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Patricia A. Monahan

Portrait of Patricia A. Monahan

Patricia concentrates her practice on insurance coverage, bad faith disputes and special insurance investigations. She regularly provides guidance to national and global insurance carriers concerning coverage issues and litigates coverage and bad faith claims brought against them.

Patricia routinely provides counsel and defense of issues arising from commercial, personal, specialty property and casualty policies, professional liability policies, health/life policies and workers' compensation policies. She has tried a wide range of bad faith lawsuits in both state and federal court and has substantial experience handling complex discovery issues presented in bad faith lawsuits. Patricia also focuses her practice on the investigation, defense and affirmative prosecution of fraudulent claims. She has extensive experience with cases involving medical provider fraud, claimant fraud, insurance claim inflation, staged accidents, application/rate evasion fraud, workers' compensation fraud and automobile thefts.

While a large portion of Patricia’s practice is focused on insurance coverage, special insurance investigations and bad faith disputes, she also is experienced in employment law defending public entities and private employers from discrimination and retaliation claims, state whistleblower suits, and employment claims filed under Section 1983, such as those arising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. She also has represented employers before the National Labor Relations Board, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the EEOC, various county courts of common pleas, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and the United States District Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 

Further, Patricia's experience also includes the defense of claims for intentional torts, civil rights violations, and any claim that may fall under a public entity's errors and omissions policy, employment policy, or general liability policy. She has tried numerous civil rights cases to verdict, including claims arising out of police pursuits, false arrests, excessive use of force, denial of due process, and zoning matters.

In 1986, Patricia received a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from the University of Florida, and in 1990, she achieved her juris doctor from the University of Pittsburgh. Throughout her legal career, Patricia has been an active trial lawyer and was elected as a shareholder with Marshall Dennehey in 1999. Her past experience also includes service in the role of solicitor to local municipalities. Patricia is a frequent speaker on employment and insurance coverage topics and has authored several articles for the firm's Defense Digest. She has received an AV® Preeminent™ rating by Martindale-Hubbell.

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 1990)
    • University of Florida (B.S., 1986)
    • Pennsylvania, 1990
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 1990
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2020
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1994
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Best Lawyers in America©, Insurance Law (2024-2027)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Litigation - Insurance (2026-2027)
    • Allegheny Bar Association
    • American Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Defense Litigation: Key Concepts and Current Developments, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, March 2026
    • Defense Perspectives: Bodily Injury and Bad Faith Claims, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, April 2025
    • Handling UM/UIM Cases in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, May, 2021
    • Employment Liability in the Cyber Age, Marshall Dennehey / AIG Employment Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, May 2, 2013
    • Speaker on various topics including employment claims, civil rights litigation, federal practice and insurance bad faith
    • "Pa. Supreme Court Evaluates Constitutional Parameters of a Jury's Punitive Damage Award,"Pennsylvania Law Weekly, October 3, 2023
    • “I’ve Been Served With a Writ of Summons. Now What?,” Defense Digest, December 2018, Vol. 24, No. 4
    • "Defending Claims While Working Within the Tripartite Relationship,"The Legal Intelligencer, Insurance Law Supplement, August 30, 2016
    • "When is an Accident Not an Accident?" Life, Health & Disability, the newsletter of the DRI's Life, Health & Disability Committee, November 21, 2014
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Is the First State Appellate Court To Address the Unfair Insurance Practices Act Protection for Victims of Abuse," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2013
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Panel Has Found That an Insured's Conduct Is Not Subject to Scrutiny in a Subsequent Bad Faith Law Suit," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 2011
    • "Are Damages For Emotional Distress Recoverable In a Pennsylvania Bad Faith Lawsuit Even Though the Bad Faith Statute Does Not Provide For Such Damages?," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2010
    • "Top Court Limits The Scope of a Public Employee's First Amendment Retaliation Claim," Defense Digest, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 2006
    • "The First Amendment's Rising Popularity in Municipal Employment Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2004
    • "Is Every Worker With a Physical Impairment Afforded Protection Under the ADA?," Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002­
    • "The Anatomy of a Civil Rights Malicious Prosecution Claim," Co-Author, Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Limits Employment At-Will," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999
    • Summary judgment granted for insurer in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith where the homeowner made a claim for vandalism when his tenant did not finish renovating the leased premises.  The Court held that the damages were not "sudden and accidental" and that the policy exclusions for faulty workmanship and renovations were applicable as a matter of law.
    • Defense verdict against an insurance carrier for breach of contract for denying a property loss claim and also obtained a $30,000 judgment against the plaintiff under the Pennsylvania insurance fraud statute for submitting a fraudulent claim.
    • Defense verdict for a major insurance carrier in a state court statutory bad faith lawsuit.
    • Defense verdict for a Pennsylvania municipality against several police officers' claims for first amendment violations and age discrimination.
    • •Summary judgment obtained for a school district in an age discrimination and first amendment retaliation claim.
    • Defense verdict for a Pennsylvania county against a former employee's claim that she was subjected to race discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation.
    • Summary judgment secured for employer law firm against a part-time attorney's claim that she was discriminated against, subjected to hostile work environment, and retaliated against based on her status as a working mother.
    • Defense verdict for insurance carrier in a bad faith trial arising out of the carrier's coverage position taken on an automobile stacking issue.
    • Successfully defended insurance broker in a claim for alleged negligence in failing to cancel a policy binder.
    • Defense verdict for municipal employer against a former employee's claim that he was terminated in violation of the state whistleblower law.
    • Defense verdict for municipality whose snowplow hit an oncoming vehicle head-on against claim for personal injuries of vehicle occupant.
    • Summary judgment secured for municipal employer against first amendment claims of several police officers claiming to have been defamed and subjected to a retaliatory investigation.
    • Summary judgment secured for Pennsylvania school district against former school board secretary's claim that she was terminated in violation of her first amendment rights and state whistleblower law.
    • Summary judgment secured for publicly traded company against former employee's claim that the company unevenly applied sales quotas to older workers, resulting in dismissal of the employee
    • Creasy v. Slippery Rock Area School District, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80523
    • Whitesell v. Dobson Communications, 102 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA), aff'd 2009 LEXIS 25791 (U.S. App.)
    • Diede v. City of McKeesport, 654 F. Supp. 2d 363 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
    • Moore v. Darlington Township, 690 F. Supp. 2d 378 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
    • Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780 (1995)
    • Heller v. Fulare, 454 F. 3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006)
    • Keefer v. Durkos, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 68519 Loughren v. USAA, 909 A.2d 896 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    • Loughren v. USAA, 909 A.2d 896 (Pa. Super. 2006)

