.

Michael L. Detweiler

Office Managing Attorney

MLDetweiler@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Michael L. Detweiler

Michael is a shareholder and member of the Casualty Department and the Managing Attorney of the King of Prussia office.  In his 20 plus years of practice experience, Michael has successfully defended clients including but not limited to retail and large corporations, construction companies and contractors, homeowner associations (HOAs), municipalities, tour operators and travel agencies, professionals, and various individuals.   He has represented his clients in high exposure personal injury matters involving fatalities and other catastrophic injuries.  He has also successfully defended entities and individuals in high exposure construction defect matters, in addition to commercial and breach of contract disputes. He has tried cases to verdict in courts throughout Pennsylvania, including the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Michael serves also as the Casualty Supervisor of the King of Prussia office in addition to his role as managing attorney, providing oversight for strategy considerations and daily operations within the King of Prussia Casualty group and office, generally.  His extensive experience with both casualty and professional liability matters provides an invaluable advantage in representing clients who require a firm grasp of both practice backgrounds.  

Michael graduated magna cum laude from Dickinson College in 1998 and from Boston College Law School in 2002.  Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Michael was Assistant City Solicitor with the City of Philadelphia Law Department for two years. He defended police officers, corrections officers, and various City of Philadelphia employees and agencies in civil lawsuits.  He is an active member of the local community, which includes his work as President and Chairman of the Board of a Philadelphia elementary school from 2014-2025.  

    • Boston College Law School (J.D., 2002)
    • Dickinson College (B.A., magna cum laude, 1998)
    • New Jersey, 2003
    • Pennsylvania, 2003
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2003
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Construction Law (2026-2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2007-2008, 2010-2016)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Board Member, Saint Mary Interparochial School
    • An Overview of Auto Law in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, July 22, 2025
    • Travel Advisors E&O Insurance: Lessons in Liability - Panelist, Travel Professional News webinar, September 12, 2023
    • PHL Airport First Responders Training, Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, PA, March 30, 2023
    • Defending Planned Community Association Cases: Directors and Officers Liability, Property, and Other Liability Issues, Engle Martin & Associates, March 2016
    • Legal Issues for Internet Travel Sellers and Travel Insurance for Industry and Consumers, Pennsylvania Bar Institute (PBI) Travel Law Seminar, Philadelphia, May 1, 2014
    • Insurance Agents and Brokers Best Claims Practices in Claims Administration and Underwriting, Liberty Mutual Insurance, December 2013
    • “Movement No Longer Required: Expansion of the “Operation of Motor Vehicle” Exception in Municipal Cases Since Balentine,” Defense Digest, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 2019
    • "When Accidents Happen: Legal Defenses for Travel Advisors," Travel Advisor, February 2019
    • "Top Legal Considerations for Independent Contractors," Travel Agent magazine, September 2014
    • "The Motor Vehicle Black Box," Dispute Resolution Institute: Annual Personal Injury Potpourri 2007, Co-Authored with Ralph P. Bocchino, Esq. 
    • Successfully drafted and argued Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on behalf of international tour operator in a federal court case in which plaintiff (a 35 year old man) drowned while on a fishing excursion near the coast of Costa Rica.  (The fishing excursion was booked through the tour operator).  The underlying motion was predicated on applicable tour operator liability law, maritime law, and the Death on the High Seas Act. 
    • Successfully drafted Motion to Dismiss on jurisdictional grounds on behalf of internationally renowned California golf resort that was sued by plaintiff for severe head and cognitive injuries.
    • Obtained voluntary dismissal of all claims as to tour operator sued by plaintiff for personal injuries as a result of alleged injuries stemming from an accident in a resort in Jamaica.
    • Obtained voluntary dismissal of all breach of contract claims as to local non-profit financial institution in a breach of contract civil action involving close to $1 million in disputed monies.
    • Obtained numerous defense verdicts as lead trial counsel on behalf of clients in federal court in which plaintiff alleged false arrest, excessive force, and other civil rights violations.
    • Obtained multiple summary judgments on behalf of clients in general casualty and products liability matters.

Results

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Successful Trial Result Achieved in a Philadelphia Premises Liability Matter

We received a successful trial result in a premises liability matter in Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The plaintiff’s expert projected future surgeries and extensive life-long medical care costs of $1.25 million. Much of our defense centered on damages and demonstrating that the projected future medical care was not supported by the actual medical treatment provided. Additionally, video of the incident was used to demonstrate that the plaintiff had actual/constructive knowledge of spilled water in the premises but proceeded to walk in that area anyway. Forty percent comparative negligence was assigned to the plaintiff, and despite the plaintiff’s introduction of the medical cost projection described above, only $50,000 in future medical care was awarded by the jury. The total award, after a molded verdict, was $118,800, which our client viewed as a victory in this venue. 

