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Kristen L. Worley

Co-Chair, Catastrophic Claims Litigation

Co-Chair, Cannabis Law Practice

Portrait of Kristen L. Worley

Kristen Worley brings more than 22 years of litigation and trial experience to Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department. Throughout her career, she has represented a variety of clients in New Jersey and Pennsylvania in the areas of product liability, premises liability, commercial motor vehicle and, specifically, companies specializing in paratransit and non-emergency medical transport lines of business. Additionally, she has handled product defect cases and negligent maintenance cases for elevators and escalators throughout PA and NJ.  Kristen routinely defends elevator mechanics in their depositions to defend modernization cases, door strikes, mislevelings, improper passenger extractions by third parties, etc. Kristen has also been admitted on a pro hac basis at the request of her clients to litigate matters with significant exposure in Delaware and New York.  

Kristen is driven by results; whether that be identifying those matters that are ripe for early resolution or engaging in targeted discovery for those cases that must be tried. Litigation with a purpose is the key to her success both behind the scenes and in the courtroom. This case management methodology and approach to litigation has proven successful over the years, assisting Kristen in securing the 3rd largest negligent entrustment verdict in New Jersey in 2017.   

Kristen is an honors graduate of Trenton State College and earned her law degree at Rutgers School of Law in Camden, New Jersey. In addition to the state courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Kristen is admitted in the District Court of New Jersey, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals.  Active in the legal community, she is a member of the International Association of Defense Counsel and the prestigious Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel. 

Kristen resides in Southern New Jersey with her family where she enjoys spending her time involved in the local youth soccer community.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 1999)
    • The College of New Jersey (B.S., magna cum laude, 1996)
    • New Jersey, 1999
    • Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Strategically defended and obtained the dismissal of a Laidlow claim asserted by the plaintiff who was acting within the course and scope of his employment with the defendant when he sustained a significant workplace injury. In a 37-page written opinion granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and addressing several other applications, the court ruled the plaintiff failed to establish that his employer committed an intentional and malicious act sufficient to circumvent the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the Millison “conduct” and “context” prongs, reasoning that the absence of prior accidents or evidence suggesting the plaintiff’s employer intentionally disabled a safety device, the lack of pre-incident OSHA violations or post-accident efforts by the employer to deceive OSHA, and the undeniable determination that the plaintiff’s incident was “part and parcel” of industrial life, all warranted the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim. You can read the opinion here.  

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained in Significant Workplace Injury Case

We secured a motion for summary judgment in a significant workplace injury case involving a Laidlow claim. The court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to establish that his employer had committed an intentional and malicious act sufficient to circumvent the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision.

Jury Defense in High-Stakes Catastrophic Litigation Case

We obtained a defense verdict in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a case where the plaintiff sought $24.1M for alleged property damages and lost revenue.     In 2014, our client defendant, a marine construction company, was retained by the U.S. Navy to conduct pile driving activities at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The plaintiff, a neighboring commercial property owner, alleged that our client's pile driving and related activities damaged its property and caused it to lose revenue. All other defendants settled before trial. The plaintiff claimed $20 million in damages against our client. A bifurcated trial began on January 17, 2023. The plaintiff’s demand dropped throughout the nine-day liability phase, which involved numerous scientific and engineering experts and other witnesses. On January 27, 2023, the jury returned its unanimous verdict, attributing 60% of the fault to plaintiff itself and 25% to the Navy, which resulted in a defense verdict for our client. As a result of the defense verdict on liability, there will be no damages phase.  

