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As a member of Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department, James focuses his efforts on defending clients in general liability matters, including cases involving products liability, premises liability, and automobile liability. James has successfully defended clients in all aspects of litigation in both state and federal court, including obtaining defense verdicts at the magistrate court level and favorable arbitration rulings before the Allegheny County Arbitration panel. His jury trial experience includes second chair defense counsel in a premises liability case involving a defective stairway and landing in Allegheny County.  Additionally, James was an integral member of a litigation team that achieved a Voluntary Stipulated Dismissal on behalf of a product distributor client from national multidistrict litigation (MDL) arising from the manufacture and sale of medical devices. Further, James was a member of a trial team that obtained a defense judgment in a product liability claim involving damages alleged in excess of $30 million.

Before joining Marshall Dennehey, James gained litigation experience at a medium-sized civil defense firm as well as experience representing clients in mass toxic tort matters in Pennsylvania and West Virginia.

James graduated sixth in his class from Capital University Law School in 2018. During law school, he served as both a Staff Member and Associate Board Member of the University's Law Review, where he sharpened his legal research and legal writing skills to prepare for his career after graduation. 

James also interned at the Pennsylvania Superior Court for the Honorable Mary Jane Bowes in 2017, where he researched and drafted memorandum opinions while working closely with the Judge’s staff. In 2018, James interned at the Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office where he worked directly with Assistant District Attorneys preparing for trial.

James is licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania and West Virginia and is also an active member of the Allegheny County Bar Association, often volunteering to serve as a judge/juror for high school mock trial competitions. James is also a member of the American Bar Association. 

    • Capital University Law School (J.D., summa cum laude, 2018)
    • Slippery Rock University (B.S., 2015)
    • Pennsylvania, 2018
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2018
    • West Virginia, 2019
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of West Virginia, 2019
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of West Virginia, 2024
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • American Bar Association
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Successful defense in $30 million product liability trial. Served as second chair in a high-stakes product liability trial, obtaining a major defense result for our client. Plaintiff’s final pre-trial demand was $22 million with claimed exposure exceeding $30 million. Plaintiff alleged that compressor systems designed and sold by our client caused weld debris and excess lubricating oil to contaminate a natural gas pipeline, leading to multimillion-dollar losses at a power plant. Through material testing and expert testimony, the defense demonstrated that the weld debris allegations were unfounded and that Plaintiff’s own design, maintenance lapses, equipment failures, and poor system response were the more likely causes. The Court found Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof, and our client paid nothing despite the significant claimed exposure.

Results

Defense Verdict Obtained After Seven-Day Bench Trial

We received a defense decision after a seven-day bench trial in a product liability action in which the exposure in the case exceeded $30 million. Our client designs, sells and services engineered equipment for the energy industry, including natural gas compression apparatuses for use in transmission pipeline systems. In 2015, the client sold the plaintiff two reciprocating compressor systems to replace outdated equipment at a station located near Downingtown, PA. The compressor systems were designed to inject oil into the gas stream for piston lubrication. This lubricating oil needed to be removed from the gas stream using filtration devices supplied by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed weld debris contained within certain vessels of the compressors migrated downstream upon commissioning and compromised several gas filtration devices. The plaintiff further contended the damaged filtration devices permitted excess lubricating oil into the pipeline, which fouled multiple turbines owned by its downstream customer at a large natural gas-fired power plant, causing significant economic losses. The applicable contract between the plaintiff and our client contained a forum selection clause requiring litigation to take place in Lake County, Indiana. The plaintiff claimed commercial losses of $18 million, plus attorney fees (per contract) in the neighborhood of $4 million. The plaintiff also maintained it was entitled to pre-judgment interest. If successful in establishing liability, this sum would have added another $5 million to $7 million to the damage award, depending on the interest rate employed by the court. Therefore, the pure exposure in the case exceeded $30 million. In response to the plaintiff’s claims, we successfully established that the weld debris incident was a red herring and did not damage the filtration equipment. Material testing of debris from within the filtration devices revealed very little weld debris compared to pipe scale and other naturally occurring components. Through key expert testimony, we established that the plaintiff could not meet its burden of proof because the oil contamination events may have been caused by several factors directly attributable to the plaintiff’s lack of design engineering, inadequate equipment maintenance, equipment failure and inappropriate response to system alarms.

Summary Judgment Secured in a Neighborhood Dispute Alleging Excess Water Runoff

We obtained summary judgment in the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas in favor of our clients in a dispute over alleged excess water runoff. Our clients, a married couple, were sued by their neighbors for claims related to water runoff due to the installation of gutters and downspouts on a shed near the property line. We effectively argued for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ injunction, trespass, nuisance and negligence claims, demonstrating that the plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert testimony to substantiate their case as required under Pennsylvania law. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ negligence claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, which had expired at least six years before the suit was filed.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

