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Kristen L. Worley

Co-Chair, Catastrophic Claims Litigation

Co-Chair, Cannabis Law Practice

Portrait of Kristen L. Worley

Kristen Worley brings more than 22 years of litigation and trial experience to Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department. Throughout her career, she has represented a variety of clients in New Jersey and Pennsylvania in the areas of product liability, premises liability, commercial motor vehicle and, specifically, companies specializing in paratransit and non-emergency medical transport lines of business. Additionally, she has handled product defect cases and negligent maintenance cases for elevators and escalators throughout PA and NJ.  Kristen routinely defends elevator mechanics in their depositions to defend modernization cases, door strikes, mislevelings, improper passenger extractions by third parties, etc. Kristen has also been admitted on a pro hac basis at the request of her clients to litigate matters with significant exposure in Delaware and New York.  

Kristen is driven by results; whether that be identifying those matters that are ripe for early resolution or engaging in targeted discovery for those cases that must be tried. Litigation with a purpose is the key to her success both behind the scenes and in the courtroom. This case management methodology and approach to litigation has proven successful over the years, assisting Kristen in securing the 3rd largest negligent entrustment verdict in New Jersey in 2017.   

Kristen is an honors graduate of Trenton State College and earned her law degree at Rutgers School of Law in Camden, New Jersey. In addition to the state courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Kristen is admitted in the District Court of New Jersey, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals.  Active in the legal community, she is a member of the International Association of Defense Counsel and the prestigious Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel. 

Kristen resides in Southern New Jersey with her family where she enjoys spending her time involved in the local youth soccer community.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 1999)
    • The College of New Jersey (B.S., magna cum laude, 1996)
    • New Jersey, 1999
    • Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Strategically defended and obtained the dismissal of a Laidlow claim asserted by the plaintiff who was acting within the course and scope of his employment with the defendant when he sustained a significant workplace injury. In a 37-page written opinion granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and addressing several other applications, the court ruled the plaintiff failed to establish that his employer committed an intentional and malicious act sufficient to circumvent the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the Millison “conduct” and “context” prongs, reasoning that the absence of prior accidents or evidence suggesting the plaintiff’s employer intentionally disabled a safety device, the lack of pre-incident OSHA violations or post-accident efforts by the employer to deceive OSHA, and the undeniable determination that the plaintiff’s incident was “part and parcel” of industrial life, all warranted the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim. You can read the opinion here.  

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained in Significant Workplace Injury Case

We secured a motion for summary judgment in a significant workplace injury case involving a Laidlow claim. The court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to establish that his employer had committed an intentional and malicious act sufficient to circumvent the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision.

Jury Defense in High-Stakes Catastrophic Litigation Case

We obtained a defense verdict in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a case where the plaintiff sought $24.1M for alleged property damages and lost revenue.     In 2014, our client defendant, a marine construction company, was retained by the U.S. Navy to conduct pile driving activities at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The plaintiff, a neighboring commercial property owner, alleged that our client's pile driving and related activities damaged its property and caused it to lose revenue. All other defendants settled before trial. The plaintiff claimed $20 million in damages against our client. A bifurcated trial began on January 17, 2023. The plaintiff’s demand dropped throughout the nine-day liability phase, which involved numerous scientific and engineering experts and other witnesses. On January 27, 2023, the jury returned its unanimous verdict, attributing 60% of the fault to plaintiff itself and 25% to the Navy, which resulted in a defense verdict for our client. As a result of the defense verdict on liability, there will be no damages phase.  