Real estate agency dismissed from litigation.

The defense prevailed on a motion to dismiss our real estate agency client. The plaintiff filed counts of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, conspiracy, conversion, invasion of privacy-false light, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel against the agency regarding an allegedly fraudulent transfer of a private residence by the co-defendant seller of the property. We filed preliminary objections, arguing that the plaintiff's claims lacked sufficient specificity and that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court dismissed all claims against our client. 

Thought Leadership

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Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Not So Fast. . . The Limitations of the Pennsylvania RELRA in Plaintiffs’ Civil Actions Against Real Estate Broker and Licensee Defendants

August 17, 2026

Much has been made of the importance and weight of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, 63 P.S. §§ 455.101, et. seq. (RELRA or Act). After all, a real estate broker generally cannot recover any commission absent a signed agreement that complies with RELRA. But can a plaintiff rely on RELRA as a distinct cause of action in a civil action as to a real estate broker or licensee defendant? The Superior Court has emphatically held that he or she cannot. In the unpublished opinion P. Perez Real Est. Holdings, LLC et. al. v. Home Sale Real Est. Servs., Inc., et al., No. 256 MDA 2025, 2025 WL 35389888 (Pa. Super. Ct. December 10, 2025), the Superior Court held that the Act “does not contemplate private actions for money damages as an enforcement mechanism and consequently, does not create a private cause of action.” citing Schwarzwaelder v. Fox, 895 A.2d 614, 620 (Pa. Super. 2006). While the Act authorizes the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Real Estate Commission, to regulate the conduct governed by RELRA, the Act alone does not create a stand-alone legal cause of action as to a broker-defendant in a civil action. See P. Perez, citing Schwarwaelder at 620. Nor can it be stated that RELRA creates or imposes any legally cognizable duties on real estate brokers or licensees. While the Act contains and refers to general concepts of duty (e.g. the agent must “exercise reasonable professional skill and care which meets the practice standards required by this act” and “to deal honestly and in good faith” 63 P.S. §§606.1 (a)(1),(2), or the broker has a duty to the buyer of property to take “action that is consistent with the buyer’s interest in transaction.”  63 P.S. §§606.3 (1)), these general concepts are secondary to the duties imposed by the required written agreement between the broker and consumer. For example, in P. Perez, a case in which the buyers-plaintiffs argued that the real estate broker failed to investigate recent legislation that would affect buyer’s intentions to convert the property to commercial space, the agreement between buyer and broker contained the following provision in the “Buyer’s Due Diligence” clause: Buyer acknowledges that Brokers, their licensees, employees, officers or partners have not made an independent examination or determination of the structural soundness of the property, the age or condition of the components, environmental conditions, the permitted uses, nor of conditions existing in the locale where the property is situated. . . Accordingly, the broker defendants expressly disclaimed any duty to buyers to inform them or determine whether any applicable zoning classifications, laws, or ordinances in the township applied to the properties in question. Moreover, the Superior Court refused to read provisions of the Act into the Agreement, citing Skiff re Buss, Inc. v. Buckingham Review, LP, 991 A.2d 956 (Pa. Super. 2010). In defending civil actions it is important for the defense attorney to identify any causes of action predicated solely on RELRA. Preliminary objections may be warranted to the extent that the plaintiff asserts RELRA as a stand-alone cause of action for monetary damages, a position struck down by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in P. Perez.  Moreover, any attempt to create or heighten duties as to the broker defendants may be countered by the general proposition that the courts will not inject the vague concepts of “reasonable professional skill” or “good faith” where the written agreement has express provisions regarding the duties of the parties. Ironically, although RELRA is an important Act with which all realtors, brokers, and licensees should be familiar to guarantee that their commissions are in fact timely paid, it is not a strong stand-alone mechanism for a plaintiff’s attempts to recover monetary damages in a civil action.

