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SIU Spotlight

The Wild West on the East Coast: How the Fix Known as “No-Fault” Turned New York Into the O.K. Corral

SIU Spotlight, Issue 1, Vol. 1, July 2024

July 1, 2024

by Matthew A. Gray

Howdy! Did y’all come to hear about the virtues and triumphs of New York State No-Fault? Well sit on down and warm yourself by the fire, while I tell you the story of how a new little law gave way to greed, corruption and the white knights, known as Defense Counsel!

Introduced in 1974, New York State’s No-Fault insurance system, controlled under Regulation 68 or 11 NYCRR Part 65, otherwise known as “the Regs,” quickly became the foundation of how auto accidents were dealt with and how compensation was disturbed. The Regs were meant to provide quick and efficient coverage for medical expenses, lost wage, and other such claims for reimbursement post-auto accident: all without the need for drawn-out legal battles. However, over the decades since its inception, and with the many amendments to the Regs, multiple dusty trails for deceptive practices have been uncovered. Originally what was intended as a streamlined method to process claims and have parties taken care of has become a standoff of the highest order.

No-Fault law was created with certain tenets in mind which aim for the swift processing of claims. Two such tenets are that (1) claims be processed with haste and (2) the parties involved work together, amicably. While the basic and establishing principle of No-Fault law was always to ensure that auto accident victims received timely compensation for medical bills, etc., those who have taken on the practice seem to break into one of two groups: the lawmen who try to protect the public (Defense Counsel) and the outlaws trying to disturb the peace (Plaintiff’s Counsel).

While it may be true that those seeking medical treatment are oft seen and treated without haste or worry, the trouble starts when the bad eggs from the medical field roll into town, enlisting Plaintiff’s Counsel firms to perpetrate their nefarious plans. For every provider properly billing and treating patients, you will find a bad actor hiding in the herd, causing chaos and frustration throughout. One may ask themselves, “But, how can just a few bad actors affect an industry?” In the simplest of terms, any Defense Counsel worth their boot leather would say, “The premiums.” You see, it is our job to protect our clients’ interests. When our job is done well, we are able, as Defense Counsel, as lawmen, to keep the bad providers out of our town. By analyzing the cases we are assigned, and by recognizing the tell-tale signs of fraud and overbilling, we protect our clients from paying out claims they would not otherwise have to; thus, saving them in exposure. This is repaid to the good citizens of our settlement, to those who enlist the protection of the insurance carriers, by allowing them to have affordable premiums and, in turn, allows them to feel protected by the coverages they pay for.

While No-Fault may have been started with good intentions, it has taken a handful of bad eggs, acting with greed in mind, to try and exploit the entire system. For as good as Defense Counsel may be, those who seek to defraud our clients are just as skillful. Our adversaries know how, and when, to file suit against the insurance carriers. They know in what venue and in what order to file their suits. They have adapted to the amendments in the Regs, learned each carrier’s style of doing business, and they know how, and when, to best overload each carrier. They know that they can file a case on the last day before the statute of limitations (six years from when the claim accrues) and still have many years before any court will take up the case. These methods cost the carriers hundreds of millions of dollars annually, resulting in higher premiums and a lower quality of medical care. 

On one side, the bad-acting providers, seeking to force cases to trial, overburdening the carriers and courts with superfluous motion practice or, even as insidious, failing to respond to Defense Counsel’s requests to resolve the matter in a timely fashion.

The other side, the Defense Counsel, tired, ever-fighting, working to make the town safe for those just seeking a better quality of auto insurance coverage.

Effectively, we are locked in a daily standoff. However, it does feel like a victory whenever we can resolve a case. We close a case and get a little closer to what No-Fault is really about.

Matthew is a member of the Fraud/Special Investigation Practice Group, where he defends against intentional/staged losses, as well as medical provider fraud. He has vast experience conducting Examinations Under Oath/Depositions.
 

SIU Spotlight, Issue 1, Vol. 1, July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.