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Laurianne Falcone

Portrait of Laurianne Falcone

Laurie handles premises liability matters for retail facilities, daycare centers, amusement parks, homeowners and businesses involving personal injury matters and governmental entities. She handles trucking and transportation as well as automobile liability litigation. Laurie is also a certified arbitrator in Philadelphia.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Laurie served as a law clerk to the Honorable Gene D. Cohen in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County where she wrote judicial opinions, observed trials, and prepared lecture materials for the National Judicial College. 

Laurie is a graduate of Temple University School of Law and Ursinus College. 

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2000)
    • Ursinus College (B.A., 1997)
    • New Jersey, 2000
    • Pennsylvania, 2000
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2000
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2002
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2005-2008, 2013-2015)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Civil Litigation State of Affairs – The Impact of COVID-19 in Pennsylvania and New Jersey & What’s Next, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, May, 2021
    • An Overview of Commercial Auto Insurance in Pennsylvania & Ohio, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, January 26, 2021
    • The Art of the Deposition, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, June 2015
    • Premises Liability Litigation: Focus on the Slip, Trip and Fall Case, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, November 2014
    • Trying a Case in State Court from Start to Finish, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, July 2012, June 2014
    • Preservation of Evidence--Counsel's Responsibility?, Defense Research Institute 15th Annual Personal Injury Potpourri, Philadelphia, PA, April 16, 2013
    • Handling the Slip Trip & Fall, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, August 2010, Winter 2012
    • Pennsylvania's New Joint and Several Liability Law, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, October 2011
    • Premises Liability Seminar, Pennsylvania Association for Justice, 2010
    • How the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 Will Impact our Practice, May 26, 2009
    • Accident Documentation and Investigation, 2007 to present
    • "Production of Surveillance Evidence in Personal Injury Cases," The Legal Intelligencer, Personal Injury Supplement, November 22, 2016
    • “It’s All About the Timing...A Guide to Producing Surveillance Evidence of the Plaintiff in Personal Injury Cases,” Defense Digest, Vol. 22, No. 3, September 2016
    • "Managing a Litigation Practice From a Woman's Perspective," The Pennsylvania Lawyer, July-August, 2014
    • "Let's Spare Some Trees - Standard Discovery Requests in Philadelphia Arbitration Cases," Defense Digest, Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2005
    • "With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies?" Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 4, December 2004
    • "The Jury Can Only Follow the Instructions It's Given: An Analysis of Vallone v. Creech," Defense Digest, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2003
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a lawsuit alleging that the defendant set off a firework that struck an 11-year-old girl, resulting in second degree burns and permanent scarring on her back. Plaintiffs alleged through two independent eyewitnesses that the defendant was the perpetrator, although the defendant was acquitted in his criminal trial.  The jury was not permitted to hear any evidence regarding the criminal trial or to know that the defendant was acquitted. The jury found that the defendant was not negligent.
    • Defense verdict in lawsuit alleging negligent supervision by daycare facility of five-year-old child who sustained a severe fracture to his arm. Plaintiffs alleged that daycare employee was not properly "spotting" the child while he swung on the monkey bars at a local playground. Jury found defendant was not negligent because child had swung on monkey bars before without "spotting" and employee was standing just several feet away. Plaintiffs were awarded $40,000 at initial arbitration.
    • Defense verdict in lawsuit alleging negligence by amusement park for failing to provide a safe egress for adult on a water slide. Plaintiffs alleged that amusement park did not provide adequate assistance to adult patron who was unable to exit an inner tube and who hit her head on the bottom of the pool. Jury found defendant was not negligent because of videotape showing many patrons using the same attraction without incident and plaintiff was responsible for her own incident. Plaintiffs were awarded $15,000 at initial arbitration.
    • Defense verdict in lawsuit alleging negligence by amusement park for failing to provide a safe environment for five-year-­old child on an "attractive nuisance" staircase. Plaintiffs alleged that amusement park did not provide sufficient padding in and around a staircase featuring a prominent television character. Jury found defendant was not negligent because defendant is not required to protect its patrons from mere accidents. Plaintiffs were awarded $8,500 at initial arbitration.
    • Defense verdict in lawsuit alleging assault and battery by employees of retail facility during shoplifting incident. Plaintiff alleged that retail facility was negligent for allowing two of its employees to physically assault suspected shoplifters while questioning them. Jury found defendant was not negligent because plaintiff's evidence was not credible to support that such an assault even occurred, even though plaintiff sustained an orbital fracture.
    • Defense verdict in a slip and fall matter.  Plaintiff alleged that she slipped and fell on a tar spot located on the sidewalk of a property rented by our clients where she sustained injuries that required surgery.  Plaintiff lived only four houses away, but claimed she had never seen the tar spot before, despite having lived there for fourteen years and taking daily walks in the area.  Our clients had only moved into the property three months before the fall occurred, and they had never noticed the tar spot before. Our expert engineer tested the tar spot and told the jury that it was not slippery and was not a defect.  The case was complicated by the fact that there was a dusting of snow on the ground, which plaintiff claims obscured the tar spot.  Plaintiff testified that the snow did not cause her fall, rather, it was the tar spot alone.  The eight-member jury deliberated for 25 minutes before finding no negligence.
    • Defense verdict in a case slip and fall matter.  Plaintiff claimed that, when a piece of the top step broke off unexpectedly, she tripped and fell down the steps inside of the home she rented from our clients. Our clients testified that they had no notice of a dangerous condition, and plaintiff presented no evidence that anyone had knowledge of the deterioration of the steps.  In addition, plaintiff's six prior criminal convictions for theft, forgery, criminal trespass, etc. were all admitted into evidence.  Plaintiff attempted to argue that she turned her life around shortly before the incident happened, and our incident set her back.  In closing, plaintiff's attorney labeled one of our medical experts a "paid assassin" and asked the jurors to give the plaintiff "something to celebrate."  The jury was out for less than a half hour and found that our clients were not negligent.

