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Patricia A. Monahan

Portrait of Patricia A. Monahan

Patricia concentrates her practice on insurance coverage, bad faith disputes and special insurance investigations. She regularly provides guidance to national and global insurance carriers concerning coverage issues and litigates coverage and bad faith claims brought against them.

Patricia routinely provides counsel and defense of issues arising from commercial, personal, specialty property and casualty policies, professional liability policies, health/life policies and workers' compensation policies. She has tried a wide range of bad faith lawsuits in both state and federal court and has substantial experience handling complex discovery issues presented in bad faith lawsuits. Patricia also focuses her practice on the investigation, defense and affirmative prosecution of fraudulent claims. She has extensive experience with cases involving medical provider fraud, claimant fraud, insurance claim inflation, staged accidents, application/rate evasion fraud, workers' compensation fraud and automobile thefts.

While a large portion of Patricia’s practice is focused on insurance coverage, special insurance investigations and bad faith disputes, she also is experienced in employment law defending public entities and private employers from discrimination and retaliation claims, state whistleblower suits, and employment claims filed under Section 1983, such as those arising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. She also has represented employers before the National Labor Relations Board, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the EEOC, various county courts of common pleas, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and the United States District Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 

Further, Patricia's experience also includes the defense of claims for intentional torts, civil rights violations, and any claim that may fall under a public entity's errors and omissions policy, employment policy, or general liability policy. She has tried numerous civil rights cases to verdict, including claims arising out of police pursuits, false arrests, excessive use of force, denial of due process, and zoning matters.

In 1986, Patricia received a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from the University of Florida, and in 1990, she achieved her juris doctor from the University of Pittsburgh. Throughout her legal career, Patricia has been an active trial lawyer and was elected as a shareholder with Marshall Dennehey in 1999. Her past experience also includes service in the role of solicitor to local municipalities. Patricia is a frequent speaker on employment and insurance coverage topics and has authored several articles for the firm's Defense Digest. She has received an AV® Preeminent™ rating by Martindale-Hubbell.

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 1990)
    • University of Florida (B.S., 1986)
    • Pennsylvania, 1990
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 1990
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2020
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1994
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Best Lawyers in America©, Insurance Law (2024-2027)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Litigation - Insurance (2026-2027)
    • Allegheny Bar Association
    • American Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Defense Litigation: Key Concepts and Current Developments, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, March 2026
    • Defense Perspectives: Bodily Injury and Bad Faith Claims, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, April 2025
    • Handling UM/UIM Cases in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, May, 2021
    • Employment Liability in the Cyber Age, Marshall Dennehey / AIG Employment Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, May 2, 2013
    • Speaker on various topics including employment claims, civil rights litigation, federal practice and insurance bad faith
    • "Pa. Supreme Court Evaluates Constitutional Parameters of a Jury's Punitive Damage Award,"Pennsylvania Law Weekly, October 3, 2023
    • “I’ve Been Served With a Writ of Summons. Now What?,” Defense Digest, December 2018, Vol. 24, No. 4
    • "Defending Claims While Working Within the Tripartite Relationship,"The Legal Intelligencer, Insurance Law Supplement, August 30, 2016
    • "When is an Accident Not an Accident?" Life, Health & Disability, the newsletter of the DRI's Life, Health & Disability Committee, November 21, 2014
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Is the First State Appellate Court To Address the Unfair Insurance Practices Act Protection for Victims of Abuse," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2013
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Panel Has Found That an Insured's Conduct Is Not Subject to Scrutiny in a Subsequent Bad Faith Law Suit," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 2011
    • "Are Damages For Emotional Distress Recoverable In a Pennsylvania Bad Faith Lawsuit Even Though the Bad Faith Statute Does Not Provide For Such Damages?," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2010
    • "Top Court Limits The Scope of a Public Employee's First Amendment Retaliation Claim," Defense Digest, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 2006
    • "The First Amendment's Rising Popularity in Municipal Employment Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2004
    • "Is Every Worker With a Physical Impairment Afforded Protection Under the ADA?," Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002­
    • "The Anatomy of a Civil Rights Malicious Prosecution Claim," Co-Author, Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Limits Employment At-Will," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999
    • Summary judgment granted for insurer in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith where the homeowner made a claim for vandalism when his tenant did not finish renovating the leased premises.  The Court held that the damages were not "sudden and accidental" and that the policy exclusions for faulty workmanship and renovations were applicable as a matter of law.
    • Defense verdict against an insurance carrier for breach of contract for denying a property loss claim and also obtained a $30,000 judgment against the plaintiff under the Pennsylvania insurance fraud statute for submitting a fraudulent claim.
    • Defense verdict for a major insurance carrier in a state court statutory bad faith lawsuit.
    • Defense verdict for a Pennsylvania municipality against several police officers' claims for first amendment violations and age discrimination.
    • •Summary judgment obtained for a school district in an age discrimination and first amendment retaliation claim.
    • Defense verdict for a Pennsylvania county against a former employee's claim that she was subjected to race discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation.
    • Summary judgment secured for employer law firm against a part-time attorney's claim that she was discriminated against, subjected to hostile work environment, and retaliated against based on her status as a working mother.
    • Defense verdict for insurance carrier in a bad faith trial arising out of the carrier's coverage position taken on an automobile stacking issue.
    • Successfully defended insurance broker in a claim for alleged negligence in failing to cancel a policy binder.
    • Defense verdict for municipal employer against a former employee's claim that he was terminated in violation of the state whistleblower law.
    • Defense verdict for municipality whose snowplow hit an oncoming vehicle head-on against claim for personal injuries of vehicle occupant.
    • Summary judgment secured for municipal employer against first amendment claims of several police officers claiming to have been defamed and subjected to a retaliatory investigation.
    • Summary judgment secured for Pennsylvania school district against former school board secretary's claim that she was terminated in violation of her first amendment rights and state whistleblower law.
    • Summary judgment secured for publicly traded company against former employee's claim that the company unevenly applied sales quotas to older workers, resulting in dismissal of the employee
    • Creasy v. Slippery Rock Area School District, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80523
    • Whitesell v. Dobson Communications, 102 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA), aff'd 2009 LEXIS 25791 (U.S. App.)
    • Diede v. City of McKeesport, 654 F. Supp. 2d 363 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
    • Moore v. Darlington Township, 690 F. Supp. 2d 378 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
    • Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780 (1995)
    • Heller v. Fulare, 454 F. 3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006)
    • Keefer v. Durkos, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 68519 Loughren v. USAA, 909 A.2d 896 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    • Loughren v. USAA, 909 A.2d 896 (Pa. Super. 2006)