The Ever-Evolving Landscape of Corporate Successor Liability in Products Cases

September 30, 2026

Key Points: • The “product line exception” in Pennsylvania is a multi-factored, flexible test wherein no one factor is mandatory or determinative. • Practicality over technicality is key. • Acquiring another company’s product line and goodwill comes at a two-fold price. Generally, Pennsylvania law holds that when one corporation transfers all of its assets to a successor corporation, the successor is not responsible for the transferor’s  liabilities. Several exceptions to this general rule apply, like express/implied agreement or fraud.  A more unique exception to this general rule is the “product line exception,”which is periodically raised in products liability cases. This exception was adopted into Pennsylvania law in 1981 by the Superior Court in Dawejko v. Jorgen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa.Super. 1981).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never directly addressed the viability of the “product line exception” since its adoption into Pennsylvania law. Thus, the Superior Court’s evolving, flexible application holds. Recently, the Superior Court attempted to clarify its flexible application of the “product line exception” in Burnley v. Loews Hotel, 355 A.3d 328 (Pa. Super. 2026). In Burnley, the plaintiff, Dana Burnley, fell on a defective cable protector at the Loews Hotel in Philadelphia, PA, while attending a conference on September 26, 2014. Mrs. Burnley alleged serious personal injuries as a result. At trial, the jury awarded Mrs. Burnley and her husband, $18,111,250 (molded by the trial court to $6,037.083.33). The cable protector was manufactured by Industrial Advanced Technologies, Inc. (“IAT”). IAT produced Firefly brand cable protectors by supplying molds to FallLine, who poured polyurethane into molds to form two pieces of the cable protector. An error occurred in the manufacturing process, which caused a batch of defective protectors to contain mismatched lengths of the protector sides. Some of these defective protectors was rented to Loews Hotel for the conference Mrs. Burnley attended in September of 2014. Checkers Industrial Products, LLC (“Checkers”) acquired IAT’s cable protector business through an asset purchase agreement in April of 2015, approximately eight months after Mrs. Burnley’s fall. There was no evidence that Checkers knew about the defective batch at the time of the agreement. Throughout litigation, Checkers argued it could not be liable because Checkers merely purchased the assets of IAT without assuming any of IAT’s debts or liabilities. The plaintiffs argued that the “product line exception” applied. At trial, the jury heard the following evidence related to the transaction between Checkers and IAT: (1) Checkers purchased all of IAT’s equipment, customer lists, intellectual property, patents, trade shows, and trade names; (2) IAT entered into a non-compete preventing IAT from manufacturing, marketing, or selling cable protectors (3) Checkers publicly announced its purchase; (4) Checkers continued to use the IAT stamp and Firefly logo; (5) Checkers handled ongoing customer complaints about IAT/Firefly products (including those before its asset purchase of IAT); (6) IAT agreed to retain all liabilities before the sale, including “product liability”; (7) IAT remained in business after the sale; (8) IAT had no insurance with respect to its cable protector business; and (9) IAT’s only assets were the Firefly brand and associated inventory, trademarks, and intellectual property. The jury returned a verdict, determining among other things, that Checkers was a successor corporation to which the “product line exception” applied. Checkers appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment based on the core principle of the exception. It held that, when a successor purchases substantially all manufacturing assets of another company and continues the same operation, strict liability in the same product will apply. The Superior Court explained that “several factors” are relevant to whether the exception is applicable. No one factor is mandatory or determinative, dubbed the “flexible” approach. The Superior Court’s recitation of the factors in Burnley is lengthy, but boils down to the following considerations: the successor’s acquisition of goodwill and customer lists; continuation as ongoing enterprise; same product, name, management, personnel, and clients; and use of same equipment, molds, and/or designs. Further, special consideration was given to the policy-based factors: virtual destruction of a plaintiff’s remedies against the original manufacturer; the successor’s ability to assume the risk; and the fairness of requiring the successor to assume responsibility. In applying these factors, the Superior Court found that Checkers purchased IAT’s goodwill and customer lists; advertised as an ongoing enterprise of the Firefly product line; profited from this goodwill; used the same product, equipment, molds, and designs; solicited IAT customers; and IAT ceased its cable protector operation, while Checkers continued it. More importantly, the Superior Court rejected Checkers’ argument that IAT technically remained in business after the sale and, therefore, a viable entity that the plaintiffs could recover from. However, IAT was in debt and financially unable to pay any judgment against it. Therefore, the jury was permitted to infer the destruction of the plaintiffs’ remedies against IAT and hold Checkers responsible under the “product line exception.” “Practicality over technicality” won the day. A corporation must look beyond mere technicalities when defending against the “product line exception.” A fact-intensive analysis will apply, which will often be left at the feet of a jury. As a result, companies such as Checkers, who had no hand in manufacturing or distributing the defective product, or even any ownership interest in the company that made the product at the time of the accident, can still be found strictly liable. This potential liability appears boundless. Checkers acquired the Firefly product line from IAT some eight months after Mrs. Burnley’s fall. However, no temporal consideration appears to have been baked into the Superior Court’s analysis. Thus, a plaintiff can viably argue the exception applies even multiple years removed from an incident or acquisition. Any time-based argument will be one of many non-dispositive factors considered by the jury. Corporations should be on notice of the potential effect of the “product line exception” on corporate transactions. Asset purchasers cannot escape liability, even strict liability, through technical structures. And acquiring assets comes at a cost, sometimes a two-fold cost. The majority’s holding in Burnley is not without criticism, with three judges dissenting. One dissenting judge, Mary Jane Bowes, advocated for a “wholesale rejection of the product line exception,” an issue that was not before the Superior Court due to Checkers’ failure to properly preserve it. James is an Associate in our Pittsburgh, PA office. He can be reached at (412) 803-1159 or at JPCullen@mdwcg.com.

Grossly Underestimated: Exploring Gross Negligence and Liability Waivers in Pennsylvania Premises Liability Law

October 1, 2024

In Pennsylvania, gross negligence is seldom considered in premises liability cases because ordinary negligence is far easier for a plaintiff to prove against a premises owner. Pennsylvania courts hold that there is a substantive difference between gross negligence and negligence. Kibler v. Blue Knob Recreation, Inc., 184 A.3d 974, 985 (Pa. Super. 2018). This substantive difference typically results in only ordinary negligence being pleaded by a plaintiff against a property owner.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.