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Osama is a member of the firm’s Casualty Department, where he defends cases involving premises and retail liability, as well as construction and transportation matters. His strong foundation in litigation strategy guides his approach to these complex cases.

Before joining Marshall Dennehey, Osama honed his litigation skills by representing clients in employment cases, gaining valuable experience that now aids him in navigating challenging legal matters.

Osama is actively involved in the Pennsylvania Bar Association. He earned his juris doctor from Emory University in 2018 and holds a bachelor’s degree in biology from Temple University.
 

    • Emory University School of Law (J.D., 2018)
    • Temple University (B.S., 2013)
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • Urdu
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association, IDEI Liaison, Section Delegate, Intellectual Property Law Section
    • “Undefined Parties and the Statutory Employer Defense,” Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Undefined Parties and the Statutory Employer Defense

December 1, 2024

Key Points:  A recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decision highlights the importance of clarity in contracts for employers asserting a statutory employer defense.  Employers will not be able to successfully assert the statutory employer defense when there is ambiguity about contracting parties. Contractors should ensure they are contracted with the owner of the property to protect against liability from a workplace accident. In litigation involving workplace accidents, a common defense raised by a contractor is the statutory employer defense under the Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act. The Act requires an employer to pay workers’ compensation benefits to employees injured in the course of their employment regardless of the employer’s own negligence. In return for assuming secondary liability for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits, a statutory employer is immune from suit brought by an employee for a work-related injury.  A recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case highlights issues that may arise when a subcontractor’s agreement for a construction project is not properly executed. In Feldman v. CP Acquisitions 25, L.P., 2024 WL 4156993 (Pa. Super. Sept. 12, 2024), the Superior Court agreed with the trial court’s decision that a contractor could not avoid liability using the statutory employer defense when it is unclear who the contracting parties are in a subcontracting agreement. In this case the plaintiff, Brian Feldman, suffered grievous injuries from a workplace electrocution accident during a tree removal project during the construction of an apartment building. Cross Properties engaged Altino Concrete Construction as a contractor to build an apartment building on a property they had recently acquired. Near the end of construction on this project, Cross Properties reached out to Vito Braccia, the owner of Altino Concrete Solutions and Braccia Construction, LLC (VBC), to remove trees on an adjacent property owned by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). Mr. Braccia then subcontracted with Colonial Tree Service, Inc., for the tree removal project. Mr. Braccia did not carry out any safety planning before the tree removal project, even though he was aware of a high-voltage power line on SEPTA’s property. Additionally, he failed to reach out to SEPTA for permission to enter the property or to have the power lines de-energized during the tree removal project. On the day of the project, Mr. Feldman was electrocuted when a current arced from the power line and through a crane hoist. As a result, Mr. Feldman suffered extensive and severe burns, and spent the next six weeks recovering in a hospital burn unit. Mr. Feldman filed and prevailed in a personal injury suit against the general contractor, developer, and related entities.  VBC, the contractor for the tree removal, appealed the trial court’s decision in favor of Mr. Feldman. One argument raised by VBC on appeal was that, as the plaintiff’s statutory employer under section 302(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, they were immune from a personal injury suit brought by Mr. Feldman.  The longstanding test to determine whether a person or entity qualifies as a statutory employer under this section was set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 153 A. 424 (Pa. 1930). The McDonald test requires an employer satisfy each of the following elements to be considered a statutory employer under section 302(b): an employer who is under contract with an owner or one in the position of an owner; the premises occupied by or under the control of such employer;  a subcontract made by such employer;  part of the employer’s regular business entrusted [sic] to such subcontractor; and  an employee of such subcontractor. It was undisputed that VBC was the contractor for the tree removal project. However, the respective representatives from Cross Properties and Colonial testified at trial that they believed they had an oral agreement with Altino Concrete Construction for the tree removal project, not VBC. As a result, the court determined there was no mutual understanding between the parties regarding who they were contracting with, which is essential for any contract. Therefore, the court held that VBC could not meet the first element of the McDonald test. The court went further and noted that, even if a valid contract existed between Cross Properties and VBC, it would not help their case. They would still be unable to prove they had a contract with the property owner or someone in a similar position. This is because SEPTA was the actual owner of the property in question, not Cross Properties. As VBC never attempted to reach an agreement with SEPTA for the tree removal, they could not establish they were a statutory employer under Section 302(b).  In conclusion, Feldman v. CP Acquisitions 25, L.P. underscores the importance of clearly defining contractual relationships in construction projects. The court’s ruling emphasizes that a lack of mutual understanding among contracting parties prevents the successful use of the statutory employer defense under the Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act.  Contractors should ensure that subcontracting agreements clearly identify all parties involved and confirm ownership of the work site. By doing so, they can better protect themselves against liability in workplace accidents and minimize potential legal disputes. *Osama is an associate and a member of our Casualty Department. He works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.