.

Kimberly A. House

Portrait of Kimberly A. House

Kim is a strong advocate for her insured and self-insured clients who are facing serious and significant claims. Kim also has extensive experience in monitoring trials for excess carriers and participating in those trials when necessary. As a member of both our Casualty and Appellate Departments, Kim has valuable experience in all aspects of litigation from pleadings through the appellate process. She has participated both as trial counsel and as appellate counsel in multiple trials involving plaintiffs who were catastrophically injured.

Kim represents clients in matters involving premises, product and automobile liability. She has experience defending an elevator/escalator manufacturer against claims of product liability including both design defect, manufacturing defect, as well as claims of negligent inspection/maintenance. Additionally, Kim has handled several construction defect cases in single family homes or condominium complexes involving water intrusion cases resulting in property damage and mold. 

Kim understands that strong practice management is a key component to favorable resolutions and positive outcomes for her clients. She is experienced in representing clients in both state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and she is also licensed to practice law in North Carolina and South Carolina. Kim is a strong mentor of young associates at the firm, and she believes that a collaborative approach to cases is an effective way to ensure that new ideas and defenses are being explored to the fullest extent.

Prior to joining the firm, Kim was an associate in the catastrophic loss department of a Philadelphia defense firm. While there, she gained valuable experience handling high-value cases for excess insurers. This experience included independently working up files and preparing cases for trial, often on short notice, in support of her litigation team. Kim also monitored litigation and trials for a variety of insurers. Kim also oversaw and handled cases for her own clients consisting of contractors and building product manufacturers.


 

    • Wake Forest University School of Law (J.D., 2008)
    • Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (B.A., cum laude, 2004)
    • Pennsylvania, 2012
    • New Jersey, 2012
    • North Carolina, 2008
    • South Carolina, 2011
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2013
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Michigan, 2019
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of North Carolina, 2008
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of North Carolina, 2010
    • U.S. District Court District of South Carolina, 2011
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2016-2023)
      Super Lawyers list is issued by Thompson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Successfully defended an appeal from a jury verdict previously secured by Aaron Moore and Alesia Sulock (Philadelphia) in favor of the firm’s client in a legal malpractice case. The plaintiffs initially asserted multiple tort claims and a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, which were dismissed by the trial court upon partial grant of the defense’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The case proceeded to trial on a remaining breach of contract claim, resulting in a defense verdict. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s rulings on both the motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion in limine related to evidentiary exclusions. The Pennsylvania Superior Court unanimously affirmed the trial court’s rulings, holding that the tort claims were time-barred and that the plaintiffs had waived their evidentiary argument by failing to properly develop it in their appellate brief.
    • Successfully defended a national homebuilding company in a Philadelphia arbitration involving a motor vehicle negligence claim. The plaintiff falsely alleged he was a passenger in a vehicle operated by an independent contractor, triggering a contractual indemnity dispute. The arbitration panel found no liability and concluded the plaintiff’s claims were fraudulent. The panel also ordered the co-defendant to reimburse all reasonable attorneys’ fees expended in the defense pursuant to the indemnity agreement.
    • Obtained a favorable settlement during jury selection for a higher education institution against wrongful death and personal injury claims resulting from a fall.
    • Obtained a favorable settlement on the eve of trial for a product manufacturer against personal injury claims arising from a house fire.
    • Drafted a successful motion for summary judgment for a civil engineer regarding a storm water management design claim.
    • Served as co-counsel  in successful defense of a national window manufacturer in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Results

Successfully Defended Appeal Sustaining Objections of Improper Venue

We successfully defended the plaintiff’s appeal of a trial court decision sustaining preliminary objections on the grounds of improper venue. This case involved the death of a 19-year-old woman at a university who fell down an 11-story trash chute in an off-campus condominium building. In this mixed negligence and product liability case, we represented two of the multiple defendants, the condominium association and the building management company. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas found that venue was improper in Philadelphia County and ordered that the case be transferred to Centre County. The plaintiff appealed that decision, and the matter was briefed and argued in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The Superior Court, in a precedential decision, affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that there was no abuse of discretion in sustaining the preliminary objections. In support of its decision, the Superior Court found that the plaintiff’s arguments were unsupported by Pennsylvania law. The Superior Court, in finding waiver of an issue, quoted directly from the brief prepared by Kim.

Achieved Dismissal of an Appeal of Our Defense Verdict

We won dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal of a defense verdict. Our client issued a professional liability insurance policy to the plaintiffs. When the plaintiffs were sued for legal malpractice, they notified our client of the suit and asked them to provide counsel to defend the matter. However, the plaintiffs never agreed to counsel proposed by our client. The plaintiffs then proceeded to mediation in the legal malpractice action and settled the matter without notifying our client. As a result, our client denied the plaintiffs’ request for indemnification. The plaintiffs then brought suit against our client for breach of contract and bad faith, alleging they wrongly denied indemnification and failed to provide counsel. The matter went to jury trial from April 8–11, 2024, where we successfully defended our client as the jury returned a defense verdict. The plaintiffs filed post-trial motions and then appealed the decision to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the jury to see a copy of the insurance contract during their deliberations. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal and found that the plaintiffs waived their argument by failing to cite relevant legal authority in their appellate brief. The Superior Court also stated in a footnote that, should the court have reached the issue on appeal, it would have found it meritless because the insurance contract was a central piece of evidence to which the plaintiffs did not object during trial.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.