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Navigating the Complexities of Cannabis Litigation: Marshall Dennehey’s Multidisciplinary Approach to a Rapidly Evolving Industry

December 1, 2025

Cannabis litigation is on the rise and impacts multiple facets of law. Marshall Dennehey’s Cannabis Law Practice Group is adept at helping clients navigate this evolving legal landscape, offering a full suite of legal services, no matter what type of claim a cannabis business or its insurers may be facing. Our services include analysis of insurance coverage and the defense of commercial general liability (CGL), professional liability, cybersecurity, employment, workers’ compensation, and health care claims. Coverage Our team defends insurers and managing general agents (MGAs) against cannabis-related coverage and bad faith claims, including those related to equipment breakdown, application of protective safeguard endorsements, business interruption, and crop losses. We are familiar with the industry’s underwriting goals and policies that reflect the unique risks of this segment.  CGL Claims  Commercial general liability claims encompass a wide range of casualty matters relevant to cannabis operations and recreational product usage. These claims may include auto liability matters, product liability claims, “Gram-Shop,” and other retail accessory risks, such as landlord liability and delivery service claims. We defend typical retail claims at cannabis dispensaries, such as falls and even assault claims involving altercations between patrons and, occasionally, employees. In doing so, we utilize varied technology assets of clients, such as surveillance and body cam footage and, where appropriate, pursue loss-transfer claims against third parties. Additionally, we defend clients in cannabis product liability matters, including claims of tainted product, and have identified a team of experts in the various fields of toxicology, analytical chemistry, food safety, and forensic science to assist in defending these claims.  Professional Liability Claims Our vast history and focus on defending professional liability claims across a broad range of industries affords our attorneys a unique advantage in defending claims brought against cannabis professionals, such as growers, cultivators, consultants, accountants, lawyers, MGAs, adjusters, and others who work within this space.  Cybersecurity Claims  Ransomware attacks and data breaches threaten cannabis operators and their obligation to safeguard their customers’ sensitive medical and personal data. Likewise, security breaches with track-and-trace software designed to track cannabis from “seed-to-sale” can interrupt an operator’s regulatory compliance. In the event of a data compromise, our cyber team is available to quickly mobilize and mitigate the damage caused by a ransomware attack. Employment and Workers’ Compensation Claims With the growing approval of recreational cannabis usage and the increasing number of cultivators and dispensaries popping up to meet consumer demand, it is not surprising that employment and workers’ compensation lawsuits in these fields are trending upwards. Our attorneys defend facility owners and operators when wage-and-hour disputes, discrimination and harassment, and retaliation claims arise. We also represent insurers and employers in workplace injury and occupational hazard claims. Our approach extends to cannabis industry-specific risks that include cultivation and manufacturing operations, as well as retail sales and distribution environments. Health Care Claims While many states have legalized the medical use of cannabis, it remains illegal under federal law. This dichotomy creates significant legal challenges for health care providers. Our attorneys leverage their experience in helping clients navigate health care regulations, such as HIPAA laws and patient privacy protections, and apply it to the uniquely complex environment surrounding the cannabis industry. We defend clients against civil claims, including medical malpractice matters, and can assist health care providers—including physicians, dispensaries and clinics—in understanding the evolving standards of care for cannabis as a therapeutic option, which can differ significantly from conventional treatments. Such claims may involve appropriate patient evaluations, dosage recommendations, and documentation requirements within the framework of state medical cannabis programs. We are also well-equipped to address challenges related to informed consent.  As the legal and regulatory frameworks surrounding cannabis continue to evolve, so too do the risks and complexities faced by businesses operating within this area. Our Cannabis Law Practice Group stands at the forefront of this rapidly developing field, providing clients with informed, strategic, and results-oriented counsel. Our multidisciplinary approach—spanning coverage, liability, cybersecurity, employment, workers’ compensation, and health care—ensures that clients receive comprehensive support tailored to the unique challenges of the cannabis industry. Whether addressing emerging claims or guiding proactive risk management, our team is committed to protecting our clients’ interests and positioning them for continued success in this dynamic legal landscape. Kristen works in our Philadelphia, PA office and can be reached at 215-575-2849 or KLWorley@mdwcg.com. Todd works in both our Philadelphia, PA and Mount Laurel, NJ offices. He can be reached at 215-575-2605, 856-414-6029 or TJLeon@mdwcg.com.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest

Including Settled Defendants on a Verdict Sheet: A Reminder that No Assumptions Are Allowed

