.

Laurianne Falcone

Portrait of Laurianne Falcone

Laurie handles premises liability matters for retail facilities, daycare centers, amusement parks, homeowners and businesses involving personal injury matters and governmental entities. She handles trucking and transportation as well as automobile liability litigation. Laurie is also a certified arbitrator in Philadelphia.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Laurie served as a law clerk to the Honorable Gene D. Cohen in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County where she wrote judicial opinions, observed trials, and prepared lecture materials for the National Judicial College. 

Laurie is a graduate of Temple University School of Law and Ursinus College. 

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2000)
    • Ursinus College (B.A., 1997)
    • New Jersey, 2000
    • Pennsylvania, 2000
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2000
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2002
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2005-2008, 2013-2015)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Civil Litigation State of Affairs – The Impact of COVID-19 in Pennsylvania and New Jersey & What’s Next, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, May, 2021
    • An Overview of Commercial Auto Insurance in Pennsylvania & Ohio, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, January 26, 2021
    • The Art of the Deposition, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, June 2015
    • Premises Liability Litigation: Focus on the Slip, Trip and Fall Case, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, November 2014
    • Trying a Case in State Court from Start to Finish, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, July 2012, June 2014
    • Preservation of Evidence--Counsel's Responsibility?, Defense Research Institute 15th Annual Personal Injury Potpourri, Philadelphia, PA, April 16, 2013
    • Handling the Slip Trip & Fall, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, August 2010, Winter 2012
    • Pennsylvania's New Joint and Several Liability Law, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, October 2011
    • Premises Liability Seminar, Pennsylvania Association for Justice, 2010
    • How the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 Will Impact our Practice, May 26, 2009
    • Accident Documentation and Investigation, 2007 to present
    • "Production of Surveillance Evidence in Personal Injury Cases," The Legal Intelligencer, Personal Injury Supplement, November 22, 2016
    • “It’s All About the Timing...A Guide to Producing Surveillance Evidence of the Plaintiff in Personal Injury Cases,” Defense Digest, Vol. 22, No. 3, September 2016
    • "Managing a Litigation Practice From a Woman's Perspective," The Pennsylvania Lawyer, July-August, 2014
    • "Let's Spare Some Trees - Standard Discovery Requests in Philadelphia Arbitration Cases," Defense Digest, Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2005
    • "With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies?" Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 4, December 2004
    • "The Jury Can Only Follow the Instructions It's Given: An Analysis of Vallone v. Creech," Defense Digest, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2003
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a lawsuit alleging that the defendant set off a firework that struck an 11-year-old girl, resulting in second degree burns and permanent scarring on her back. Plaintiffs alleged through two independent eyewitnesses that the defendant was the perpetrator, although the defendant was acquitted in his criminal trial.  The jury was not permitted to hear any evidence regarding the criminal trial or to know that the defendant was acquitted. The jury found that the defendant was not negligent.
    • Defense verdict in lawsuit alleging negligent supervision by daycare facility of five-year-old child who sustained a severe fracture to his arm. Plaintiffs alleged that daycare employee was not properly "spotting" the child while he swung on the monkey bars at a local playground. Jury found defendant was not negligent because child had swung on monkey bars before without "spotting" and employee was standing just several feet away. Plaintiffs were awarded $40,000 at initial arbitration.
    • Defense verdict in lawsuit alleging negligence by amusement park for failing to provide a safe egress for adult on a water slide. Plaintiffs alleged that amusement park did not provide adequate assistance to adult patron who was unable to exit an inner tube and who hit her head on the bottom of the pool. Jury found defendant was not negligent because of videotape showing many patrons using the same attraction without incident and plaintiff was responsible for her own incident. Plaintiffs were awarded $15,000 at initial arbitration.
    • Defense verdict in lawsuit alleging negligence by amusement park for failing to provide a safe environment for five-year-­old child on an "attractive nuisance" staircase. Plaintiffs alleged that amusement park did not provide sufficient padding in and around a staircase featuring a prominent television character. Jury found defendant was not negligent because defendant is not required to protect its patrons from mere accidents. Plaintiffs were awarded $8,500 at initial arbitration.
    • Defense verdict in lawsuit alleging assault and battery by employees of retail facility during shoplifting incident. Plaintiff alleged that retail facility was negligent for allowing two of its employees to physically assault suspected shoplifters while questioning them. Jury found defendant was not negligent because plaintiff's evidence was not credible to support that such an assault even occurred, even though plaintiff sustained an orbital fracture.
    • Defense verdict in a slip and fall matter.  Plaintiff alleged that she slipped and fell on a tar spot located on the sidewalk of a property rented by our clients where she sustained injuries that required surgery.  Plaintiff lived only four houses away, but claimed she had never seen the tar spot before, despite having lived there for fourteen years and taking daily walks in the area.  Our clients had only moved into the property three months before the fall occurred, and they had never noticed the tar spot before. Our expert engineer tested the tar spot and told the jury that it was not slippery and was not a defect.  The case was complicated by the fact that there was a dusting of snow on the ground, which plaintiff claims obscured the tar spot.  Plaintiff testified that the snow did not cause her fall, rather, it was the tar spot alone.  The eight-member jury deliberated for 25 minutes before finding no negligence.
    • Defense verdict in a case slip and fall matter.  Plaintiff claimed that, when a piece of the top step broke off unexpectedly, she tripped and fell down the steps inside of the home she rented from our clients. Our clients testified that they had no notice of a dangerous condition, and plaintiff presented no evidence that anyone had knowledge of the deterioration of the steps.  In addition, plaintiff's six prior criminal convictions for theft, forgery, criminal trespass, etc. were all admitted into evidence.  Plaintiff attempted to argue that she turned her life around shortly before the incident happened, and our incident set her back.  In closing, plaintiff's attorney labeled one of our medical experts a "paid assassin" and asked the jurors to give the plaintiff "something to celebrate."  The jury was out for less than a half hour and found that our clients were not negligent.

