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The Quarterly Dose

New Rules, New Risks: Florida’s Latest Health Care Legislation Explained

The Quarterly Dose – August 2025

August 1, 2025

by Megan J. Nelson

On July 1, 2025, the following laws were enacted and may affect health care providers in Florida. These legislative changes introduce updates to regulatory compliance, patient care protocols and provider responsibilities. This overview highlights key provisions and their practical implications for providers across the state.

HB 519 — Administration of Controlled Substances by Paramedics
The Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (Chapter 893, Fla. Stat.) allowed for specific licensed practitioners to authorize the administration of a controlled substance by a licensed nurse or an intern practitioner. It did not expressly include paramedics. Under federal law, the Protecting Patient Access to Emergency Medications Act of 2017 (PPAEMA) created specific rules relevant to the EMS setting, allowing for a paramedic to administer controlled substances outside the physical presence of a medical director if the EMS agency was authorized to do so by state law, was registered with the DEA, and had a standing order or verbal order from a medical director.

What the changes mean:
A licensed practitioner may now authorize a certified paramedic to administer controlled substances in the course of providing emergency services.

HB 647 —Advanced Practice Registered Nurse Services (APRN)
Advanced practice registered nurses were not authorized to file a death certificate or complete a medical certification of cause of death, unless they were registered for autonomous practice.

What the changes mean:
An advanced practice registered nurse providing hospice care may certify the cause of death and file the certificate of death.

SB 958 — Type 1 Diabetes Early Detection Program
This bill created § 381.992, Fla. Stat., and requires the Department of Health, in collaboration with school districts throughout the state, to develop Type 1 diabetes information material related to early detection for the parents and guardians of students. The material must include a description of Type 1 diabetes, the risk factors and warning signs associated with Type 1 diabetes, the process for screening students using a blood autoantibody test, and recommendations for further evaluation for students displaying warning signs or positive early detection screening results.

What the new law means:
Medical providers may see an increase in concerned parents wanting to discuss Type 1 diabetes. However, some parents may not be able to seek medical care due to financial and insurance reasons.

It may be beneficial for pediatricians to reach out to their local school districts and assist with providing additional education and/or workshops for parents.

HB 791 - Surrendered Infants
Section 383.50, Fla. Stat., allows parents to safely surrender infants up to 30 days of life at an emergency medical services station, fire station, or hospital without civil or criminal liability. Existing provisions related to the presumption that the parent intended to surrender the infant, consented to appropriate medical treatment and care, and to the termination of parental rights; the care and custodial processing of an infant upon lawful surrender; and the parent’s anonymity upon surrender remain in effect.

New additions to the law:
The new law extends the previous law to include the surrender of an infant using an infant safety device. An infant safety device is a device that is installed in a supporting wall of a hospital, an emergency medical services station, or a fire station and that has an exterior point of access allowing an individual to place an infant inside and an interior point of access allowing individuals inside the building to safely retrieve the infant.

The infant safety device must be:

  • Physically part of the hospital, emergency medical services station, or fire station and be in a conspicuous and visible area to employees;
  • Temperature controlled and ventilated;
  • Equipped with a dual alarm system which automatically triggers an alarm inside the building when an infant is placed in the device, and the alarm must be tested at least once a week;
  • Equipped with a surveillance system that allows for monitoring the inside of the device 24 hours a day; and 
  • Physically checked at least twice a day.

If the infant safety device is located at an emergency medical services station or fire station, the alarm must also immediately alert 911, and dispatch must send the nearest first responder to retrieve the infant.

HB 1089 — Newborn Screenings
Newborn screening is a preventive public health service provided in every state to identify, diagnose and manage newborns at risk for selected disorders that, without detection and treatment, can lead to permanent development and physical damage or death. The Florida Newborn Screening Program serves to promote the screening of all newborns for metabolic, hereditary and congenital disorders known to result in significant impairment of health or intellect. The program currently screens for 37 core conditions and 23 secondary conditions, nearly all of which are screened for through the collection and testing of blood spots. Hearing screening, critical congenital heart disease and targeted testing for congenital cytomegalovirus are completed at the birthing facility through point of care testing.

What the changes mean:
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD) will be added to the Newborn Screening beginning January 1, 2027. DMD is a rare genetic condition, but it is also the most common childhood-onset form of muscular dystrophy. It affects approximately one in every 3,300—5,000 live male births. DMD is an X-linked inherited neuromuscular disorder that can be carried by females, but typically only presents symptomatically in boys. DMD is considered a lethal condition for which there is no curative treatment. However, early diagnoses and a multidisciplinary approach can slow the progression of the disease, prolong the survival rate and maintain a quality of life.

SB 1156 — Home Health Aide for Medically Fragile Children Program
The Home Health Aide for Medically Fragile Children (HHAMFC) Program was created in 2023 in response to the national health care provider shortage and its impact on medically fragile children and their family caregivers to provide an opportunity for family caregivers to receive training and gainful employment. Other Medicaid programs exist that pay a family member to provide home health services to a Medicaid enrollee, but the HHAMFC Program is the only one that pays a family member who is not a licensed nurse for the provision of home health services to a medically fragile child. The program allows a family caregiver to be reimbursed by Medicaid as an HHAMFC once they have completed an approved training program or graduated from an accredited pre-licensure nursing education program and are waiting to take the state licensing exam.

What the changes mean:
The HHAMFC must complete an approved training program, and the employing home health agency must provide validation of the HHAMFC prior to the aide providing services to an eligible relative. The employing home health agency must also provide training on HIV/AIDS and ensure that the HHAMFC holds and maintains a CPR certification.

