.

Patricia A. Monahan

Portrait of Patricia A. Monahan

Patricia concentrates her practice on insurance coverage, bad faith disputes and special insurance investigations. She regularly provides guidance to national and global insurance carriers concerning coverage issues and litigates coverage and bad faith claims brought against them.

Patricia routinely provides counsel and defense of issues arising from commercial, personal, specialty property and casualty policies, professional liability policies, health/life policies and workers' compensation policies. She has tried a wide range of bad faith lawsuits in both state and federal court and has substantial experience handling complex discovery issues presented in bad faith lawsuits. Patricia also focuses her practice on the investigation, defense and affirmative prosecution of fraudulent claims. She has extensive experience with cases involving medical provider fraud, claimant fraud, insurance claim inflation, staged accidents, application/rate evasion fraud, workers' compensation fraud and automobile thefts.

While a large portion of Patricia’s practice is focused on insurance coverage, special insurance investigations and bad faith disputes, she also is experienced in employment law defending public entities and private employers from discrimination and retaliation claims, state whistleblower suits, and employment claims filed under Section 1983, such as those arising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. She also has represented employers before the National Labor Relations Board, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the EEOC, various county courts of common pleas, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and the United States District Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 

Further, Patricia's experience also includes the defense of claims for intentional torts, civil rights violations, and any claim that may fall under a public entity's errors and omissions policy, employment policy, or general liability policy. She has tried numerous civil rights cases to verdict, including claims arising out of police pursuits, false arrests, excessive use of force, denial of due process, and zoning matters.

In 1986, Patricia received a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from the University of Florida, and in 1990, she achieved her juris doctor from the University of Pittsburgh. Throughout her legal career, Patricia has been an active trial lawyer and was elected as a shareholder with Marshall Dennehey in 1999. Her past experience also includes service in the role of solicitor to local municipalities. Patricia is a frequent speaker on employment and insurance coverage topics and has authored several articles for the firm's Defense Digest. She has received an AV® Preeminent™ rating by Martindale-Hubbell.

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 1990)
    • University of Florida (B.S., 1986)
    • Pennsylvania, 1990
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 1999
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Best Lawyers in America©, Insurance Law (2024-2026)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Litigation - Insurance (2026)
    • Allegheny Bar Association
    • American Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Defense Litigation: Key Concepts and Current Developments, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, March 2026
    • Defense Perspectives: Bodily Injury and Bad Faith Claims, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, April 2025
    • Handling UM/UIM Cases in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, May, 2021
    • Employment Liability in the Cyber Age, Marshall Dennehey / AIG Employment Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, May 2, 2013
    • Speaker on various topics including employment claims, civil rights litigation, federal practice and insurance bad faith
    • "Pa. Supreme Court Evaluates Constitutional Parameters of a Jury's Punitive Damage Award,"Pennsylvania Law Weekly, October 3, 2023
    • “I’ve Been Served With a Writ of Summons. Now What?,” Defense Digest, December 2018, Vol. 24, No. 4
    • "Defending Claims While Working Within the Tripartite Relationship,"The Legal Intelligencer, Insurance Law Supplement, August 30, 2016
    • "When is an Accident Not an Accident?" Life, Health & Disability, the newsletter of the DRI's Life, Health & Disability Committee, November 21, 2014
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Is the First State Appellate Court To Address the Unfair Insurance Practices Act Protection for Victims of Abuse," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2013
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Panel Has Found That an Insured's Conduct Is Not Subject to Scrutiny in a Subsequent Bad Faith Law Suit," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 2011
    • "Are Damages For Emotional Distress Recoverable In a Pennsylvania Bad Faith Lawsuit Even Though the Bad Faith Statute Does Not Provide For Such Damages?," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2010
    • "Top Court Limits The Scope of a Public Employee's First Amendment Retaliation Claim," Defense Digest, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 2006
    • "The First Amendment's Rising Popularity in Municipal Employment Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2004
    • "Is Every Worker With a Physical Impairment Afforded Protection Under the ADA?," Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002­
    • "The Anatomy of a Civil Rights Malicious Prosecution Claim," Co-Author, Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Limits Employment At-Will," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999
    • Summary judgment granted for insurer in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith where the homeowner made a claim for vandalism when his tenant did not finish renovating the leased premises.  The Court held that the damages were not "sudden and accidental" and that the policy exclusions for faulty workmanship and renovations were applicable as a matter of law.
    • Defense verdict against an insurance carrier for breach of contract for denying a property loss claim and also obtained a $30,000 judgment against the plaintiff under the Pennsylvania insurance fraud statute for submitting a fraudulent claim.
    • Defense verdict for a major insurance carrier in a state court statutory bad faith lawsuit.
    • Defense verdict for a Pennsylvania municipality against several police officers' claims for first amendment violations and age discrimination.
    • •Summary judgment obtained for a school district in an age discrimination and first amendment retaliation claim.
    • Defense verdict for a Pennsylvania county against a former employee's claim that she was subjected to race discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation.
    • Summary judgment secured for employer law firm against a part-time attorney's claim that she was discriminated against, subjected to hostile work environment, and retaliated against based on her status as a working mother.
    • Defense verdict for insurance carrier in a bad faith trial arising out of the carrier's coverage position taken on an automobile stacking issue.
    • Successfully defended insurance broker in a claim for alleged negligence in failing to cancel a policy binder.
    • Defense verdict for municipal employer against a former employee's claim that he was terminated in violation of the state whistleblower law.
    • Defense verdict for municipality whose snowplow hit an oncoming vehicle head-on against claim for personal injuries of vehicle occupant.
    • Summary judgment secured for municipal employer against first amendment claims of several police officers claiming to have been defamed and subjected to a retaliatory investigation.
    • Summary judgment secured for Pennsylvania school district against former school board secretary's claim that she was terminated in violation of her first amendment rights and state whistleblower law.
    • Summary judgment secured for publicly traded company against former employee's claim that the company unevenly applied sales quotas to older workers, resulting in dismissal of the employee
    • Creasy v. Slippery Rock Area School District, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80523
    • Whitesell v. Dobson Communications, 102 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA), aff'd 2009 LEXIS 25791 (U.S. App.)
    • Diede v. City of McKeesport, 654 F. Supp. 2d 363 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
    • Moore v. Darlington Township, 690 F. Supp. 2d 378 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
    • Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780 (1995)
    • Heller v. Fulare, 454 F. 3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006)
    • Keefer v. Durkos, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 68519 Loughren v. USAA, 909 A.2d 896 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    • Loughren v. USAA, 909 A.2d 896 (Pa. Super. 2006)

