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Kimberlin L. Ruiz

Portrait of Kimberlin L. Ruiz

Kimberlin is a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department and focuses her practice on the defense of attorneys, accountants, insurance producers, real estate professionals, public entities, corporate directors and officers, and financial institutions, among other clients.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Kimberlin was an associate at a New Jersey-based law firm, where her practice included labor and employment, litigation, municipal law and OPRA. Kimberlin also previously worked at a law firm where she gained experience in the area of family law.  Following law school, Kimberlin served as a Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable James J. Guida, J.S.C. in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, in Bergen County.  

A graduate of Rutgers Law School, Kimberlin received the G.A. Moore Prize at graduation for her distinguished work in employment discrimination law.  While pursuing her juris doctor, Kimberlin worked full-time as a paralegal.  

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 2020)
    • Loyola University Maryland (B.A., 2014)
    • New Jersey
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star (2026-2027)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Professional Liability Underwriting Society

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

New Jersey Supreme Court Clarifies That Insurance Brokers, Producers, and Agents Are Not Exempt from Consumer Fraud Act Liability

August 25, 2026

On July 15, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an opinion in James G. Lowe, M.D. v. Bernard Audet, wherein the Court addressed many prior conflicting opinions and held that insurance brokers, producers and agents are not exempt from the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et. seq., under the “learned professional” exception as “semi-professionals” or otherwise. This opinion reversed a decision from the trial court and Appellate Division where the trial judge determined that insurance brokers, producers, and agents are exempt. The Supreme Court further indicates in a footnote “to the extent there is any distinction between insurance brokers, insurance producers, and insurance agents, none of those occupations are exempt from the CFA under any exception.” Plaintiff was a neurosurgeon who co-owned the medical practice he worked at, as well as several other unrelated businesses. The defendants were insurance brokers and producers who marketed, sold, produced and procured policies to and for Plaintiff and his medical practice for thirteen years. Such policies included loss related to disability. The defendants failed to advise plaintiff that business interests that were not related to his medical practice may have an effect on any benefits claims. However, plaintiff alleges he was advised by the defendants that, should he become disabled, he would receive maximum benefits under the policies. In 2021, plaintiff was diagnosed with a permanent vision condition that prevented him from performing neurosurgery. When the claim was made for maximum benefits under the policies plaintiff purchased from the defendants, only partial benefits were paid due to the other business interests plaintiff was involved in that were unrelated to his medical practice. Plaintiff filed suit against the defendants, which included a claim for violation of the CFA by negligently failing to obtain sufficient disability insurance for the plaintiff.  At the trial court level, the judge relied upon Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Serv., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that insurance brokers are “semi-professionals,” and are “excluded from liability under the CFA for the services they render within the scope of their professional licenses”),but acknowledged the competing appellate decision of Shaw v Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019) (holding that the “learned professional” exemption is limited to “those professionals who have historically been recognized as ‘learned’ based on the requirement of extensive learning or erudition”).   The Supreme Court went through the history of opinions which addressed and set the standards for which the CFA applies and where there are exceptions for both “learned professionals” and “semi-professionals.” Ultimately, the Court ruled that insurance brokers do not fall under either the learned professional or semi-professional exception, and that semi-professionals like insurance brokers, producers and agents are not exempt from the CFA. 

Case Law Alerts

New Jersey Judiciary Implements Trial de Novo Deadline Reminders After Arbitration Awards

July 21, 2026

As there are times where cases against real estate brokers and producers are subject to non-binding arbitration in New Jersey, one thing that maintains of high importance is the strict deadline for the filing of demand for a trial de novo in the instance that a party seeks that the arbitration award be vacated and the matter return to the trial calendar.  In 2026, in the unreported decision of Arora Petroleum 2, LLC v. Avin Petroleum LLC, No. A-1706-24, 2026 WL 291226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 4, 2026), the Appellate Division commented as to the new steps the judiciary now takes to ensure that a reminder is sent to parties before the deadline for the demand for a trial de novo expires. This Omnibus Rule Amendment Order & Supreme Court Action on Non-Rule Recommendations sets forth that, similar to discovery end date reminders, the judiciary now issues electronic reminders, through eCourts, to all parties seven days before the expiration of the thirty-day deadline imposed by Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1). This newly implemented reminder came after an amendment to Rule 4:21A-6  (which has since been rescinded), that allotted an additional ten days to a party who missed the thirty-day period to file the demand for trial de novo to file a motion to reject an arbitration award and demand a trial de novo as within time upon establishing good cause.  This Omnibus Rule brings to light the importance of filing a timely demand for trial de novo in matters that are subject to arbitration in the Superior Court. The court is now taking an additional step to issue a reminder to parties about the deadline through eCourts, which should not be ignored or taken lightly. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.