Results

Successful Appeal of Summary Judgment in Favor of Insurer

We successfully appealed a summary judgment in favor of an insurance client that had been sued by another insurance carrier for more than $1.6 million in damages arising out of a fire loss to an insured auto repair facility. The opposing insurance company had paid $1.6 million in damages and intended to pursue a product liability claim against a vehicle manufacturer, alleging a defectively manufactured vehicle had caused the fire. Our client insured the vehicle that was allegedly defective. After the insurance companies conducted a preliminary expert evaluation, the vehicle was destroyed by a salvage yard in the normal course of business. A claim was made against our client for promissory estoppel where it was alleged the vehicle was destroyed despite a promise to preserve. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County’s rejection of the claims against our client and agreed with our contention that the promissory estoppel claim was a disguised claim for negligent spoliation, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not recognize. 

School District Prevails in Busing Dispute

We successfully defended a public school district that had been sued in federal court for not providing busing to charter schools within its district. The charter schools sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent the district from prioritizing busing to students attending traditional schools over those attending charter schools. The court agreed that the district was fairly maximizing its bus driver resources to service the most students possible.

Thought Leadership

Pa. Supreme Court Evaluates Constitutional Parameters of a Jury’s Punitive Damage Award

September 28, 2023

While it is well known that an insured has a clear and convincing standard of proving bad faith in order to recover such damages, it is lesser recognized that an insured does not have to prove outrageous conduct or evil motive to prove entitlement to punitive damages.

Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses Stacking Waivers in Single Vehicle Policies

January 17, 2023

In Erie Ins. Exchange v. Backmeier, __A.3d__, 2022 Pa. Super. 221, the Pennsylvania Superior Court applied Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent to determine that an insured’s waiver of stacking, executed on two single vehicle policies when issued, precluded inter-policy stacking of underinsured motorist benefits at the second priority level. Additionally, the court enforced the policies’ limit of protection to the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy. Andrew Backmeier was tragically struck and killed by an underinsured motorist while riding his bicycle. His mother sought underinsured coverage pursuant to her two Erie policies that provided limits of $100,000 per person, unstacked. Both policies provided coverage at the second priority level under the MVFRL because they covered vehicles not involved in the accident. Erie filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Backmeier’s Estate’s recovery was limited to $100,000, as the Estate sought $200,000 and claimed that inter-policy stacking had not been waived on the two policies that covered only single vehicles. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for Erie. It applied existing precedent to conclude that the stacking waivers were valid since they were executed at the inception of the single vehicle policies, and no meaning other than waiver of inter-policy stacking could be ascribed to the waivers. Moreover, the limit of protection clause was not violative of the MVFRL because it limited recovery at the same level based upon a knowing waiver of stacking.    The material in Legal Updates for Insurance Services, January 17, 2023, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.