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…King of Prussia Office: A Historic Legacy and a Dynamic Future of Legal Excellence

December 1, 2025

Situated in the shadow of Valley Forge and the rich history of the Revolutionary War, the King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office is steeped in history. The office itself has a long history of servicing the counties adjacent to Philadelphia, in addition to Philadelphia. Though once located in the Montgomery County seat of Norristown, this office now sits not far from the King of Prussia Mall and an always active Top Golf facility. The office is also steeped in firm history as it has been affiliated with many of the firm’s founders and leaders through the years, including Jack Warner, Tom Brophy, Christopher Dougherty, Joe Santarone, and Wendy Bracaglia, to name a few. Today, with approximately 40 attorneys and 60 staff employees, the King of Prussia office is one of the firm’s largest branch offices and one of the largest law offices in Montgomery County. The office has long serviced Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia Counties. We consolidated with our Doylestown and Allentown offices several years ago, and we now also service Berks, Bucks, Carbon, Lehigh, Monroe, Northampton, and Schuylkill Counties. The addition of attorneys from other offices and the acquisition of key talent from other firms through the years has created a dynamic team comprised of attorneys with numerous backgrounds, skill sets, and perspectives. The health care team has been a powerful engine for the office for years and continues to flourish. The group has long-standing client relationships with health care systems and providers throughout eastern Pennsylvania and continues to develop new relationships. Led by attorneys Robin Snyder and Donna Modestine, the group continues to grow, even with the recent retirements of several key health care attorneys in the past several years. In 2024, Gary Samms, one of the most sought-after trial attorneys in Pennsylvania, joined an already stalwart group of attorneys: Joan Ford, Joe Hoynoski, and Gabor Ovari. Recent special counsel and associate additions in the past several years include Kevin Majernik, Jonathan Landua, Evan Pentz, David McColloch, and Julianna Malloy, all of whom have joined us from other firms and have added to an already strong and highly-regarded unit.  Despite retirements of several experienced and senior attorneys in the past several years (we will sorely miss Mark Riley and Ed McGinn when they retire at year’s end) from the Casualty Department, we have pivoted and recently welcomed several talented and energetic associates—Khaliyah Pugh, Richard Lechette, and Ashley Stasak—to our core casualty group, consisting of Michele Frisbie, Michele Krengel, Tim Hartigan, Ed Tuite, and Rob Morton, in addition to those attorneys who strengthened our group after joining us from the Allentown office: Jason Banonis, Steve Keim, and Wendy O’Connor. The casualty attorneys handle a wide array of high-exposure casualty matters, ranging from construction personal injury to serious auto and premises liability matters and everything in between.  Frank Wickersham, Judd Woytek, Tony Natale, Michael Duffy, and Anna Jaoudi comprise the office’s workers’ compensation unit, which routinely achieves favorable results on behalf of their clients and is very well-regarded by the workers’ compensation bar. Tony and Anna also work in our Medicare Compliance Practice Group, providing the entire firm with an invaluable resource in reaching solutions for often complicated questions created by settlements and Medicare issues. Finally, the firm is fortunate to have a group of attorneys who handle a wide array of professional liability matters. They include Audrey Copeland, who handles appeals; Gregory Kelley, who focuses on professional liability and construction defects; Maureen Fitzgerald and Christin Kochel, who handle a wide variety of professional liability cases; and Paul Laughlin, who handles professional liability and health care cases. These added practice areas, and the skill with which these attorneys practice, ensure that the office, the firm, and our clients have access to invaluable resources and representation in numerous practice areas.  The office is defined, in large part, by the skill and talent of its attorneys, but it has had its share of characters and levity through the years, too. There has never been a shortage of social events (Top Golf, happy hours, associate dinners), games (trivia night), music (a staple on the “Class Action” tour circuit) and the occasional awkward photo of an office attorney from yesteryear. The office has always embodied one of the defining features that makes Marshall Dennehey special and unique: “A culture where humor is the great equalizer, and no one is above the friendly jest.” The office is also blessed with hard-working and talented paralegals and support staff, who are an integral part of our success and are led by our dedicated and tireless office manager, Suzie Spitko. One of the office’s primary strengths remains its versatility, both in the various practice groups that provide skilled lawyering and in its capacity to provide representation in numerous venues in eastern Pennsylvania. We have always thrived, in great part, due to our flexibility and adaptability and in bringing on new talent to continue our tradition of excellence. In many ways, the King of Prussia office serves as a microcosm of the firm at large: rich in history but poised for great things moving forward.  Mike is the managing attorney of our King of Prussia, PA office. He can be reached at 610-354-8271 or MLDetweiler@mdwcg.com.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

News

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Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter