.

Noah E. Blake

Portrait of Noah E. Blake

Noah Blake is an associate in our Casualty Department where he represents defendants in third-party insurance defense matters concerning negligence, automobile liability, and premises liability. He also defends insurance carriers in matters involving personal injury protection (PIP) litigation, bodily injury, and general liability.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Noah served as the Assistant Public Defender in Hillsborough County. During his time in this office, he litigated over 2,000 cases that included several trials and motions to suppress and dismiss. Notably he received a 'not guilty' verdict at trial after the jury had only deliberated for eight minutes on a case where the client was facing up to 10 years prison. 

Noah earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Law Enforcement and Justice Administration from Western Illinois University. He received his juris doctor from University of Florida Levin College of Law graduating magna cum laude. While in law school, he served as Volunteer Coordinator for the Ask a Lawyer Project which helped provide free legal consultation to the homeless community in Gainesville, Florida. 

When he is not working, he enjoys spending time with his family. Noah is admitted to practice in Florida. 

    • University of Florida Levin College of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2020)
    • Western Illinois University (B.S., summa cum laude, 2017)
    • Florida, 2020

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Take a Closer Look: The Precise Language of an Out-of-State Coverage Provision Leads To Varying Results

March 1, 2024

Key Points: Where the language in an insurance contract is plain and unambiguous, the courts must interpret the terms of the contract according to their plain meaning as written. Florida Statute §627.733 only requires a nonresident owner of a vehicle to maintain PIP coverage after they have been within Florida for more than 90 days of the preceding 365 days.  Due to Florida’s presence requirement under Fla. Stat. §627.733 for nonresidents, an out-of-state coverage provision that only applies to unconditional out-of-state compulsory insurance laws will not provide PIP benefits in Florida. The recent ruling by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in T.I.O. Medical Intervention LLC a/a/o Mary Faison v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 373 So. 3d 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) serves as a reminder to pay very close attention to the exact wording in insurance policy provisions. This case involved an insured that maintained a Georgia-based insurance policy but was involved in an accident in Florida. The insured was treated in Florida, and the plaintiff, a medical provider, submitted medical bills to the defendant insurer for reimbursement under Florida Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits.  The insurer argued that the Georgia policy did not provide for Florida PIP benefits per the policy language. At the county court level, the insurer was granted summary judgment because the court found that the “clear and unambiguous” language of the Georgia policy did not provide for Florida PIP benefits. The plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Fourth District analyzed the specific out-of-state coverage provision. Specifically, the court noted, “Where the language in an insurance contract is plain and unambiguous, a court must interpret the policy in accordance with the plain meaning so as to give effect to the policy as written.” Wash. Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So.3d 943, 948 (Fla. 2013). Looking first to the subject out-of-state coverage provision, the Georgia policy stated:  If an auto accident to which this policy applies occurs in any state or province other than the one in which ‘your covered auto’ is principally garaged, we will interpret your policy for that accident as follows: If the state or province has: … A compulsory insurance or similar law requiring a nonresident to maintain insurance whenever the nonresident uses a vehicle in that state or province, your policy will provide at least the required minimum amounts and types of coverage.  The Fourth District then looked to the presence requirement under Fla. Stat. §627.733(2) which governs PIP coverage for nonresidents: Every nonresident owner or registrant of a motor vehicle which, whether operated or not, has been physically present within this state for more than 90 days during the preceding 365 days shall thereafter maintain security as defined by subsection (3)… Fla. Stat. §627.733(2). In comparing the policy provision and the relevant Florida statute, the Fourth District concluded that the Georgia policy did not provide for Florida PIP benefits. Specifically, the court noted that the Georgia policy would only provide out-of-state coverage if the state’s compulsory insurance laws require a nonresident to have insurance “whenever” they use a vehicle. Florida law does not require a nonresident owner of a vehicle to maintain PIP coverage every time they drive, only when they have been in Florida for 90 out of the last 365 days.   The plaintiffs did not present any evidence that the insured met the nonresident presence requirement under Fla. Stat. §627.733(2), but the Fourth District stated that it would make no difference to the court’s conclusion since Florida law does not “unconditionally require” nonresidents to have PIP coverage when they drive in Florida as considered by the policy. The Fourth District contrasted the Georgia policy language with out-of-state coverage provisions interpreted by the Fifth and Second District Court of Appeals. In Meyer v. Hutchinson, 861 So.2d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) and Jiminez v. Faccone, 98 So.3d 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), the Fifth and Second Districts analyzed an out-of-state coverage provision of an insurance policy which stated: If an insured is in another state or Canada and, as a nonresident, becomes subject to its motor vehicle compulsory insurance, financial responsibility, or similar law: This policy will be interpreted to give the coverage required by the law…  The Fourth District distinguished the policy provisions interpreted by the Fifth and Second Districts from the Georgia policy provision on the basis that the former policy provision would allow coverage for nonresidents who “became subject” to Florida’s PIP statute by virtue of maintaining presence in Florida for 90 days. In comparison, the Georgia policy provision does not include the same language that would afford coverage to nonresidents who maintain presence in Florida for 90 days pursuant to Fla. Stat. §627.733(2). Therefore, the Fourth District held that the Georgia policy did not provide for Florida PIP benefits, and the lower court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the insurer was affirmed. In light of this case, it is recommended that insurance companies review the out-of-state coverage provisions in their respective policies. As shown by this case, these provisions need to be carefully constructed so as not to afford coverage when it is not intended. They are easy to overlook, but every word is vital since courts interpret these policy provisions by their plain meaning. That is why it is important to look closely at each provision and make sure the clear meaning of the provision is what is intended.  *Noah is an associate in our Tampa, Florida, office. He can be reached at (813) 898-1817 or NEBlake@mdwcg.com.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.