December 1, 2023

Key Points: Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act permits the inclusion of a defendant or other non-party who has entered into a release with a plaintiff to be included on the verdict sheet and, thus, subject to apportionment of liability “… upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party.”  Employers who are granted immunity from liability and suit under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act are not subject to inclusion on a verdict sheet.  Trial of any case necessarily comes at the conclusion of months, and, in many instances, years, of discovery. Practitioners carefully weigh their strategy when propounding and answering written discovery, asserting objections during depositions, and serving expert reports. During this phase, it is easy to push the notion of trial and all of its practical considerations to the side, acknowledging the oft-cited statistic that only 1% of cases will reach the trial stage. Nevertheless, when those few cases we encounter in our practice reach the trial stage, we find ourselves preparing in earnest for testimony, crafting arguments for the admission or exclusion of evidence, as the case may be, and finally, preparing a litany of pretrial submissions. It is this latter subset of considerations, and specifically the verdict sheet, that are ultimately submitted to a jury which is the focus herein. A jury verdict sheet is the sum of every case expressed in its simplest form and, quite arguably, the most important document in any trial. The verdict sheet outlines for a jury the decisions that must be rendered once all the evidence has been placed before it. The form can take any number of versions, but in the traditional case, it directs a jury to determine liability, causation, and damages. But who goes on the verdict sheet? We expect that parties to a lawsuit will be placed on a verdict sheet, but what about settled defendants and non-parties? A defendant has a significant interest in providing a jury with the opportunity to apportion fault to as many entities as possible, thereby reducing its overall exposure.  Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, directs practitioners as to those instances in which settled defendants and non-parties may be included on a verdict sheet for purposes of apportionment of liability. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a)(2) provides as follows: Apportionment of responsibility among certain nonparties and effect.--For purposes of apportioning liability only, the question of liability of any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party. A person whose liability may be determined pursuant to this section does not include an employer to the extent that the employer is granted immunity from liability or suit pursuant to the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Note the key phrase in the foregoing citation, “…any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party.” (Emphasis added.) Significantly, Pennsylvania courts have determined that there is no absolute right to the inclusion of a settled defendant on a verdict sheet. Hyrcza v. West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc,. 978 A.2d 961, 969-970 (Pa. Super. 2009). Rather, a jury must be presented with proofs sufficient to find the settled defendant or other person liable, and the trial court functions as the gate keeper to determine whether that evidential burden has been satisfied. Ultimately, a trial court’s determination of whether sufficient evidence has been adduced that supports a prima facie case against a settled defendant and, thus, its inclusion on a verdict sheet is a decision that is subject to review for an abuse of discretion or error of law. See Rose v. Annabi, 934 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. Super. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of the trial court represents “not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. In discussing this standard of review, practitioners must take note that the decision of the trial court concerning the inclusion of a settled defendant or other person on a verdict sheet will be, for better or worse, a difficult ruling to challenge on appeal, and one should prepare their trial proofs accordingly.  In converse to settled defendants that may be placed on a verdict sheet following the submission of sufficient evidence of fault, employers who are granted immunity under the Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act are not subject to inclusion on a verdict sheet. The exclusivity provision of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, set forth at 77 P.S. § 481, provides that the “liability of an employer under this Act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employees … entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death … .” Acknowledging the Act’s limitation of suit, or exclusivity provision, the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act similarly bars the apportionment of any liability to an employer immunized from liability or suit under the Act. In sum, practitioners should not presume that defendants or non-parties who have entered into a release with the plaintiff will automatically be included on the verdict sheet. Rather, they should prepare their cases for trial with special attention paid to expert discovery and advance theories of liability against a settled entity. In this manner, practitioners can ensure that they are capable of presenting sufficient proofs from which the trial court can conclude that a prima facie case of liability has been advanced against a settled entity and, thereby, order the inclusion of said entity on the verdict sheet for purposes of liability apportionment.  *Kristen, a shareholder in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office, is Co-Chair of our firm’s Catastrophic Claims Litigation Practice Group. She can be reached at 215.575.2849 or KLWorley@mdwcg.com.   Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.