.

Michael A. Salvati

Portrait of Michael A. Salvati

A litigator and legal scholar, Michael provides streamlined solutions to his casualty clients’ most complex litigation challenges. With a focus on product liability, premises liability, automobile and other personal injury claims, he provides counsel to manufacturers of consumer goods, regional and national retail chains, manufacturing facilities, restaurants/bars, commercial landowners, pharmacies and more. Michael has experience in all aspects of defense litigation, from initial claim investigation through discovery and trial.  Michael has also assisted in the defense of class actions involving various subject matters, ranging from alleged product failures to data breach claims.

Michael prioritizes efficiency, achieving favorable outcomes, and ensuring the best possible results for his clients. By dissecting the key issues in litigation, he aims to avoid unnecessary complexities and legal disputes. He approaches every client matter strategically, by first assessing the case; identifying critical legal arguments; and creating a well-informed legal strategy.  

An avid reader and life-long student, he keeps abreast of legal topics pertinent to his clients, so he can better understand the current legal landscape and how it may impact their cases. A prolific writer, he has published substantive articles in The Pennsylvania Lawyer, The Legal Intelligencer and Law360. 

Michael’s scholarship and devotion to the law has not gone unnoticed. In 2023, he was selected to serve a five-year term on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s Civil Jury Instruction Subcommittee, which drafts jury instructions used by trial judges throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Admitted to practice in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Michael is a member of the Pennsylvania, Philadelphia and New Jersey State Bar Associations. He is additionally a member of the Defense Research Institute where he has served as an editor for its Product Liability Defenses, a State-by-State Compendium. 

Prior to joining the firm, Michael served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Timothy G. Farrell of the Superior Court of New Jersey. In that capacity, Michael managed the judge's dockets, drafted opinions and orders, and served as a mediator in Small Claims and Special Civil Part cases.

Michael earned his juris doctor at Villanova Law School, where he graduated in the top 10% of his class, was a member of the Order of the Coif, and served as an Associate Editor of the Villanova Law Review.  He earned his bachelor's degree in history from Villanova University, where he graduated first in his class with a 4.0 GPA.

Michael resides in South Jersey with his wife and twin boys.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2011)
    • Villanova University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2008)
    • New Jersey, 2011
    • Pennsylvania, 2011
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2013
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2024-2025)
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court Subcommittee for Civil Jury Instructions
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
  • Obtained summary judgment in a premises liability case pending the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The case involved an alleged trip-and-fall at a Chester County movie theater.  At the close of discovery, we filed a Rule 702 Motion challenging Plaintiffs’ expert and a Motion for Summary Judgment.  The Court granted both, finding that Plaintiffs’ expert did not satisfy the “reliability” or “fit” requirements of Rule 702; and finding that Plaintiffs could not prove that the defendants were on notice of an any allegedly hazardous condition.

    Obtained summary judgment on behalf of our client, a nonprofit organization, in a premises liability action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff allegedly fractured her leg after slipping and falling on an icy walkway outside the client’s community center. We argued that her claims were barred by a liability waiver she signed as part of her membership application. Although the plaintiff denied signing the waiver, the court ordered targeted discovery, and both parties retained handwriting experts. The court ultimately found that the defense had persuasively established the authenticity of the signature and that the plaintiff’s unsupported denials were insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Summary judgment was entered in favor of our client.

    Successfully obtained dismissal of a wrongful death action against a product manufacturer and distributor for lack of personal jurisdiction. The case involved allegations of a defective windshield installed in Pennsylvania, but the defense team demonstrated that the clients—located in Ohio and South Carolina—lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state, overcoming the plaintiff’s stream-of-commerce jurisdiction theory.

    Prevailed on a Motion to Dismiss in a data breach class action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Sixteen named plaintiffs brought claims alleging that a hacker had accessed the personal information of over 1,000,000 individuals nationwide. We defended the debt collection company whose computer servers were compromised. Plaintiffs asserted broad and novel legal theories, including negligent failure to protect data, breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy, negligence per se, and violations of various state consumer protection laws. We successfully contested these claims, resulting in the dismissal of eight plaintiffs for lack of standing and 15 of the 17 asserted causes of action being dismissed.

    Obtained a defense verdict as second chair in a federal jury trial involving an allegedly defective motorcycle that caught fire when left running contrary to instructions in the owner's manual, causing significant fire and smoke damage to the plaintiffs' residence.

