFS explicitly identified the offerors as “‘Plaintiffs’ or ‘the homeowners’” and their willingness as party plaintiffs to accept damages in full settlement of their pending action. Therefore, the homeowners made a unified, single claim for damages. 



 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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