.

Lee C. Durivage

Chair, Employment Law

Chair, School Leaders' Liability

Portrait of Lee C. Durivage

Lee is a shareholder and the Chair of the Employment Law Practice Group, where he represents employers in the full spectrum of discrimination, harassment and retaliation claims, including claims pursuant to Title VII, the ADA public accommodation, the ADEA, the FMLA, whistleblower, housing discrimination and related tort claims. He is experienced in handling wage and hour lawsuits, including class and collective actions, pursuant to the FLSA, the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law. Additionally, Lee serves as the Vice Chair of the firm's School Leaders' Liability Practice Group. He routinely defends school districts, charter schools and other academic institutions in civil rights litigation, as well as in special education due process matters alleging violations of the IDEA and related federal and state statutes.

Lee serves as lead counsel for clients from a wide range of industries, including construction, manufacturing, restaurant and hospitality, education, real estate development, health care and non-profit organizations. He has served as lead counsel in a number of employment litigation matters in federal court and state court, as well as before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations. Additionally, Lee advises clients on how to avoid employment disputes altogether by counseling them on compliance with federal, state and local laws with respect to hiring, discipline, medical leave and terminations, as well as conducting workplace investigations and creating and updating employment policies and procedures to proactively manage employee relations.

In 2004, Lee graduated from Syracuse University with a double major in Communications & Rhetorical Studies and Political Science. Following graduation, he attended Widener University School of Law, receiving his juris doctor, cum laude, in 2007 and was awarded a Business Organization Law Certificate, with honors. During his time in law school, Lee served as an administrative board member of the Delaware Journal of Corporate Law and as a member of the Moe Levine Trial Advocacy Honor Society. He joined Marshall Dennehey as a summer associate in May 2006 and continued to work with the firm during his final year of law school. Following graduation, Lee returned to the firm as an associate in August 2007.

In addition to his employment practice, Lee has experience litigating environmental, toxic tort and professional liability matters. He has been recognized as a Pennsylvania Super Lawyer: Rising Star by Philadelphia Magazine in the area of Employment Litigation: Defense in from 2012 through 2021. Rising Stars are chosen by their peers as being among the top-up-and-coming lawyers in Pennsylvania. Only 2.5 percent of Pennsylvania attorneys receive this honor each year.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2007)
    • Syracuse University (B.S., 2004)
    • Pennsylvania, 2007
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2007
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2014
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2012-2022)
    • American Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Hot Topics in Employment Law, PBA Law Firm Administrators Conference, April 30, 2025
    • EPL – You Have Headaches, We Have Solutions, Public Risk Management Association Conference, Long Beach, CA, June 2023
    • Best Practices in Handling Employment Issues, Motor Carrier Insurance Education Foundation, November 2015
    • EPL Training, Berkley Mid-Atlantic Group, co-presenter, June 26, 2014
    • Social Media & Cyber Breaches: the Internet's Impact on Your Business, The Graham Company, co-presenter, May 2014
    • "The EEOC's Litigation Under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,"The Legal Intelligencer, November 8, 2024
    • "EEOC's Expansion of Accommodations Under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,"Pennsylvania Law Weekly, December 13, 2023
    • "The State of Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements," Pennsylvania Law Weekly, November 22, 2016
    • "EEOC’s Proposed Guidance Expands the Scope of Retaliation," Legal Updates for Employment Law, February 2016
    • "Avoiding Penalties When Classifying Independent Contractors,"The Legal Intelligencer, Employment Law Supplement, June 30, 2015
    • "Pennsylvania Employment Law Update," Counterpoint, newsletter of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute, 2008-present
    • "Avoiding Age Discrimination Claims in Succession Planning," The Legal Intelligencer, June 11, 2013
    • "When Does Striving for a Health Workforce Violate the Law?," The Legal Intelligencer, June 12, 2012
    • "The Continued Expansion of the ADA: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Updated Regulations In Light of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act," Counterpoint, newsletter of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute, Oct. 2011
    • "Undue Hardship: the Employer's Burden Under the ADAAA," The Legal Intelligencer, June 15, 2011
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2008-2018

Results

Defense Verdict Obtained in Two Consolidated Matters Following a Five-Day Trial

We obtained a defense verdict in two consolidated matters in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania following a five-day trial before Judge Gallagher. The first plaintiff alleged he was terminated in retaliation for filing a lawsuit and that he was subjected to racial discrimination during his employment. The second plaintiff alleged he was terminated in retaliation for supporting the wage and hour claims of the first plaintiff. After deliberating for approximately two hours, the jury answered “no” on the five theories asserted by the plaintiffs.

Unanimous Defense Verdict Secured in Fourth Amendment Civil Rights Trial

We obtained a defense verdict in a Fourth Amendment civil rights trial before Judge Michael Baylson in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that a public agency violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching and seizing his personal property after his vehicle was impounded. The defense witnesses each testified that the vehicle was never searched by the public agency and that the public agency does not have a policy or custom of searching vehicles once they are impounded, which was an essential element of plaintiff’s constitutional violation claim. After less than 15 minutes of deliberation, the jury unanimously found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the public agency violated his constitutional rights, granting judgment in favor of the public agency defendant.  

Thought Leadership

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.