.

Case Law Alerts

Federal District Court Recognizes Important Limitations on “Post-Sale Duty to Warn”

Liebig v. MTD Products, Inc., et al., Civ. No. 2:22-cv-04427, 2023 WL 5517557 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2023)

October 1, 2023

by Michael A. Salvati

A product may be defective if it is sold without adequate warnings. But what if a manufacturer learns new safety information after a product is already on the market? Must the manufacturer track down every buyer of its product to issue updated warnings? Some plaintiffs advance the theory of a “post-sale duty to warn,” but a recent federal trial court decision recognized important limitations on that theory. 

In Liebig, the plaintiff claimed he had been injured by an allegedly defective snow thrower. Among the theories of liability included in the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the product manufacturer had failed to issue post-sale warnings about the defective nature of the snow thrower. 

The District Court cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Walton v. AVCO Corp., 610 A.2d 454 (Pa. 1992), which recognized a post-sale duty to warn on the part of a helicopter manufacturer. However, the court noted, that duty was limited to circumstances where it would be feasible to impart warnings to consumers after a product has been purchased. Helicopters are “are sold in a small and distinct market”; in contrast, mass-marketed and mass-produced products are much harder to track down, especially if they may be re-sold on the secondary market. Further, helicopters may require service and maintenance, which provides a logical point of contact through which to distribute warnings. In contrast, a consumer product like a snow thrower is mass-produced, may be re-sold (the product in Liebig, in fact, was allegedly purchased from an anonymous seller at a flea market), and lacks a centralized point of contact through which to distribute warnings.

The Liebig court found that the post-sale duty to warn is “narrow” and applies only to “unusual products sold in small and distinct markets”—those products for which it is feasible to find downstream buyers and issue additional warnings. 

If faced with such a claim, it is important to emphasize that it is the exception, rather than the rule, and to highlight the factors that would make it impractical to identify and track down all current owners of the product. 
 

 

Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.