Results

Successful Appeal of Summary Judgment in Favor of Insurer

We successfully appealed a summary judgment in favor of an insurance client that had been sued by another insurance carrier for more than $1.6 million in damages arising out of a fire loss to an insured auto repair facility. The opposing insurance company had paid $1.6 million in damages and intended to pursue a product liability claim against a vehicle manufacturer, alleging a defectively manufactured vehicle had caused the fire. Our client insured the vehicle that was allegedly defective. After the insurance companies conducted a preliminary expert evaluation, the vehicle was destroyed by a salvage yard in the normal course of business. A claim was made against our client for promissory estoppel where it was alleged the vehicle was destroyed despite a promise to preserve. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County’s rejection of the claims against our client and agreed with our contention that the promissory estoppel claim was a disguised claim for negligent spoliation, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not recognize. 

School District Prevails in Busing Dispute

We successfully defended a public school district that had been sued in federal court for not providing busing to charter schools within its district. The charter schools sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent the district from prioritizing busing to students attending traditional schools over those attending charter schools. The court agreed that the district was fairly maximizing its bus driver resources to service the most students possible.

Thought Leadership

Pa. Supreme Court Evaluates Constitutional Parameters of a Jury’s Punitive Damage Award

September 28, 2023

While it is well known that an insured has a clear and convincing standard of proving bad faith in order to recover such damages, it is lesser recognized that an insured does not have to prove outrageous conduct or evil motive to prove entitlement to punitive damages.

Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses Stacking Waivers in Single Vehicle Policies

January 17, 2023

In Erie Ins. Exchange v. Backmeier, __A.3d__, 2022 Pa. Super. 221, the Pennsylvania Superior Court applied Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent to determine that an insured’s waiver of stacking, executed on two single vehicle policies when issued, precluded inter-policy stacking of underinsured motorist benefits at the second priority level. Additionally, the court enforced the policies’ limit of protection to the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy. Andrew Backmeier was tragically struck and killed by an underinsured motorist while riding his bicycle. His mother sought underinsured coverage pursuant to her two Erie policies that provided limits of $100,000 per person, unstacked. Both policies provided coverage at the second priority level under the MVFRL because they covered vehicles not involved in the accident. Erie filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Backmeier’s Estate’s recovery was limited to $100,000, as the Estate sought $200,000 and claimed that inter-policy stacking had not been waived on the two policies that covered only single vehicles. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for Erie. It applied existing precedent to conclude that the stacking waivers were valid since they were executed at the inception of the single vehicle policies, and no meaning other than waiver of inter-policy stacking could be ascribed to the waivers. Moreover, the limit of protection clause was not violative of the MVFRL because it limited recovery at the same level based upon a knowing waiver of stacking.    The material in Legal Updates for Insurance Services, January 17, 2023, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.