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Sometimes Discovery Disputes Can Be Interesting

March 1, 2023

Key Points: The distinction between security video and surveillance video is important. Preservation of all possible video is critical to avoiding spoliation claims. Discovery issues aren’t usually the most moving and compelling (see what I did there), but a court’s resolution of those issues can be informative. One such discovery issue that is in flux much of the time concerns production of video footage in premises liability cases. Two recent opinions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania are worth examining. In the case of Dietzel v. Costco, et al., 2022 WL 2703612 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2022), the plaintiff claimed that he tripped and fell on an uneven sidewalk as he attempted to enter the tire center at Costco. According to the defendants, the alleged incident was not captured on their video cameras because there were no cameras covering the area in question. However, the plaintiffs noted that the claim notes produced by the defendants in discovery instructed the defendants to save video footage from the closest camera from one hour prior to the alleged incident until one hour after. Thus, the plaintiffs moved to compel production of any and all video footage from the entire property on the day of the alleged incident, regardless of whether that footage depicted the incident. In her opinion, Magistrate Judge Sitarski noted that the crux of the dispute was whether the footage in question was “security footage,” which was the plaintiffs’ position, or “surveillance footage,” as the defendants contended. Judge Sitarski noted that Pennsylvania courts have held that a defendant does not have to produce surveillance footage until after the plaintiff has been deposed because such footage is made for the purposes of impeachment. In contrast, the footage in that case was not a surveillance tape, rather, it was a security tape made in the normal course of business operations. Thus, Judge Sitarski ordered the defendants to produce 30 minutes of video footage before the time of the alleged incident and 30 minutes of footage after the incident, for a total of 60 minutes. Alternatively, if the defendants had no such footage, they were required to certify that in writing to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were not required to appear for their depositions until after either the footage or the certification was produced. In the case of Defrehn v. TJX Companies, Inc., 2022 WL 2974717 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2022), the plaintiff alleged that she was injured after she slipped and fell on a clear, gel-like substance inside of a TJ Maxx store on December 16, 2018. On December 31, 2018, the defendants’ insurance carrier requested that the defendants’ loss prevention district manager preserve all video footage from 20 minutes before and after the fall. The manager stated that no video of the incident existed. However, the manager later testified at his deposition that he had “reviewed” the footage but chose not to preserve it because he “didn’t think it was relevant.” In his testimony, he also confirmed that cameras would have captured when an employee removed cleaning supplies from a janitor’s closet. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligence claim. The plaintiff argued that the motion should be denied because of the defendants’ failure to preserve the video. District Judge Robreno agreed, stating that the manager testified he reviewed the footage and chose not to preserve it, even though it was relevant in that it would have at least shown when employees removed cleaning supplies from the janitor’s closet. Thus, application of an adverse inference by the court precluded the defendants from prevailing on summary judgment. What’s the practical application of these decisions? First, it is critical to ensure that any video footage, even if it doesn’t show the alleged incident, is preserved from the entire location for the entire day of the incident, if possible. Many times we are forced to try to prove a negative, and being able to show that something didn’t happen, or couldn’t have happened, is key. Second, there should be clear guidelines in place at the facility level as to what steps should be taken in the event of a customer incident in terms of incident reporting and preservation of video footage. As your defense attorneys, we typically come in to these situations long after the fact. Having solid protocols in place for these events protects your business from spoliation claims and adverse inferences, or worse, and makes our job easier.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.