The training program must consist of at least 76 total hours of training with at least 40 hours of home health aide training, 20 hours of skills training tailored to the needs of the child, 16 hours of clinical training related to the child’s needs, and training on HIV infections and CPR.

Increased the Medicaid utilization cap from eight hours per day to 12 hours per day.

Requires the home health agency to report an adverse incident within 48 hours of the incident.

HB 1195 — Fentanyl Testing
The bill created § 395.1042, Fla. Stat., and requires a hospital or hospital-based off-campus emergency department treating patients for possible drug overdose or poisoning to include testing for fentanyl in the urine drug screening. If the urine test is positive for fentanyl, a second analytical confirmation test must be performed. The results of the urine drug test and confirmation test must be retained as part of the patient’s medical record for the period of time required by the hospital’s current practice.

What the new law means:
Providers must include testing for fentanyl when a patient is suspected of a possible drug overdose or poisoning.

The addition of testing for fentanyl should not be limited to patients who are suspected of a possible drug overdose or poisoning. As fentanyl overdoses are becoming more common in patients who unknowingly take a substance that contains fentanyl, emergency medical providers should include testing for fentanyl when ordering any urine drug screening, including for patients who are disoriented or unconscious for unknown reasons.

HB 1353 — Home Health Care Services
What the changes mean:
An administrator may now manage up to five home health agencies that have the same controlling interest, regardless of where they are located in the state.

The initial admission visit, all service evaluation visits, and the discharge visit that a home health agency must provide may now be performed by a registered nurse who is contracted but not a direct employee of the home health agency.

HB 1421 — Improving Screening for and Treatment of Blood Clots
This bill aims to improve the screening for and treatment of venous thromboembolism or deep vein thrombosis (blood clots).

New additions to the law:
Every hospital with an emergency department and every ambulatory surgical center must develop and implement policies and procedures for the rendering of appropriate medical attention for patients at risk of forming blood clots.

All non-physician personnel must be trained on the policies and procedures annually. A certified nursing assistant (CNA) employed by a nursing home must undergo in-service training which includes recognizing the signs and symptoms of a blood clot and techniques for providing an emergency response.

A CNA wishing to administer medication, as delegated by a registered nurse, must complete training on identifying signs and symptoms of a blood clot and response protocols to assist a patient with a blood clot as part of the 34-hour training course on medication administration.

Assisted living facilities must provide a pamphlet to residents upon admission which contains information about risk factors for, and recognizing signs and symptoms of, a blood clot.

SB 1768 - Stem Cell Therapy
The new law, §§ 458.3245 and 459.0127, Fla. Stat., authorizes physicians to perform stem cell therapies that have not been approved by the FDA when used for orthopedic conditions, wound care or pain management. It sets forth standards for the retrieval, manufacture, storage and use of stem cells, ensuring the stem cells used are obtained from facilities that meet rigorous regulatory and accreditation requirements. Before administering any stem cell therapy, a physician must provide written notice to the patient that the therapy is not approved by the FDA and must obtain signed informed consent clearly informing the patient of the nature and purpose of the proposed treatment prior to initiation of therapy. Any advertisements must include clearly legible writing indicating the stem cell therapy is not approved by the FDA.

Who does the law not apply to:
Physicians who have obtained FDA approval for an investigational new drug or device for the use of human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products.

Physicians who perform stem cell therapy under an employment or other contract on behalf of an institution that is certified to perform stem cell therapy or has expertise in stem cell therapy as determined by the Department of Health.

Violations of the law:
A violation may subject the physician to disciplinary action by their regulating board.

A physician who willfully performs, or actively participates in, treatment or research using human cells or tissues derived from a fetus or embryo after abortion commits a felony of the third degree.

A physician who willfully performs, or actively participates in, the sale, manufacture or distribution of computer products created using human cells, tissues or cellular tissue-based products commits a felony of the third degree.

SB 1808 — Refund of Overpayments Made by Patients
This bill requires anyone who accepts payment from a patient’s insurance for services rendered by a health care practitioner and determines that a patient has overpaid for said services to refund the overpayment within 30 days. If a health care practitioner fails to timely refund the overpayment, the failure will constitute grounds for disciplinary action. If a facility or provider licensed by the Agency for Health Care Administration fails to timely refund an overpayment, the agency may impose an administrative penalty of up to $500 on the license.

HB 597 — Diabetes Management in Schools
Public schools may acquire and maintain a supply of undesignated glucagon for use on students with diabetes experiencing hypoglycemic emergencies. Public schools are authorized to obtain the glucagon through a prescription from a county health department or authorized healthcare practitioner, or through arrangements with manufacturers or suppliers. This will help decrease the delay in treatment as students with diabetes experiencing a hypoglycemic emergency can now be treated with glucagon even if they don’t have their own medication at school.

SB 1514 —Anaphylaxis in Public and Charter Schools
Schools may maintain a supply of epinephrine auto-injectors (epi-pens), accessible to trained school personnel or authorized students. They must adopt a physician-developed protocol for school personnel, medical and non-medical, who are trained to recognize an anaphylactic reaction and to administer an injection of epinephrine via auto-injection during emergencies. This will help decrease the delay in treatment as students who are experiencing an anaphylactic emergency can receive an injection of epinephrine via an auto-injector by a school nurse or other trained school employee, even if they don’t have their own epi-pen with them. 


 

The Quarterly Dose – August 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.