.

Jonathan E. Kanov

Portrait of Jonathan E. Kanov

Jonathan concentrates his practice of law in complex, high-exposure litigation and has litigated a wide array of professional liability and commercial cases in federal and state courts, as well as arbitration forums, throughout the country. He zealously defends professionals in tort and contract actions, including attorneys, accountants, architects, engineers, contractors, directors and officers, brokers, dealers and fiduciaries. He has extensive experience with real estate actions, defending numerous parties, including real estate agents, brokers, developers, appraisers, title and settlement agents, and lenders.

Jonathan devotes considerable time on behalf of his clients in complex commercial, contract, construction, fraud, professional negligence/malpractice, statutory violations, shareholder/member disputes, directors/officers, business tort, and whistleblower litigation, and he has tried many cases to verdict. He brings to the firm a unique combination of business and litigation skills developed during his career. This background is invaluable to his representation of various individuals, private and public companies, including Fortune 500 corporations, and non-profit entities in a broad range of matters. He is highly sought after by clients and insurance carriers for his ability to handle extremely complex and difficult matters.  

Jonathan graduated from the University of Texas at Austin in 1992, where he received his Bachelor of Business Administration degree in finance. He obtained his juris doctor in 1996 from the University of Miami School of Law, graduating cum laude. Jonathan is admitted to the Bar of the state of Florida. He is also admitted to practice before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for the Southern, Middle and Northern Districts of Florida.
 

    • University of Miami School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1996)
    • The University of Texas at Austin (B.A., 1992)
    • Florida, 1996
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida, 1997
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 1997
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2001
    • Who's Who In American Law - Top Lawyers
    • American Bar Association
    • Association of Trial Lawyers of America
    • Miami-Dade County Bar Association
    • Professional Liability Underwriting Society
    • Anatomy of a Real Estate Transaction: How Actions of Participants Give Rise to Claims, Client Presentation, July, 2019
    • FDIC Actions Against Appraisers, 2012 - 2013
    • Trends in Florida Real Estate E&O Claims, 2010 – 2013
    • Subprime Lending Crisis and the Growing Litigation Claims Against Real Estate Professionals: Understanding How This Happened and Planning for Actionable Defense Strategies, 2008
    • Internet Research for Florida Legal Counsel and Staff, CLE Speaker Series, 2000-2008
    • Accounting Malpractice Pre- and Post Sarbanes-Oxley and When It Is Appropriate To Withdraw From A Public Audit, 2005-2006
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2010-2018
    • "Developer Scores Big Victory in Federal Court in Miami Concerning Condo Deposit Recovery Cases," Defense Digest, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 2009
    • "Subprime Woes May Lead To More Regulations And Duties Placed On Mortgage Brokers," Florida Professional Liability and Ethics Law Letter, April 2008, Vol. 4, No. 4 
    • Successfully defended West Palm Beach lawyer and law firm in a malpractice claim stemming from a former client who was prevented from exercising option to purchase property worth in excess of $2 million.
    • Won complete defense verdict and affirmative damages in high-profile federal court trial in Southern District of Florida in defense of auditors/accountants of public real estate company. Plaintiff had sought approximately $7 million in damages for alleged botched audit and improper withdrawal from engagement.
    • Prevailed at trial in Broward County in defense of a property management company of a tax-credit housing community in Lauderhill. Plaintiff, the corporate owner of the property, brought claims for negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory breaches in the management and operation of the property. The case was litigated over seven years and Plaintiff sought millions of dollars in damages. After a week of Plaintiff’s testimony, and eviscerating cross-examinations, we were successful in obtaining a directed verdict.   
    • Won complete defense verdict in legal malpractice case in Broward County concerning defendant's representation of borrowers in a secured loan transaction.
    • Won a directed verdict at trial in $650,000 litigation on behalf of a national engineering firm in a professional negligence action in Miami-Dade County.
    • Summary judgment secured in defense of claims against real estate broker and agent for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in $500,000 case in Broward County.
    • Successfully defended law firm and lawyer as plaintiffs walked away with no damages from a heavily litigated case concerning lawyer's representation of one of the parties to the sale of a nurse staffing business in Orange County, Florida.
    • Victorious after trial in Miami-Dade County in a will contest brought by three children of decedent with estate over $10 million alleging undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and lack of capacity.
    • Successfully defended title agent against claims brought by title insurer. Tracked down and collected the ill-gotten gains from the beneficiary of an unrecorded mortgage so that client did not have to satisfy those losses.
    • Counsel for a leading provider of outpatient information systems in successful $12 million federal litigation in Northern District of California regarding development of software application for radiology facilities.
    • Counsel for partner in South Florida real estate conglomerate in successful action to terminate partnership agreement and buy out other partners in development deal for Miami-Dade County multi-use project.
    • Victorious after trial against one of largest U.S. spirits distributors, alleging breach of distribution agreement, business torts and copyright infringement causes of action.

Results

Court affirms dismissal of real estate agent and his broker.

Our attorneys succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District affirmed the dismissal, with prejudice, of our clients, a listing real estate agent and his broker, in an alleged negligence and fraud case. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing their pleadings due to their attorney’s conduct. The court detailed how the plaintiff’s attorney dropped the ball in litigating the case in a separate opinion reversing the plaintiffs’ attorney’s contempt conviction.