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Sometimes Discovery Disputes Can Be Interesting

March 1, 2023

Key Points: The distinction between security video and surveillance video is important. Preservation of all possible video is critical to avoiding spoliation claims. Discovery issues aren’t usually the most moving and compelling (see what I did there), but a court’s resolution of those issues can be informative. One such discovery issue that is in flux much of the time concerns production of video footage in premises liability cases. Two recent opinions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania are worth examining. In the case of Dietzel v. Costco, et al., 2022 WL 2703612 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2022), the plaintiff claimed that he tripped and fell on an uneven sidewalk as he attempted to enter the tire center at Costco. According to the defendants, the alleged incident was not captured on their video cameras because there were no cameras covering the area in question. However, the plaintiffs noted that the claim notes produced by the defendants in discovery instructed the defendants to save video footage from the closest camera from one hour prior to the alleged incident until one hour after. Thus, the plaintiffs moved to compel production of any and all video footage from the entire property on the day of the alleged incident, regardless of whether that footage depicted the incident. In her opinion, Magistrate Judge Sitarski noted that the crux of the dispute was whether the footage in question was “security footage,” which was the plaintiffs’ position, or “surveillance footage,” as the defendants contended. Judge Sitarski noted that Pennsylvania courts have held that a defendant does not have to produce surveillance footage until after the plaintiff has been deposed because such footage is made for the purposes of impeachment. In contrast, the footage in that case was not a surveillance tape, rather, it was a security tape made in the normal course of business operations. Thus, Judge Sitarski ordered the defendants to produce 30 minutes of video footage before the time of the alleged incident and 30 minutes of footage after the incident, for a total of 60 minutes. Alternatively, if the defendants had no such footage, they were required to certify that in writing to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were not required to appear for their depositions until after either the footage or the certification was produced. In the case of Defrehn v. TJX Companies, Inc., 2022 WL 2974717 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2022), the plaintiff alleged that she was injured after she slipped and fell on a clear, gel-like substance inside of a TJ Maxx store on December 16, 2018. On December 31, 2018, the defendants’ insurance carrier requested that the defendants’ loss prevention district manager preserve all video footage from 20 minutes before and after the fall. The manager stated that no video of the incident existed. However, the manager later testified at his deposition that he had “reviewed” the footage but chose not to preserve it because he “didn’t think it was relevant.” In his testimony, he also confirmed that cameras would have captured when an employee removed cleaning supplies from a janitor’s closet. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligence claim. The plaintiff argued that the motion should be denied because of the defendants’ failure to preserve the video. District Judge Robreno agreed, stating that the manager testified he reviewed the footage and chose not to preserve it, even though it was relevant in that it would have at least shown when employees removed cleaning supplies from the janitor’s closet. Thus, application of an adverse inference by the court precluded the defendants from prevailing on summary judgment. What’s the practical application of these decisions? First, it is critical to ensure that any video footage, even if it doesn’t show the alleged incident, is preserved from the entire location for the entire day of the incident, if possible. Many times we are forced to try to prove a negative, and being able to show that something didn’t happen, or couldn’t have happened, is key. Second, there should be clear guidelines in place at the facility level as to what steps should be taken in the event of a customer incident in terms of incident reporting and preservation of video footage. As your defense attorneys, we typically come in to these situations long after the fact. Having solid protocols in place for these events protects your business from spoliation claims and adverse inferences, or worse, and makes our job easier.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.