    Obtained a summary judgment on behalf of a janitorial franchising company, successfully arguing that it was not responsible for the rogue acts of its franchisee who allegedly stole jewelry and engaged in sexual acts while cleaning the plaintiff's office.

    Obtained summary judgment on behalf of two homeowners, successfully arguing that they had no duty to prevent their general contractor from injuring his subcontractor, the plaintiff, who had fallen from a ladder on the job.

    Successfully defended a retail pharmacy and its delivery driver at arbitration on an auto accident claim for which liability was uncontested.  Michael obtained a limited tort finding and limited plaintiff to recovery of her unpaid medical expenses, which were minimal.  The suit had initially been filed as a major jury case before being remanded to arbitration, and the award was less than 1% of plaintiff's original demand.

    Obtained a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds of product liability and wrongful death claims brought against a truck dealership that was located in Ohio and that did not conduct regular business in Pennsylvania.

    Obtained a summary judgment for the manufacturer of a smoker in a failure to warn claim involving an allegedly defective barbecue smoker by successfully challenging the opinions of the plaintiff's expert as speculative.

    • The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers, A.M. Best Podcast, April 1, 2026
    • Strategies to Mitigate Risk and Avoid Litigation, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, May 14, 2025
    • Panel Member, Nuts and Bolts of Litigation Practice Under the Fair Share Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, April 2016.
    • Litigation Pointers for Defending the Supermarket Slip and Fall Case, Liberty Mutual Insurance, February 2015
    • "Pa. Supreme Court Must Defend Established Venue Standard," Law360, February 17, 2023
    • "A Two-Pronged Test Becomes One - Why the Superior Court's Venue Decision in Hangey Departs From Decades of Prior Precedent," The Pennsylvania Lawyer, January/February 2023
    • "After 'Tincher,' Evidence of Industry Standards Should be Admissible in PI Litigation,"The Legal Intelligencer, Personal Injury Supplement, November 5, 2021
    • “There’s No Turning Back Now: Product Liability Jury Instructions in the Wake of Tincher v. Omega Flex,” Defense Digest, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 2018
    • "There’s No Place Like “Home”: Challenging General Jurisdiction When an LLC Is a Citizen of the Forum State," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2017
    • “Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act: Practical Pointers for Litigators,” Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 2, June 2014, co-author

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

June 30, 2026

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Case Law Alerts

Superior Court Clarifies Crashworthiness Doctrine and Provides Key Jury‑Instruction Guidance

April 1, 2026

In the much-publicized Amagasu case, a jury returned a verdict of nearly a billion dollars to a plaintiff who was paralyzed in a rollover car accident.  On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the award and remanded for a new trial stating that the trial court did not properly charge the jury on crashworthiness principles. Crashworthiness is a subset of products liability cases in which it is alleged that a vehicle possessed a defect that did not cause an accident, but did not offer sufficient protection to the vehicle’s occupant during the accident. Pennsylvania law recognizes that collisions and other accidents are part of the intended use of a motor vehicle, so manufacturers must design and manufacture a product that is “reasonably crashworthy.” For example, if a plaintiff is involved in a head-on collision and the air bags do not deploy, the lack of air bag deployment did not cause the collision, but possibly increased the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries –  that failure to perform may give rise to a product defect claim. In Amagasu, the Superior Court re-affirmed the elements of a crashworthiness claim, which was first recognized in Pennsylvania in 1994, but has not frequently been analyzed since the landmark Tincher case re-defined the product liability cause of action. Amagasu explained that crashworthiness cases involved a “more rigorous” and a “heightened burden of proof” compared to ordinary products liability cases as a trade off for expanding the scope of liability to an alleged defect that did not cause the underlying accident. Specifically, in addition to proving a product defect, the plaintiff must prove that, at the time the vehicle was designed, a safer and more practical design existed. A plaintiff’s burden to prove causation is also heavier in a crashworthiness case, as he or she must distinguish between the “enhanced injury” caused by the defect, and the “non-compensable injuries” he or she would have sustained in the accident anyway. The Superior Court emphasized that these crashworthiness elements “impose a burden of proof far and above that of a typical” products liability case. Amagasu may have a greater impact than simply crashworthiness cases as the billion-dollar verdict was vacated because the trial court did not give proper jury instructions. The trial court had avoided giving instructions that were not included in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions, which did not provide a specific instruction on crashworthiness. The Suggested Standard Jury Instructions are an excellent resource and guide, but they are not an exhaustive statement of every area of the law. If a legal issue is raised by the evidence, the jury must be given an appropriate instruction, even if one is not included in the SSJI.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.