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Kristen L. Worley

Co-Chair, Catastrophic Claims Litigation

Co-Chair, Cannabis Law Practice

Portrait of Kristen L. Worley

Kristen Worley brings more than 22 years of litigation and trial experience to Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department. Throughout her career, she has represented a variety of clients in New Jersey and Pennsylvania in the areas of product liability, premises liability, commercial motor vehicle and, specifically, companies specializing in paratransit and non-emergency medical transport lines of business. Additionally, she has handled product defect cases and negligent maintenance cases for elevators and escalators throughout PA and NJ.  Kristen routinely defends elevator mechanics in their depositions to defend modernization cases, door strikes, mislevelings, improper passenger extractions by third parties, etc. Kristen has also been admitted on a pro hac basis at the request of her clients to litigate matters with significant exposure in Delaware and New York.  

Kristen is driven by results; whether that be identifying those matters that are ripe for early resolution or engaging in targeted discovery for those cases that must be tried. Litigation with a purpose is the key to her success both behind the scenes and in the courtroom. This case management methodology and approach to litigation has proven successful over the years, assisting Kristen in securing the 3rd largest negligent entrustment verdict in New Jersey in 2017.   

Kristen is an honors graduate of Trenton State College and earned her law degree at Rutgers School of Law in Camden, New Jersey. In addition to the state courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Kristen is admitted in the District Court of New Jersey, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals.  Active in the legal community, she is a member of the International Association of Defense Counsel and the prestigious Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel. 

Kristen resides in Southern New Jersey with her family where she enjoys spending her time involved in the local youth soccer community.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 1999)
    • The College of New Jersey (B.S., magna cum laude, 1996)
    • New Jersey, 1999
    • Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Strategically defended and obtained the dismissal of a Laidlow claim asserted by the plaintiff who was acting within the course and scope of his employment with the defendant when he sustained a significant workplace injury. In a 37-page written opinion granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and addressing several other applications, the court ruled the plaintiff failed to establish that his employer committed an intentional and malicious act sufficient to circumvent the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the Millison “conduct” and “context” prongs, reasoning that the absence of prior accidents or evidence suggesting the plaintiff’s employer intentionally disabled a safety device, the lack of pre-incident OSHA violations or post-accident efforts by the employer to deceive OSHA, and the undeniable determination that the plaintiff’s incident was “part and parcel” of industrial life, all warranted the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim. You can read the opinion here.  

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained in Significant Workplace Injury Case

We secured a motion for summary judgment in a significant workplace injury case involving a Laidlow claim. The court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to establish that his employer had committed an intentional and malicious act sufficient to circumvent the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision.

Jury Defense in High-Stakes Catastrophic Litigation Case

We obtained a defense verdict in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a case where the plaintiff sought $24.1M for alleged property damages and lost revenue.     In 2014, our client defendant, a marine construction company, was retained by the U.S. Navy to conduct pile driving activities at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The plaintiff, a neighboring commercial property owner, alleged that our client's pile driving and related activities damaged its property and caused it to lose revenue. All other defendants settled before trial. The plaintiff claimed $20 million in damages against our client. A bifurcated trial began on January 17, 2023. The plaintiff’s demand dropped throughout the nine-day liability phase, which involved numerous scientific and engineering experts and other witnesses. On January 27, 2023, the jury returned its unanimous verdict, attributing 60% of the fault to plaintiff itself and 25% to the Navy, which resulted in a defense verdict for our client. As a result of the defense verdict on liability, there will be no damages phase.  

