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Kimberlin L. Ruiz

Portrait of Kimberlin L. Ruiz

Kimberlin is a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department and focuses her practice on the defense of attorneys, accountants, insurance producers, real estate professionals, public entities, corporate directors and officers, and financial institutions, among other clients.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Kimberlin was an associate at a New Jersey-based law firm, where her practice included labor and employment, litigation, municipal law and OPRA. Kimberlin also previously worked at a law firm where she gained experience in the area of family law.  Following law school, Kimberlin served as a Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable James J. Guida, J.S.C. in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, in Bergen County.  

A graduate of Rutgers Law School, Kimberlin received the G.A. Moore Prize at graduation for her distinguished work in employment discrimination law.  While pursuing her juris doctor, Kimberlin worked full-time as a paralegal.  

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 2020)
    • Loyola University Maryland (B.A., 2014)
    • New Jersey
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star (2026-2027)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Professional Liability Underwriting Society

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

New Jersey Supreme Court Clarifies That Insurance Brokers, Producers, and Agents Are Not Exempt from Consumer Fraud Act Liability

August 25, 2026

On July 15, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an opinion in James G. Lowe, M.D. v. Bernard Audet, wherein the Court addressed many prior conflicting opinions and held that insurance brokers, producers and agents are not exempt from the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et. seq., under the “learned professional” exception as “semi-professionals” or otherwise. This opinion reversed a decision from the trial court and Appellate Division where the trial judge determined that insurance brokers, producers, and agents are exempt. The Supreme Court further indicates in a footnote “to the extent there is any distinction between insurance brokers, insurance producers, and insurance agents, none of those occupations are exempt from the CFA under any exception.” Plaintiff was a neurosurgeon who co-owned the medical practice he worked at, as well as several other unrelated businesses. The defendants were insurance brokers and producers who marketed, sold, produced and procured policies to and for Plaintiff and his medical practice for thirteen years. Such policies included loss related to disability. The defendants failed to advise plaintiff that business interests that were not related to his medical practice may have an effect on any benefits claims. However, plaintiff alleges he was advised by the defendants that, should he become disabled, he would receive maximum benefits under the policies. In 2021, plaintiff was diagnosed with a permanent vision condition that prevented him from performing neurosurgery. When the claim was made for maximum benefits under the policies plaintiff purchased from the defendants, only partial benefits were paid due to the other business interests plaintiff was involved in that were unrelated to his medical practice. Plaintiff filed suit against the defendants, which included a claim for violation of the CFA by negligently failing to obtain sufficient disability insurance for the plaintiff.  At the trial court level, the judge relied upon Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Serv., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that insurance brokers are “semi-professionals,” and are “excluded from liability under the CFA for the services they render within the scope of their professional licenses”),but acknowledged the competing appellate decision of Shaw v Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019) (holding that the “learned professional” exemption is limited to “those professionals who have historically been recognized as ‘learned’ based on the requirement of extensive learning or erudition”).   The Supreme Court went through the history of opinions which addressed and set the standards for which the CFA applies and where there are exceptions for both “learned professionals” and “semi-professionals.” Ultimately, the Court ruled that insurance brokers do not fall under either the learned professional or semi-professional exception, and that semi-professionals like insurance brokers, producers and agents are not exempt from the CFA. 

Case Law Alerts

New Jersey Judiciary Implements Trial de Novo Deadline Reminders After Arbitration Awards

July 21, 2026

As there are times where cases against real estate brokers and producers are subject to non-binding arbitration in New Jersey, one thing that maintains of high importance is the strict deadline for the filing of demand for a trial de novo in the instance that a party seeks that the arbitration award be vacated and the matter return to the trial calendar.  In 2026, in the unreported decision of Arora Petroleum 2, LLC v. Avin Petroleum LLC, No. A-1706-24, 2026 WL 291226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 4, 2026), the Appellate Division commented as to the new steps the judiciary now takes to ensure that a reminder is sent to parties before the deadline for the demand for a trial de novo expires. This Omnibus Rule Amendment Order & Supreme Court Action on Non-Rule Recommendations sets forth that, similar to discovery end date reminders, the judiciary now issues electronic reminders, through eCourts, to all parties seven days before the expiration of the thirty-day deadline imposed by Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1). This newly implemented reminder came after an amendment to Rule 4:21A-6  (which has since been rescinded), that allotted an additional ten days to a party who missed the thirty-day period to file the demand for trial de novo to file a motion to reject an arbitration award and demand a trial de novo as within time upon establishing good cause.  This Omnibus Rule brings to light the importance of filing a timely demand for trial de novo in matters that are subject to arbitration in the Superior Court. The court is now taking an additional step to issue a reminder to parties about the deadline through eCourts, which should not be ignored or taken lightly. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.