Results

Successful Appeal of Summary Judgment in Favor of Insurer

We successfully appealed a summary judgment in favor of an insurance client that had been sued by another insurance carrier for more than $1.6 million in damages arising out of a fire loss to an insured auto repair facility. The opposing insurance company had paid $1.6 million in damages and intended to pursue a product liability claim against a vehicle manufacturer, alleging a defectively manufactured vehicle had caused the fire. Our client insured the vehicle that was allegedly defective. After the insurance companies conducted a preliminary expert evaluation, the vehicle was destroyed by a salvage yard in the normal course of business. A claim was made against our client for promissory estoppel where it was alleged the vehicle was destroyed despite a promise to preserve. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County’s rejection of the claims against our client and agreed with our contention that the promissory estoppel claim was a disguised claim for negligent spoliation, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not recognize. 

School District Prevails in Busing Dispute

We successfully defended a public school district that had been sued in federal court for not providing busing to charter schools within its district. The charter schools sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent the district from prioritizing busing to students attending traditional schools over those attending charter schools. The court agreed that the district was fairly maximizing its bus driver resources to service the most students possible.

Thought Leadership

Pa. Supreme Court Evaluates Constitutional Parameters of a Jury’s Punitive Damage Award

September 28, 2023

While it is well known that an insured has a clear and convincing standard of proving bad faith in order to recover such damages, it is lesser recognized that an insured does not have to prove outrageous conduct or evil motive to prove entitlement to punitive damages.

Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses Stacking Waivers in Single Vehicle Policies

January 17, 2023

In Erie Ins. Exchange v. Backmeier, __A.3d__, 2022 Pa. Super. 221, the Pennsylvania Superior Court applied Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent to determine that an insured’s waiver of stacking, executed on two single vehicle policies when issued, precluded inter-policy stacking of underinsured motorist benefits at the second priority level. Additionally, the court enforced the policies’ limit of protection to the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy. Andrew Backmeier was tragically struck and killed by an underinsured motorist while riding his bicycle. His mother sought underinsured coverage pursuant to her two Erie policies that provided limits of $100,000 per person, unstacked. Both policies provided coverage at the second priority level under the MVFRL because they covered vehicles not involved in the accident. Erie filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Backmeier’s Estate’s recovery was limited to $100,000, as the Estate sought $200,000 and claimed that inter-policy stacking had not been waived on the two policies that covered only single vehicles. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for Erie. It applied existing precedent to conclude that the stacking waivers were valid since they were executed at the inception of the single vehicle policies, and no meaning other than waiver of inter-policy stacking could be ascribed to the waivers. Moreover, the limit of protection clause was not violative of the MVFRL because it limited recovery at the same level based upon a knowing waiver of stacking.    The material in Legal Updates for Insurance Services, January 17, 2023, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.