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Navigating the Complexities of Cannabis Litigation: Marshall Dennehey’s Multidisciplinary Approach to a Rapidly Evolving Industry

December 1, 2025

Cannabis litigation is on the rise and impacts multiple facets of law. Marshall Dennehey’s Cannabis Law Practice Group is adept at helping clients navigate this evolving legal landscape, offering a full suite of legal services, no matter what type of claim a cannabis business or its insurers may be facing. Our services include analysis of insurance coverage and the defense of commercial general liability (CGL), professional liability, cybersecurity, employment, workers’ compensation, and health care claims. Coverage Our team defends insurers and managing general agents (MGAs) against cannabis-related coverage and bad faith claims, including those related to equipment breakdown, application of protective safeguard endorsements, business interruption, and crop losses. We are familiar with the industry’s underwriting goals and policies that reflect the unique risks of this segment.  CGL Claims  Commercial general liability claims encompass a wide range of casualty matters relevant to cannabis operations and recreational product usage. These claims may include auto liability matters, product liability claims, “Gram-Shop,” and other retail accessory risks, such as landlord liability and delivery service claims. We defend typical retail claims at cannabis dispensaries, such as falls and even assault claims involving altercations between patrons and, occasionally, employees. In doing so, we utilize varied technology assets of clients, such as surveillance and body cam footage and, where appropriate, pursue loss-transfer claims against third parties. Additionally, we defend clients in cannabis product liability matters, including claims of tainted product, and have identified a team of experts in the various fields of toxicology, analytical chemistry, food safety, and forensic science to assist in defending these claims.  Professional Liability Claims Our vast history and focus on defending professional liability claims across a broad range of industries affords our attorneys a unique advantage in defending claims brought against cannabis professionals, such as growers, cultivators, consultants, accountants, lawyers, MGAs, adjusters, and others who work within this space.  Cybersecurity Claims  Ransomware attacks and data breaches threaten cannabis operators and their obligation to safeguard their customers’ sensitive medical and personal data. Likewise, security breaches with track-and-trace software designed to track cannabis from “seed-to-sale” can interrupt an operator’s regulatory compliance. In the event of a data compromise, our cyber team is available to quickly mobilize and mitigate the damage caused by a ransomware attack. Employment and Workers’ Compensation Claims With the growing approval of recreational cannabis usage and the increasing number of cultivators and dispensaries popping up to meet consumer demand, it is not surprising that employment and workers’ compensation lawsuits in these fields are trending upwards. Our attorneys defend facility owners and operators when wage-and-hour disputes, discrimination and harassment, and retaliation claims arise. We also represent insurers and employers in workplace injury and occupational hazard claims. Our approach extends to cannabis industry-specific risks that include cultivation and manufacturing operations, as well as retail sales and distribution environments. Health Care Claims While many states have legalized the medical use of cannabis, it remains illegal under federal law. This dichotomy creates significant legal challenges for health care providers. Our attorneys leverage their experience in helping clients navigate health care regulations, such as HIPAA laws and patient privacy protections, and apply it to the uniquely complex environment surrounding the cannabis industry. We defend clients against civil claims, including medical malpractice matters, and can assist health care providers—including physicians, dispensaries and clinics—in understanding the evolving standards of care for cannabis as a therapeutic option, which can differ significantly from conventional treatments. Such claims may involve appropriate patient evaluations, dosage recommendations, and documentation requirements within the framework of state medical cannabis programs. We are also well-equipped to address challenges related to informed consent.  As the legal and regulatory frameworks surrounding cannabis continue to evolve, so too do the risks and complexities faced by businesses operating within this area. Our Cannabis Law Practice Group stands at the forefront of this rapidly developing field, providing clients with informed, strategic, and results-oriented counsel. Our multidisciplinary approach—spanning coverage, liability, cybersecurity, employment, workers’ compensation, and health care—ensures that clients receive comprehensive support tailored to the unique challenges of the cannabis industry. Whether addressing emerging claims or guiding proactive risk management, our team is committed to protecting our clients’ interests and positioning them for continued success in this dynamic legal landscape. Kristen works in our Philadelphia, PA office and can be reached at 215-575-2849 or KLWorley@mdwcg.com. Todd works in both our Philadelphia, PA and Mount Laurel, NJ offices. He can be reached at 215-575-2605, 856-414-6029 or TJLeon@mdwcg.com.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest

Including Settled Defendants on a Verdict Sheet: A Reminder that No Assumptions Are Allowed

