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Patricia A. Monahan

Portrait of Patricia A. Monahan

Patricia concentrates her practice on insurance coverage, bad faith disputes and special insurance investigations. She regularly provides guidance to national and global insurance carriers concerning coverage issues and litigates coverage and bad faith claims brought against them.

Patricia routinely provides counsel and defense of issues arising from commercial, personal, specialty property and casualty policies, professional liability policies, health/life policies and workers' compensation policies. She has tried a wide range of bad faith lawsuits in both state and federal court and has substantial experience handling complex discovery issues presented in bad faith lawsuits. Patricia also focuses her practice on the investigation, defense and affirmative prosecution of fraudulent claims. She has extensive experience with cases involving medical provider fraud, claimant fraud, insurance claim inflation, staged accidents, application/rate evasion fraud, workers' compensation fraud and automobile thefts.

While a large portion of Patricia’s practice is focused on insurance coverage, special insurance investigations and bad faith disputes, she also is experienced in employment law defending public entities and private employers from discrimination and retaliation claims, state whistleblower suits, and employment claims filed under Section 1983, such as those arising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. She also has represented employers before the National Labor Relations Board, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the EEOC, various county courts of common pleas, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and the United States District Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 

Further, Patricia's experience also includes the defense of claims for intentional torts, civil rights violations, and any claim that may fall under a public entity's errors and omissions policy, employment policy, or general liability policy. She has tried numerous civil rights cases to verdict, including claims arising out of police pursuits, false arrests, excessive use of force, denial of due process, and zoning matters.

In 1986, Patricia received a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from the University of Florida, and in 1990, she achieved her juris doctor from the University of Pittsburgh. Throughout her legal career, Patricia has been an active trial lawyer and was elected as a shareholder with Marshall Dennehey in 1999. Her past experience also includes service in the role of solicitor to local municipalities. Patricia is a frequent speaker on employment and insurance coverage topics and has authored several articles for the firm's Defense Digest. She has received an AV® Preeminent™ rating by Martindale-Hubbell.

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 1990)
    • University of Florida (B.S., 1986)
    • Pennsylvania, 1990
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 1999
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Best Lawyers in America©, Insurance Law (2024-2026)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Litigation - Insurance (2026)
    • Allegheny Bar Association
    • American Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Defense Litigation: Key Concepts and Current Developments, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, March 2026
    • Defense Perspectives: Bodily Injury and Bad Faith Claims, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, April 2025
    • Handling UM/UIM Cases in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, May, 2021
    • Employment Liability in the Cyber Age, Marshall Dennehey / AIG Employment Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, May 2, 2013
    • Speaker on various topics including employment claims, civil rights litigation, federal practice and insurance bad faith
    • "Pa. Supreme Court Evaluates Constitutional Parameters of a Jury's Punitive Damage Award,"Pennsylvania Law Weekly, October 3, 2023
    • “I’ve Been Served With a Writ of Summons. Now What?,” Defense Digest, December 2018, Vol. 24, No. 4
    • "Defending Claims While Working Within the Tripartite Relationship,"The Legal Intelligencer, Insurance Law Supplement, August 30, 2016
    • "When is an Accident Not an Accident?" Life, Health & Disability, the newsletter of the DRI's Life, Health & Disability Committee, November 21, 2014
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Is the First State Appellate Court To Address the Unfair Insurance Practices Act Protection for Victims of Abuse," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2013
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Panel Has Found That an Insured's Conduct Is Not Subject to Scrutiny in a Subsequent Bad Faith Law Suit," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 2011
    • "Are Damages For Emotional Distress Recoverable In a Pennsylvania Bad Faith Lawsuit Even Though the Bad Faith Statute Does Not Provide For Such Damages?," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2010
    • "Top Court Limits The Scope of a Public Employee's First Amendment Retaliation Claim," Defense Digest, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 2006
    • "The First Amendment's Rising Popularity in Municipal Employment Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2004
    • "Is Every Worker With a Physical Impairment Afforded Protection Under the ADA?," Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002­
    • "The Anatomy of a Civil Rights Malicious Prosecution Claim," Co-Author, Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Limits Employment At-Will," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999
    • Summary judgment granted for insurer in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith where the homeowner made a claim for vandalism when his tenant did not finish renovating the leased premises.  The Court held that the damages were not "sudden and accidental" and that the policy exclusions for faulty workmanship and renovations were applicable as a matter of law.
    • Defense verdict against an insurance carrier for breach of contract for denying a property loss claim and also obtained a $30,000 judgment against the plaintiff under the Pennsylvania insurance fraud statute for submitting a fraudulent claim.
    • Defense verdict for a major insurance carrier in a state court statutory bad faith lawsuit.
    • Defense verdict for a Pennsylvania municipality against several police officers' claims for first amendment violations and age discrimination.
    • •Summary judgment obtained for a school district in an age discrimination and first amendment retaliation claim.
    • Defense verdict for a Pennsylvania county against a former employee's claim that she was subjected to race discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation.
    • Summary judgment secured for employer law firm against a part-time attorney's claim that she was discriminated against, subjected to hostile work environment, and retaliated against based on her status as a working mother.
    • Defense verdict for insurance carrier in a bad faith trial arising out of the carrier's coverage position taken on an automobile stacking issue.
    • Successfully defended insurance broker in a claim for alleged negligence in failing to cancel a policy binder.
    • Defense verdict for municipal employer against a former employee's claim that he was terminated in violation of the state whistleblower law.
    • Defense verdict for municipality whose snowplow hit an oncoming vehicle head-on against claim for personal injuries of vehicle occupant.
    • Summary judgment secured for municipal employer against first amendment claims of several police officers claiming to have been defamed and subjected to a retaliatory investigation.
    • Summary judgment secured for Pennsylvania school district against former school board secretary's claim that she was terminated in violation of her first amendment rights and state whistleblower law.
    • Summary judgment secured for publicly traded company against former employee's claim that the company unevenly applied sales quotas to older workers, resulting in dismissal of the employee
    • Creasy v. Slippery Rock Area School District, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80523
    • Whitesell v. Dobson Communications, 102 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA), aff'd 2009 LEXIS 25791 (U.S. App.)
    • Diede v. City of McKeesport, 654 F. Supp. 2d 363 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
    • Moore v. Darlington Township, 690 F. Supp. 2d 378 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
    • Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780 (1995)
    • Heller v. Fulare, 454 F. 3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006)
    • Keefer v. Durkos, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 68519 Loughren v. USAA, 909 A.2d 896 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    • Loughren v. USAA, 909 A.2d 896 (Pa. Super. 2006)

