.

Defense Digest

Caution: The Potential Quagmire of Unwanted Arbitration Clauses Are Often Buried in the Details

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023

December 1, 2023

Key Points:

  • Consider including third parties or remote parties to a complaint.
  • Arbitration clauses can appear in various contracts, including product warranties.
  • The potential dangers of agency relationships in construction.

Most parties follow a simple rule—if you don’t want to arbitrate, don’t agree to an arbitration provision as the means to resolve your dispute. More and more, arbitration provisions for dispute resolution are avoided as arbitration has become both costly and lengthy—the opposite of what had been intended. However, there are times and instances when you may not have a choice about arbitration because the choice has already been made. This is especially true in the context of construction. In construction matters, there are often complicated relationships between parties—owners, contractors, and subcontractors, materialmen, etc.—which establish duties and responsibilities that flow up and down the chain. 

One example that is often ignored or overlooked is an arbitration provision in a warranty from a manufacturer of a product. If you are procuring the product to incorporate into your project, you may be agreeing to the terms of an express warranty. Manufacturers do not typically negotiate their product warranties on a case-by-case basis, and arbitration provisions in a warranty or contract with other parties may attach without warning. 

One such instance was the recent case of SICIS North America, Inc. v. Sadie’s Hideaway, LLC, 368 So.3d 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), where a property owner elected to sue a tile manufacturer, SICIS North America, and the general contractor, Galvas Construction, Inc. The owner alleged that the exterior tiles installed at its project were defective. The tiles were procured from SICIS by Galvas for the owner. The owner sued Galvas under various theories and sued SICIS for breaches of warranty and negligence. Galvas, in turn, asserted a cross-claim for indemnification against SICIS. 

This scenario represents a typical construction litigation case that we might all find ourselves involved with. However, in Sadie’s Hideaway, since there was an arbitration provision in the warranty documents and Galvas’ indemnification claim arose from that transaction, SICIS moved to compel the owner’s claim and Galvas’ cross-claim to arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court set forth the proper analysis relating to a motion to compel arbitration: “[T]he three elements for courts to consider in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration are: (1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitrate was waived,” citing CEFCO v. Odom, 278 So.3d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

The appellate court ultimately reversed and stated:

First, because [the owner] was suing [SICIS] based upon the written warranty, it was bound by the arbitration provision contained in [Galvas’] agreement with [SICIS]. As the Florida Supreme Court has explained, ‘[W]hen a plaintiff sues under a contract to which the plaintiff is not a party . . . we will ordinarily enforce an arbitration clause contained in that contract, absent some other valid defense. ...’ [The owner] had no valid defense against arbitration, a fact which it apparently realized when it voluntarily dismissed its express warranty claim after the notice of appeal and initial brief were filed.

Second, the trial court erred in not compelling arbitration based upon the agency relationship that existed between [the owner] and [Galvas]. The essential elements of an actual agency relationship are: (1) acknowledgement by the principal that the agent will act for him; (2) the agent’s acceptance of the undertaking; and (3) control by the principal over the actions of the agent. 

SICIS North America, 368 So.3d at 1055 (internal citations omitted).

The appellate court further held that the evidence established that the owner authorized Galvas to act as its agent when purchasing the tiles from SICIS. Because Galvas’ purchase of the tiles was within the scope of work that the owner hired it to do, it was unnecessary for the owner to expressly authorize Galvas to enter into the arbitration agreement with SICIS. As such, the court held that the owner is bound by the agreement between SICIS and Galvas by virtue of the owner’s agency relationship with Galvas.

Ultimately, the owner did not need to sue SICIS. It could have just sued Galvas for the alleged defective tiles. Suing SICIS in this case was the owner’s choice, and in doing so, it complicated its claims between itself, Galvas, and SICIS, such that the arbitration clause in the warranty was ultimately held to apply to some of the owner’s claims—an arbitration provision the owner never agreed to. As a result, the owner and Galvas are tasked with arbitrating claims against a manufacturer under a warranty. 

The lesson is that, prior to bringing suit or a counterclaim or cross-claim, you should thoroughly evaluate the claims asserted, especially those against distant or removed parties. In doing so, you will not unwillingly stroll into an arbitration quagmire.


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.