December 1, 2023

Key Points: Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act permits the inclusion of a defendant or other non-party who has entered into a release with a plaintiff to be included on the verdict sheet and, thus, subject to apportionment of liability “… upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party.”  Employers who are granted immunity from liability and suit under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act are not subject to inclusion on a verdict sheet.  Trial of any case necessarily comes at the conclusion of months, and, in many instances, years, of discovery. Practitioners carefully weigh their strategy when propounding and answering written discovery, asserting objections during depositions, and serving expert reports. During this phase, it is easy to push the notion of trial and all of its practical considerations to the side, acknowledging the oft-cited statistic that only 1% of cases will reach the trial stage. Nevertheless, when those few cases we encounter in our practice reach the trial stage, we find ourselves preparing in earnest for testimony, crafting arguments for the admission or exclusion of evidence, as the case may be, and finally, preparing a litany of pretrial submissions. It is this latter subset of considerations, and specifically the verdict sheet, that are ultimately submitted to a jury which is the focus herein. A jury verdict sheet is the sum of every case expressed in its simplest form and, quite arguably, the most important document in any trial. The verdict sheet outlines for a jury the decisions that must be rendered once all the evidence has been placed before it. The form can take any number of versions, but in the traditional case, it directs a jury to determine liability, causation, and damages. But who goes on the verdict sheet? We expect that parties to a lawsuit will be placed on a verdict sheet, but what about settled defendants and non-parties? A defendant has a significant interest in providing a jury with the opportunity to apportion fault to as many entities as possible, thereby reducing its overall exposure.  Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, directs practitioners as to those instances in which settled defendants and non-parties may be included on a verdict sheet for purposes of apportionment of liability. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a)(2) provides as follows: Apportionment of responsibility among certain nonparties and effect.--For purposes of apportioning liability only, the question of liability of any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party. A person whose liability may be determined pursuant to this section does not include an employer to the extent that the employer is granted immunity from liability or suit pursuant to the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Note the key phrase in the foregoing citation, “…any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party.” (Emphasis added.) Significantly, Pennsylvania courts have determined that there is no absolute right to the inclusion of a settled defendant on a verdict sheet. Hyrcza v. West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc,. 978 A.2d 961, 969-970 (Pa. Super. 2009). Rather, a jury must be presented with proofs sufficient to find the settled defendant or other person liable, and the trial court functions as the gate keeper to determine whether that evidential burden has been satisfied. Ultimately, a trial court’s determination of whether sufficient evidence has been adduced that supports a prima facie case against a settled defendant and, thus, its inclusion on a verdict sheet is a decision that is subject to review for an abuse of discretion or error of law. See Rose v. Annabi, 934 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. Super. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of the trial court represents “not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. In discussing this standard of review, practitioners must take note that the decision of the trial court concerning the inclusion of a settled defendant or other person on a verdict sheet will be, for better or worse, a difficult ruling to challenge on appeal, and one should prepare their trial proofs accordingly.  In converse to settled defendants that may be placed on a verdict sheet following the submission of sufficient evidence of fault, employers who are granted immunity under the Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act are not subject to inclusion on a verdict sheet. The exclusivity provision of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, set forth at 77 P.S. § 481, provides that the “liability of an employer under this Act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employees … entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death … .” Acknowledging the Act’s limitation of suit, or exclusivity provision, the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act similarly bars the apportionment of any liability to an employer immunized from liability or suit under the Act. In sum, practitioners should not presume that defendants or non-parties who have entered into a release with the plaintiff will automatically be included on the verdict sheet. Rather, they should prepare their cases for trial with special attention paid to expert discovery and advance theories of liability against a settled entity. In this manner, practitioners can ensure that they are capable of presenting sufficient proofs from which the trial court can conclude that a prima facie case of liability has been advanced against a settled entity and, thereby, order the inclusion of said entity on the verdict sheet for purposes of liability apportionment.  *Kristen, a shareholder in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office, is Co-Chair of our firm’s Catastrophic Claims Litigation Practice Group. She can be reached at 215.575.2849 or KLWorley@mdwcg.com.   Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.