.

Carolin A. Pacheco

Portrait of Carolin A. Pacheco
As a member of the Professional Liability Department, Carolin Pacheco focuses a part of her practice on first-party insurance coverage claims, defending insurance carriers in a wide range of disputes. She also defends insurers in matters pertaining to coverage and bad faith claims, and assists them through pre-suit investigations and arbitrations.

Carolin also represents condominium association boards in directors and officers suits, as well as real estate agents, brokers and appraisers in errors and omissions claims. She also concentrates a portion of her practice, litigating FDCPA claims and suits brought by debtors, against the collection services assigned to recover the debt.

Before joining Marshall Dennehey, Carolin was an Assistant Public Defender with the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida in Orange and Osceola County. She focused her practice on criminal defense for indigent clients. During this time, she litigated various cases ranging from criminal traffic infractions to property damage and violent crimes from initial arrest to jury trial and sentencing.

Carolin graduated from the University of Central Florida in 2008 with a Bachelor of Arts in Legal Studies and earned her juris doctor from Stetson University College of Law in 2015.  While in law school, Carolin was a law clerk at a general civil litigation firm, where she worked on cases involving breach of contract, landlord-tenant law, and family law. She was also a law clerk for the U.S. Attorney's Office of the Middle District of Florida. Carolin had an active role in her law school's campus activities where she served as a Student Ambassador, she was the president of the Immigration Law Student Association and the secretary of the Hispanic Bar Student Association.

Outside her law practice, Carolin enjoys exploring Central Florida.

    • Stetson University College of Law (J.D., 2015)
    • University of Central Florida (B.S., 2008)
    • Florida, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2019
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2019
    • Spanish (Fluent)
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Insurance Law (2021-2026)
    • Orange County Bar Association
    • National Creditors Bar Association

Results

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Raise it or Waive it! In Order to Preserve Appeal, You Must Raise the Issues at the Trial Court Level

June 11, 2026

Homeowner's Choice Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Deborah Oakes No. 4D2024-1873, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D485a (Fla. 4th DCA March 18, 2026) The Fourth District Court of Appeals rendered an opinion finding that you must raise issues at the trial court level in order to preserve the issue for appeal, affirming the trial court’s final judgment. Through this opinion, the court provides an instructive examination of policy interpretation issues and further highlights the importance of preserving legal arguments at the trial level. Homeowners brought breach of contract action against property insurer Homeowners Choice in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, after the insurer denied coverage for damage to their house allegedly caused by an abrupt collapse. After trial of this breach of contract action, the court found, in reliance on holding by Fifth District Court of Appeals in Kings Ridge Community Ass'n v. Sagamore Insurance Co., that "additional collapse coverage" provided by policy could not be modified or qualified in any manner by other listed exclusions except those specifically contained within the "additional collapse" coverage provision. The magistrate issued a report and recommendation concluding that insured’s motion for partial summary judgment should be granted. The jury entered verdict in favor of insured and this appeal followed. On appeal, the insurer raised several issues concerning the interpretation of the insurance policy. However, the Fourth District Court found that the insurer's attorney failed to preserve these legal issues for appellate review during the trial proceedings. As noted within the opinion, one of the most common reasons behind a per curiam affirmance without written opinion is the appellant's failure to preserve issues for review. In this instance, the court was compelled to specifically address the preservation issue "to flesh out its requirements" as guidance for the bar. Namely, they examined the terms of the policy in detail specifically as to Section I, which contains four parts: (1) Property Coverages; (2) Perils Insured Against; (3) Exclusions; and (4) Conditions. The court paid special attention to the “Additional Coverages – Collapse” provision, as the policy expressly excludes collapse coverage except as provided in this section. The policy also includes endorsement that completely replaces the “Additional Coverages” section of the policy when a catastrophic ground cover collapse occurs. Ultimately, the court agreed with the  homeowner that the only exclusions that apply relative to the additional coverage for collapse are the exclusions that are expressly stated within the additional coverage provision, while insurer failed to provide a substantive argument against insured’s interpretation of the policy or against the applicability of Kings Ridge. In affirming  the trial court’s judgment, the Fourth District Court noted that even after having the opportunity to address the policy interpretation issues at a hearing on the insurer’s exceptions to the magistrate’s report before trial, the insurer failed to properly raise arguments against the homeowner’s policy interpretation and instead focused on issues of fact as to whether the collapse was abrupt. The insurer largely failed to refute the homeowner’s actual argument for partial summary judgment concerning the inapplicability of general exceptions or exclusions based on the policy language. The insurer made a different argument than the arguments it made to advance on appeal. On appeal, the insurer argued that the text and structure of the policy and “well-reasoned case law” demonstrate that the general exclusions apply to all coverages, including additional coverage. Further, the insurer argued that the reasoning in Kings Ridge was distinguishable. It is noteworthy that the insurer did not present the trial court with these arguments and thus failed to preserve the arguments for appellate review. The lesson the Fourth District Court seeks to provide in taking the time to write this opinion is that particularly when an insurer believes the policy language supports its coverage position, it must properly raise those arguments during trial or the risk waiver on appeal. Core legal arguments must be raised with clarity and specificity, and the court rejects that notion that vague comments can substitute for clear and specific legal objections.

Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Florida’s Fifth District Reaffirms Appellate Consensus on Assignment of Benefits Contract Requirements

March 1, 2026

The Kidwell Group LLC dba AQA aao John Fortner v Citizens Property, Case No. 5D2024-1843 (December 19, 2025) The Fifth District Court of Appeals rendered a decision further upholding the requirements set forth within Section 627.7152, Florida Statutes, finding valid an assignment of benefits, even though the insurance company argued that the assignment company’s purported paperwork was not detailed enough to satisfy the statutory requirements to render the contract valid and enforceable. The underlying action concerned an assignment of benefits that attached an invoice as its so-called “Itemized Per-Unit Cost Invoice" that consisted of assessment services to prepare an engineering report with a repair plan for an estimated $3,000. The assignment agreement stated that both parties acknowledged that the itemized per-unit cost estimate/invoice was legally binding. Citizens declined to pay and argued that the contract did not contain a written, itemized, per-unit cost estimate of the services the assignee had to perform. The Kidwell Group filed suit, claiming that Citizens breached its insurance agreement by failing to pay for the engineer report. Citizens ultimately moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the assignment agreement was invalid because it failed to comply with section 627.7152(2)(a)4. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice after a re-hearing. The court opined that the plaintiff’s assignment agreement and the incorporated invoice plainly comport with the dictates of section 627.7152(2)(a)4 – an engineer report with repair plan. In reaching its decision, the Fifth District noted that the trial judge who dismissed the case failed to follow the Fourth District's SafePoint decision, even though that ruling was binding precedent. Specifically citing to prior decisions from the Third and Fourth districts (In Kidwell Group, LLC v. SafePoint Insurance Co., 376 So. 3d 48, 51–52 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)), where the Fourth District determined that identical language within The Kidwell Group’s assignment agreement and incorporated invoice was “sufficiently detailed” to comply with section 627.7152(2)(a). As it happens, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts are in agreement as to how to interpret section 627.7152(2)(a) as it pertains to similar engineering reports assignment agreements.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.