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Joshua is a member of the Professional Liability Department and focuses his practice on appellate advocacy, post-trial motions, and appeals. His practice extends to civil rights and public entity litigation, employment law, school leaders’ liability, and healthcare matters. Before joining Marshall Dennehey, Joshua clerked for Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Daniel D. McCaffery during his tenure on the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. There, Joshua engaged in the resolution of complex civil and criminal matters at the appellate level. Prior to serving in chambers, Joshua participated in Marshall Dennehey’s Summer Associate Program and interned for Rodney A. Smolla, former Dean of Widener University School of Law. As an intern, Joshua was responsible for revising and analyzing common law jurisdictional developments in First Amendment jurisprudence for the legal treatise, "Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech."

In 2021, Joshua earned his Juris Doctor, cum laude, from Widener University School of Law.  During law school, Joshua was regularly recognized on the Dean’s List and held senior positions on various honor societies, such as the Widener Law Review, the Transactional Law Honor Society, and the Moot Court Honor Society.  During his tenure on the executive committee of the Moot Court Honor Society, Joshua earned top marks in many interscholastic, appellate moot court competitions, including top oralist in the 2021 Touro Law Center’s National Moot Court Competition on Law and Religion. Joshua’s interscholastic achievements led to his induction into the Order of the Barristers, an honorary organization for law students and practicing lawyers who demonstrate exceptional skill in trial advocacy, oral advocacy, and brief writing.  

Joshua is deeply committed to fostering legal skills and advancing the professional development of future attorneys. He is an adjunct professor of Legal Methods at Widener University School of Law and volunteers his time as a coach for Widener’s Moot Court Honor Society.  

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2021)
    • Rowan University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2018)
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2022
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2024-2026)
    • Federal Bar Association
    • Order of the Barristers
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • The Bar Association of the Third Federal Circuit
    • Clarity Wins Cases: Practical Techniques for High-Impact Legal Writing, 2026 Pennsylvania Continuing Legal Education Course
    • Appellate Preservation: A Crash Course to Avoid the Pitfalls, 2026 Pennsylvania Continuing Legal Education Course
    • Is the Fair Share Act Dead Following Spencer vs. Johnson?, Pennsylvania Association of Mutual Insurance Companies Claims Summit
    • Competencies for LGBTQ Clinical Practices: LGBTQ Rights and Their Progeny, Chestnut Hill College Master's Program, 2020; 2021
    • “Handing Over the Public’s Purse: Political Subdivision Employees, Indemnification and Assignments,” Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021

Results

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Summary Judgment Secured in a Section 1983 Substantive Due Process Case

We obtained summary judgment in a Section 1983 substantive due process claim involving a Philadelphia police officer. The officer had taken a photo of the plaintiff’s son after he attempted suicide by jumping off a bridge, and the photo was later circulated on social media. The plaintiff alleged that circulation of the photo violated her substantive due process privacy rights, and she also asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. One week before trial began, the Honorable Mark Kearney, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, held, although the plaintiff possessed a viable privacy right, that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident; therefore, the court granted qualified immunity to the officer. Additionally, the court held the plaintiff failed to present competent expert opinion evidence establishing her emotional distress and, therefore, dismissed the state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   

Defense Verdict Secured in Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution Trial

We secured a defense verdict in a Section 1983 malicious prosecution trial in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that our client’s law enforcement officers falsified evidence and testimony in order to maliciously prosecute him for conspiracy for engaging in the illegal sale of narcotics. We successfully contended that the former narcotics detective, who corroborated the plaintiff’s complaint, was lying, and called various members of our client’s narcotics unit to testify about the facts of the investigation.

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

The en banc Third Circuit concludes citizens with prior felony convictions for welfare fraud are among ‘the people’ protected by the Second Amendment.

July 1, 2023

In 1995, Bryan David Range pleaded guilty to one count of making a false statement to obtain food stamps in violation of Pennsylvania law and faced up to five years’ imprisonment. Following the conviction, Mr. Range attempted to purchase a firearm but was rejected by Pennsylvania’s instant background check system. He then learned the 1995 conviction prohibited him from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1), which criminalizes the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Mr. Range filed for equitable relief in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking among other remedies a declaration that Section 922(g)(1), as applied to him, violates the Second Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government, so Mr. Range appealed. Applying New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), a panel of the Third Circuit affirmed. Mr. Range was then granted rehearing, the panel decision was vacated, and the en banc court reversed.  In Range, Judge Hardiman explains that Bruen abrogated the Third Circuit’s “two-step” Second Amendment jurisprudence such that future Second Amendment challenges must be analyzed under Bruen’s three-part test, which requires determination of: (1) whether the challenger is “of the people” who have Second Amendment rights; (2) whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the challenger’s conduct; and (3) if so, whether the government has proven that the firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms. Under this analysis the en banc majority reversed the district court, concluding: (1) Mr. Range was among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, despite his non-violent felony conviction, because the rights conferred by the Second Amendment presumptively belong to all Americans; (2) by prohibiting Mr. Range from possessing a rile to hunt and a shotgun to defend himself at home, Section 922(g)(1) regulates conduct protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment; and (3) since Section 922(g)(1) is not a “longstanding” regulation as contemplated by D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and it could not otherwise identify an older analogous regulation, the Government failed to demonstrate Section 922(g)(1) was consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulations. Accordingly, the en banc majority held that Section 922(g)(1), as applied to citizens with prior felony convictions for welfare fraud, violates the Second Amendment.      Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Case Law Alerts

Following Commonwealth v. Alexander, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution continues to permit warrantless “inventory searches” of impounded automobiles.

April 1, 2023

In Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords greater privacy interests than the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and, thus, requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances before a vehicle may be subject to a warrantless investigatory search for evidence of a crime. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania rejected, in a case of first impression, the argument that Alexander necessarily eliminated the “inventory search” exception to the warrant requirement, which allows a warrantless search of a vehicle lawfully impounded, so long as the search is undertaken for a noncriminal purpose pursuant to a routine practice of securing and inventorying the impounded vehicle’s contents. Distinguishing Alexander, the Superior Court emphasized that an inventory search proceeds from a “community caretaking” principle and, therefore, does not involve the probable cause determination required for investigatory searches. While recognizing Alexander may support placing limitations on the inventory search exception, the court declined to address the viability of any such limitations because the appellant argued only that Alexander eliminated the inventory search exception in total. Accordingly, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution continues to permit warrantless “inventory searches” of impounded automobiles, without limitation.      Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Firm Highlights

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department