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Navigating the Complexities of Cannabis Litigation: Marshall Dennehey’s Multidisciplinary Approach to a Rapidly Evolving Industry

December 1, 2025

Cannabis litigation is on the rise and impacts multiple facets of law. Marshall Dennehey’s Cannabis Law Practice Group is adept at helping clients navigate this evolving legal landscape, offering a full suite of legal services, no matter what type of claim a cannabis business or its insurers may be facing. Our services include analysis of insurance coverage and the defense of commercial general liability (CGL), professional liability, cybersecurity, employment, workers’ compensation, and health care claims. Coverage Our team defends insurers and managing general agents (MGAs) against cannabis-related coverage and bad faith claims, including those related to equipment breakdown, application of protective safeguard endorsements, business interruption, and crop losses. We are familiar with the industry’s underwriting goals and policies that reflect the unique risks of this segment.  CGL Claims  Commercial general liability claims encompass a wide range of casualty matters relevant to cannabis operations and recreational product usage. These claims may include auto liability matters, product liability claims, “Gram-Shop,” and other retail accessory risks, such as landlord liability and delivery service claims. We defend typical retail claims at cannabis dispensaries, such as falls and even assault claims involving altercations between patrons and, occasionally, employees. In doing so, we utilize varied technology assets of clients, such as surveillance and body cam footage and, where appropriate, pursue loss-transfer claims against third parties. Additionally, we defend clients in cannabis product liability matters, including claims of tainted product, and have identified a team of experts in the various fields of toxicology, analytical chemistry, food safety, and forensic science to assist in defending these claims.  Professional Liability Claims Our vast history and focus on defending professional liability claims across a broad range of industries affords our attorneys a unique advantage in defending claims brought against cannabis professionals, such as growers, cultivators, consultants, accountants, lawyers, MGAs, adjusters, and others who work within this space.  Cybersecurity Claims  Ransomware attacks and data breaches threaten cannabis operators and their obligation to safeguard their customers’ sensitive medical and personal data. Likewise, security breaches with track-and-trace software designed to track cannabis from “seed-to-sale” can interrupt an operator’s regulatory compliance. In the event of a data compromise, our cyber team is available to quickly mobilize and mitigate the damage caused by a ransomware attack. Employment and Workers’ Compensation Claims With the growing approval of recreational cannabis usage and the increasing number of cultivators and dispensaries popping up to meet consumer demand, it is not surprising that employment and workers’ compensation lawsuits in these fields are trending upwards. Our attorneys defend facility owners and operators when wage-and-hour disputes, discrimination and harassment, and retaliation claims arise. We also represent insurers and employers in workplace injury and occupational hazard claims. Our approach extends to cannabis industry-specific risks that include cultivation and manufacturing operations, as well as retail sales and distribution environments. Health Care Claims While many states have legalized the medical use of cannabis, it remains illegal under federal law. This dichotomy creates significant legal challenges for health care providers. Our attorneys leverage their experience in helping clients navigate health care regulations, such as HIPAA laws and patient privacy protections, and apply it to the uniquely complex environment surrounding the cannabis industry. We defend clients against civil claims, including medical malpractice matters, and can assist health care providers—including physicians, dispensaries and clinics—in understanding the evolving standards of care for cannabis as a therapeutic option, which can differ significantly from conventional treatments. Such claims may involve appropriate patient evaluations, dosage recommendations, and documentation requirements within the framework of state medical cannabis programs. We are also well-equipped to address challenges related to informed consent.  As the legal and regulatory frameworks surrounding cannabis continue to evolve, so too do the risks and complexities faced by businesses operating within this area. Our Cannabis Law Practice Group stands at the forefront of this rapidly developing field, providing clients with informed, strategic, and results-oriented counsel. Our multidisciplinary approach—spanning coverage, liability, cybersecurity, employment, workers’ compensation, and health care—ensures that clients receive comprehensive support tailored to the unique challenges of the cannabis industry. Whether addressing emerging claims or guiding proactive risk management, our team is committed to protecting our clients’ interests and positioning them for continued success in this dynamic legal landscape. Kristen works in our Philadelphia, PA office and can be reached at 215-575-2849 or KLWorley@mdwcg.com. Todd works in both our Philadelphia, PA and Mount Laurel, NJ offices. He can be reached at 215-575-2605, 856-414-6029 or TJLeon@mdwcg.com.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest

Including Settled Defendants on a Verdict Sheet: A Reminder that No Assumptions Are Allowed

