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Megan J. Nelson

Portrait of Megan J. Nelson

Megan devotes her practice to representing hospitals, physicians, nurses, long-term care facilities, skilled nursing facilities, and other healthcare providers in the defense of medical malpractice and negligence claims, along with premises and general liability claims.

Megan also represents nurses and other medical providers who are facing administrative or regulatory discipline by their governing medical licensing boards.

In addition to health care defense, Megan assists hospitals, long-term care facilities, and skilled nursing facilities with the initiation of petitions for determination of incapacity and the appointment of plenary guardians for patients who are unable to make their own medical and financial decisions. Megan also assists hospitals, long-term care facilities, and skilled nursing facilities with patients and family who "stay against medical advice."

Megan began her career as a firefighter for her hometown volunteer fire department and has utilized her knowledge as a firefighter to represent fire academies in lawsuits.

Megan has been a Registered Nurse since 2010. Before becoming a lawyer, she worked as a neonatal and pediatric critical care nurse in various settings, including the neonatal intensive care unit, pediatric intensive care unit, pediatric cardiac intensive care unit, and pediatric emergency room. She received The Daisy Award For Extraordinary Nurses in August 2013. Her experience also included patients on ECMO (extracorporeal membrane oxygenation) and cardiac bypass. Megan's background in nursing helps to bridge the gap between medicine and the law.

Megan is a frequent lecturer on medical and nursing topics, including incident reporting, guardianships, and AI (artificial intelligence). She is a member of the Florida State Guardianship Association, Central Florida Medical Malpractice Claims Council, and the Orange County Bar Association.

Megan graduated from Del Mar College with an Associate's Degree in Nursing and Texas A&M University Corpus Christi with a Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Megan graduated cum laude from Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law with a Juris Doctor.

When she is not working, Megan volunteers her time at The Sanctuary at Lakota Farms, where she helps care for horses that have been rescued.

    • Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2019)
    • Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi (B.S., 2014)
    • Del Mar College (ADN, 2009)
    • Florida, 2019
    • Central Florida Medical Malpractice Claims Council
    • Florida State Guardianship Association
    • Orange County Bar Association
    • Secured multiple favorable rulings granting Florida Rule 5.900 petitions for expedited judicial intervention concerning medical treatment procedures, enabling hospitals to safely discharge medically cleared patients despite significant resistance from guardians and family decision-makers. Across several matters, Megan successfully addressed situations where guardians, health care surrogates, or family members refused to consent to appropriate discharge plans, declined to provide necessary financial documentation for ICP Medicaid evaluations, or failed to cooperate with case management teams—often causing prolonged, unnecessary hospital stays. Through emergency and evidentiary hearings, courts consistently granted relief, ordering patient transfers to skilled nursing facilities or assisted living facilities, requiring the production of financial records, mandating Medicaid application compliance, and, in one case, appointing an emergency temporary co-guardian to facilitate discharge. As a result of these efforts,patients were promptly and appropriately discharged—sometimes within 24 hours of court orders—demonstrating Megan’s effective advocacy in resolving complex guardianship and discharge disputes to ensure proper patient care and hospital throughput.
    • Was successful in having a Florida Rule 5.900 Petition for Expedited Judicial Intervention Concerning Medical Treatment Procedure granted. The alleged incapacitated person had been medically cleared for discharge to a skilled nursing facility. However, his brother, who had been appointed as the health care surrogate and power of attorney, had refused to consent to his brother's transfer to any skilled nursing facility. After numerous unsuccessful attempts by the hospital case management team to transfer the patient, Megan was retained to file a Florida Rule 5.900 Petition for Expedited Judicial Intervention Concerning Medical Treatment Procedures. After the emergency evidentiary hearing, the court granted the petition and ordered the brother to consent to the transfer of the patient to a skilled nursing facility.
    • Obtained final summary judgment in an equine-related case involving fraud, negligent misrepresentation, warranty, and consumer protection claims arising from the sale of a horse, resulting in dismissal of all claims against the clients.
    • You've Been Served! What's Next and How to Manage the Risk of Corporate Representative Depositions, Florida Society for Healthcare Risk Management & Patient Safety Annual Meeting & Education Conference, Fort Lauderdale, FL, August 27, 2026
    • Protecting Patients in Real Time: A Guide to Rule 5.900 Petitions, Florida Hospital Association’s General Counsel Roundtable, June 30, 2026
    • The Latest on Medical AI Innovation, Legal Liability and Claims, Florida Society for Healthcare Risk Management & Patient Safety Annual Meeting & Education Conference, Orlando, FL, August 14, 2025
    • Tort Reform: Where Do We Go From Here?, Florida Society for Healthcare Risk Management & Patient Safety Annual Meeting & Education Conference, Orlando, FL, August 16, 2024
    • Adversity in the World of Adverse Incident Reporting: A Panel Discussion on Reporting Requirements and Addressing Related Discovery, Florida Society for Healthcare Risk Management & Patient Safety Annual Meeting & Education Conference, Orlando, FL, August 13, 2021
    • Florida Nursing License

Results

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

From Bedside to Bar

June 11, 2026

Tyler R. Price, Esquire Former Nationally Registered Paramedic Working in emergency medicine demanded sharp critical thinking — recognizing life-threatening conditions, delivering timely interventions, uncovering relevant medical history, and shaping a treatment plan that aligned with a patient’s ultimate needs. I was taught to always “bring a shovel” to every encounter, because careful digging almost always revealed the details that mattered most. As an attorney, I still bring that shovel. Thorough investigation and deliberate “digging” into the facts of each case are essential to understanding potential theories of liability, assessing exposure, and evaluating every viable defense. Examining a case from multiple angles and points in the timeline allows me to appreciate how each fact fits into the broader strategy. Although I’m no longer making split second medical decisions, the same disciplined approach guides my litigation work. Every detail counts. For every client, in every matter, my goal is to identify the key facts that allow us to build the strongest possible defense. My training in emergency medicine gave me the tools, mindset, and discipline that now make me an effective litigator. Megan J. Nelson, Esquire Registered Nurse My nursing career has been a significant asset to my work as a medical malpractice defense attorney. A Registered Nurse since 2010, I have extensive, hands-on clinical experience across high-acuity settings. My background in neonatal and pediatric critical care (including work in the NICU, PICU, pediatric cardiac ICU, and pediatric emergency department) and experience managing critically ill patients (including those requiring ECMO and cardiac bypass) gives me a practical understanding of complex medical care, clinical decision-making, and the realities of fast-paced health care settings often central to malpractice claims. This firsthand knowledge allows me to analyze medical records with precision, communicate effectively with experts and providers, and identify nuances that may be overlooked by those without clinical training. In my current work on Rule 5.900 petitions for expedited judicial intervention regarding medical treatments, this clinical foundation is especially critical, as I am often tasked with effectively “educating” the court during emergency hearings—translating complex medical conditions, interventions, and risks into understandable terms for the judge. I am also able to prepare providers for testimony in a way that ensures clarity and accuracy under pressure. Ultimately, my clinical foundation enables me to bridge the gap between medicine and law, strengthening my ability to build compelling defenses grounded in real-world health care practice.

Documentation Do’s and Don’ts: Know What Really Matters

January 1, 2026

“Document, document, document!” is the mantra of healthcare risk management. If it was not documented, did it really happen? If it was documented, was it documented properly? Knowing the right and wrong ways to document can make the difference when defending a malpractice claim or conducting a root cause investigation.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.