Results

Successful Appeal of Summary Judgment in Favor of Insurer

We successfully appealed a summary judgment in favor of an insurance client that had been sued by another insurance carrier for more than $1.6 million in damages arising out of a fire loss to an insured auto repair facility. The opposing insurance company had paid $1.6 million in damages and intended to pursue a product liability claim against a vehicle manufacturer, alleging a defectively manufactured vehicle had caused the fire. Our client insured the vehicle that was allegedly defective. After the insurance companies conducted a preliminary expert evaluation, the vehicle was destroyed by a salvage yard in the normal course of business. A claim was made against our client for promissory estoppel where it was alleged the vehicle was destroyed despite a promise to preserve. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County’s rejection of the claims against our client and agreed with our contention that the promissory estoppel claim was a disguised claim for negligent spoliation, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not recognize. 

School District Prevails in Busing Dispute

We successfully defended a public school district that had been sued in federal court for not providing busing to charter schools within its district. The charter schools sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent the district from prioritizing busing to students attending traditional schools over those attending charter schools. The court agreed that the district was fairly maximizing its bus driver resources to service the most students possible.

Thought Leadership

Pa. Supreme Court Evaluates Constitutional Parameters of a Jury’s Punitive Damage Award

September 28, 2023

While it is well known that an insured has a clear and convincing standard of proving bad faith in order to recover such damages, it is lesser recognized that an insured does not have to prove outrageous conduct or evil motive to prove entitlement to punitive damages.

Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses Stacking Waivers in Single Vehicle Policies

January 17, 2023

In Erie Ins. Exchange v. Backmeier, __A.3d__, 2022 Pa. Super. 221, the Pennsylvania Superior Court applied Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent to determine that an insured’s waiver of stacking, executed on two single vehicle policies when issued, precluded inter-policy stacking of underinsured motorist benefits at the second priority level. Additionally, the court enforced the policies’ limit of protection to the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy. Andrew Backmeier was tragically struck and killed by an underinsured motorist while riding his bicycle. His mother sought underinsured coverage pursuant to her two Erie policies that provided limits of $100,000 per person, unstacked. Both policies provided coverage at the second priority level under the MVFRL because they covered vehicles not involved in the accident. Erie filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Backmeier’s Estate’s recovery was limited to $100,000, as the Estate sought $200,000 and claimed that inter-policy stacking had not been waived on the two policies that covered only single vehicles. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for Erie. It applied existing precedent to conclude that the stacking waivers were valid since they were executed at the inception of the single vehicle policies, and no meaning other than waiver of inter-policy stacking could be ascribed to the waivers. Moreover, the limit of protection clause was not violative of the MVFRL because it limited recovery at the same level based upon a knowing waiver of stacking.    The material in Legal Updates for Insurance Services, January 17, 2023, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.