December 1, 2023

Key Points: Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act permits the inclusion of a defendant or other non-party who has entered into a release with a plaintiff to be included on the verdict sheet and, thus, subject to apportionment of liability “… upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party.”  Employers who are granted immunity from liability and suit under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act are not subject to inclusion on a verdict sheet.  Trial of any case necessarily comes at the conclusion of months, and, in many instances, years, of discovery. Practitioners carefully weigh their strategy when propounding and answering written discovery, asserting objections during depositions, and serving expert reports. During this phase, it is easy to push the notion of trial and all of its practical considerations to the side, acknowledging the oft-cited statistic that only 1% of cases will reach the trial stage. Nevertheless, when those few cases we encounter in our practice reach the trial stage, we find ourselves preparing in earnest for testimony, crafting arguments for the admission or exclusion of evidence, as the case may be, and finally, preparing a litany of pretrial submissions. It is this latter subset of considerations, and specifically the verdict sheet, that are ultimately submitted to a jury which is the focus herein. A jury verdict sheet is the sum of every case expressed in its simplest form and, quite arguably, the most important document in any trial. The verdict sheet outlines for a jury the decisions that must be rendered once all the evidence has been placed before it. The form can take any number of versions, but in the traditional case, it directs a jury to determine liability, causation, and damages. But who goes on the verdict sheet? We expect that parties to a lawsuit will be placed on a verdict sheet, but what about settled defendants and non-parties? A defendant has a significant interest in providing a jury with the opportunity to apportion fault to as many entities as possible, thereby reducing its overall exposure.  Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, directs practitioners as to those instances in which settled defendants and non-parties may be included on a verdict sheet for purposes of apportionment of liability. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a)(2) provides as follows: Apportionment of responsibility among certain nonparties and effect.--For purposes of apportioning liability only, the question of liability of any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party. A person whose liability may be determined pursuant to this section does not include an employer to the extent that the employer is granted immunity from liability or suit pursuant to the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Note the key phrase in the foregoing citation, “…any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party.” (Emphasis added.) Significantly, Pennsylvania courts have determined that there is no absolute right to the inclusion of a settled defendant on a verdict sheet. Hyrcza v. West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc,. 978 A.2d 961, 969-970 (Pa. Super. 2009). Rather, a jury must be presented with proofs sufficient to find the settled defendant or other person liable, and the trial court functions as the gate keeper to determine whether that evidential burden has been satisfied. Ultimately, a trial court’s determination of whether sufficient evidence has been adduced that supports a prima facie case against a settled defendant and, thus, its inclusion on a verdict sheet is a decision that is subject to review for an abuse of discretion or error of law. See Rose v. Annabi, 934 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. Super. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of the trial court represents “not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. In discussing this standard of review, practitioners must take note that the decision of the trial court concerning the inclusion of a settled defendant or other person on a verdict sheet will be, for better or worse, a difficult ruling to challenge on appeal, and one should prepare their trial proofs accordingly.  In converse to settled defendants that may be placed on a verdict sheet following the submission of sufficient evidence of fault, employers who are granted immunity under the Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act are not subject to inclusion on a verdict sheet. The exclusivity provision of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, set forth at 77 P.S. § 481, provides that the “liability of an employer under this Act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employees … entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death … .” Acknowledging the Act’s limitation of suit, or exclusivity provision, the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act similarly bars the apportionment of any liability to an employer immunized from liability or suit under the Act. In sum, practitioners should not presume that defendants or non-parties who have entered into a release with the plaintiff will automatically be included on the verdict sheet. Rather, they should prepare their cases for trial with special attention paid to expert discovery and advance theories of liability against a settled entity. In this manner, practitioners can ensure that they are capable of presenting sufficient proofs from which the trial court can conclude that a prima facie case of liability has been advanced against a settled entity and, thereby, order the inclusion of said entity on the verdict sheet for purposes of liability apportionment.  *Kristen, a shareholder in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office, is Co-Chair of our firm’s Catastrophic Claims Litigation Practice Group. She can be reached at 215.575.2849 or KLWorley@mdwcg.com.   Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.