Arbitration Defense Verdict for Prominent Florida Real Estate Developer

Marshall Dennehey and its shareholder, Jonathan E. Kanov, Esq., were successful in a South Florida arbitration representing a prominent Florida real estate developer against construction damage claims brought by a neighboring property’s condominium association. In a final, binding ruling, the arbitrator issued a complete defense verdict, plus an award of attorney’s fees and costs to the developer. The plaintiff condominium association had contended that construction of the developer’s luxury condominium tower caused many areas of their property to be damaged, largely from vibrations/seismic activity during demolition and construction. The plaintiff demanded $1.2 million in damages pursuant to a contract that was entered into by the parties covering the construction activity.   The arbitrator agreed with the defense’s arguments that the “conditions the claimant contends were caused by vibration damage from construction activities are actually age-related deterioration and the result of deferred maintenance. Additionally, there is no evidentiary basis to allocate uncompensated damage associated with the pool and pool deck to the developer, as opposed to preexisting conditions requiring repair and upgrades required for code compliance.” Marshall Dennehey presented highly credible experts and fact witnesses in support of its defense.    Another key to the defense verdict was Marshall Dennehey’s effective cross examination of the claimant’s structural engineering expert on construction vibration/seismic activity data, which formed the crux of their damage claims.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Florida Fourth DCA Clarifies Limits of Attorney Liability in Third‑Party Opinion Letters

March 1, 2026

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal recently affirmed that an attorney who prepares an opinion letter on behalf of the borrowers for the benefit of the lender in an arms-length transaction does not owe a duty to the lender. In this case, a $7.5 million loan was issued to the operators of ultra-luxury auto dealerships, and its cars, such as a 2019 McLaren Senna, were used as collateral for the loan. The defendant issued an opinion letter on behalf of the borrowers, which was required by the claimant as a condition for funding the loan. The opinion letter contained representations based on the loan documents, such as that the borrowers had no known pending or threatened claims, no other encumbrances, and that claimant would have a valid security interest in the autos used as collateral. After the borrowers defaulted on the loan, claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty were brought against the defendant for alleged misrepresentations in the opinion letter. The claimant demanded $9,000,000 in damages, contending that it wouldn’t have made the loan if not for the defendant’s misrepresentations. The claimant filed competing summary judgment motions. Ultimately, the judge agreed with the defense argument that despite stating in the opinion letter that the claimant could rely on his representations, there is no duty imposed on a party or its counsel to act for the benefit or protection of the opposing party in an arms-length commercial transaction. If the claimant chose to rely on such representations, that is a calculated risk with no recourse against the defendant for its own failure to investigate further. A final judgment in favor of the defendant with an award of costs was entered. The claimant appealed to the 4th DCA, who affirmed the judgment. This case expands past precedent and is highly instructive for attorneys issuing third party opinion letters and those that choose to rely upon them.

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability - CASE LAW UPDATE

September 1, 2025

Arbitration Clause in Attorney Retainer Agreement Covering Professional Negligence Claims Found to Be Valid and Binding Hill v. Farah & Farah, No. 2024-11972-CICI (Volusia) A Florida state circuit court enforced a mandatory arbitration clause in a retainer agreement, thus dismissing a legal malpractice claims against a law firm filed by a former client. The agreement contained a mandatory arbitration clause, which stated that any and all legal disputes arising out of or relating to the agreement will be resolved through a binding arbitration proceeding administered in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Rejecting arguments that the clause failed to comply with Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i) and that the firm waived its right to arbitrate by delay, the court held that the agreement was enforceable and compelled arbitration under Florida’s Revised Arbitration Code. The law firm filed a motion to dismiss and/or to compel arbitration. In opposition, their former client, the plaintiff, argued that the agreement failed to comply with Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i), which provides required language notifying the client that he or she should consider consulting with another lawyer about the advisability of entering into an agreement with an arbitration provision concerning fee disputes. That language was included in the agreement, but the law firm added “and other” to the first sentence of the notice, which states in full: “NOTICE: This agreement contains provisions requiring arbitration of fee and other disputes.”  Further, the plaintiff contended that the notice language in the agreement was ineffective since it was underlined rather than solely in bold type. These arguments were rejected by the court.  The plaintiff also argued that the law firm waived its right to arbitrate her malpractice claims by failing to invoke the arbitration clause or to reserve the right to do so in the order of withdrawal as counsel, or in the two years before the plaintiff filed her complaint.  Waiver of the right to arbitrate may be found if the party seeking arbitration first answered the complaint and then engaged in discovery regarding the merits of a claim before moving to compel arbitration. Olson Elec. Co. v. Winter Park Redev. Agency, 987 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Ibis Lakes HOA, Inc. v. Ibis Isle HOA, Inc., 102 So. 3d 722, 731 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“The active participation in litigation or the propounding of discovery would be circumstances where the right to arbitrate would be deemed waived.”). All doubts regarding waiver should be construed in favor of arbitration. Retail Detail Merch., LLC, v. Murphy, 373 So. 3d 670, 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).  The trial court also rejected the plaintiff’s position that the law firm waived its right to arbitrate, as the motion to dismiss and/or to compel arbitration was filed as the firm’s initial response to the malpractice complaint. The trial court held that the agreement required the plaintiff to submit her claims for professional negligence to binding arbitration. The case was dismissed pursuant to Fla. Stat. Chapter 682, Revised Florida Arbitration Code. The plaintiff has appealed the ruling to the 5th District Court of Appeal, which remains pending.     Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – September 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.