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As a member of Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department, James focuses his efforts on defending clients in general liability matters, including cases involving products liability, premises liability, and automobile liability. James has successfully defended clients in all aspects of litigation in both state and federal court, including obtaining defense verdicts at the magistrate court level and favorable arbitration rulings before the Allegheny County Arbitration panel. His jury trial experience includes second chair defense counsel in a premises liability case involving a defective stairway and landing in Allegheny County.  Additionally, James was an integral member of a litigation team that achieved a Voluntary Stipulated Dismissal on behalf of a product distributor client from national multidistrict litigation (MDL) arising from the manufacture and sale of medical devices. Further, James was a member of a trial team that obtained a defense judgment in a product liability claim involving damages alleged in excess of $30 million.

Before joining Marshall Dennehey, James gained litigation experience at a medium-sized civil defense firm as well as experience representing clients in mass toxic tort matters in Pennsylvania and West Virginia.

James graduated sixth in his class from Capital University Law School in 2018. During law school, he served as both a Staff Member and Associate Board Member of the University's Law Review, where he sharpened his legal research and legal writing skills to prepare for his career after graduation. 

James also interned at the Pennsylvania Superior Court for the Honorable Mary Jane Bowes in 2017, where he researched and drafted memorandum opinions while working closely with the Judge’s staff. In 2018, James interned at the Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office where he worked directly with Assistant District Attorneys preparing for trial.

James is licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania and West Virginia and is also an active member of the Allegheny County Bar Association, often volunteering to serve as a judge/juror for high school mock trial competitions. James is also a member of the American Bar Association. 

    • Capital University Law School (J.D., summa cum laude, 2018)
    • Slippery Rock University (B.S., 2015)
    • Pennsylvania, 2018
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2018
    • West Virginia, 2019
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of West Virginia, 2019
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of West Virginia, 2024
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • American Bar Association
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Successful defense in $30 million product liability trial. Served as second chair in a high-stakes product liability trial, obtaining a major defense result for our client. Plaintiff’s final pre-trial demand was $22 million with claimed exposure exceeding $30 million. Plaintiff alleged that compressor systems designed and sold by our client caused weld debris and excess lubricating oil to contaminate a natural gas pipeline, leading to multimillion-dollar losses at a power plant. Through material testing and expert testimony, the defense demonstrated that the weld debris allegations were unfounded and that Plaintiff’s own design, maintenance lapses, equipment failures, and poor system response were the more likely causes. The Court found Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof, and our client paid nothing despite the significant claimed exposure.

Results

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Defense Verdict Obtained After Seven-Day Bench Trial

We received a defense decision after a seven-day bench trial in a product liability action in which the exposure in the case exceeded $30 million. Our client designs, sells and services engineered equipment for the energy industry, including natural gas compression apparatuses for use in transmission pipeline systems. In 2015, the client sold the plaintiff two reciprocating compressor systems to replace outdated equipment at a station located near Downingtown, PA. The compressor systems were designed to inject oil into the gas stream for piston lubrication. This lubricating oil needed to be removed from the gas stream using filtration devices supplied by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed weld debris contained within certain vessels of the compressors migrated downstream upon commissioning and compromised several gas filtration devices. The plaintiff further contended the damaged filtration devices permitted excess lubricating oil into the pipeline, which fouled multiple turbines owned by its downstream customer at a large natural gas-fired power plant, causing significant economic losses. The applicable contract between the plaintiff and our client contained a forum selection clause requiring litigation to take place in Lake County, Indiana. The plaintiff claimed commercial losses of $18 million, plus attorney fees (per contract) in the neighborhood of $4 million. The plaintiff also maintained it was entitled to pre-judgment interest. If successful in establishing liability, this sum would have added another $5 million to $7 million to the damage award, depending on the interest rate employed by the court. Therefore, the pure exposure in the case exceeded $30 million. In response to the plaintiff’s claims, we successfully established that the weld debris incident was a red herring and did not damage the filtration equipment. Material testing of debris from within the filtration devices revealed very little weld debris compared to pipe scale and other naturally occurring components. Through key expert testimony, we established that the plaintiff could not meet its burden of proof because the oil contamination events may have been caused by several factors directly attributable to the plaintiff’s lack of design engineering, inadequate equipment maintenance, equipment failure and inappropriate response to system alarms.

Summary Judgment Secured in a Neighborhood Dispute Alleging Excess Water Runoff

We obtained summary judgment in the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas in favor of our clients in a dispute over alleged excess water runoff. Our clients, a married couple, were sued by their neighbors for claims related to water runoff due to the installation of gutters and downspouts on a shed near the property line. We effectively argued for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ injunction, trespass, nuisance and negligence claims, demonstrating that the plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert testimony to substantiate their case as required under Pennsylvania law. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ negligence claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, which had expired at least six years before the suit was filed.

Thought Leadership

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Grossly Underestimated: Exploring Gross Negligence and Liability Waivers in Pennsylvania Premises Liability Law

October 1, 2024

In Pennsylvania, gross negligence is seldom considered in premises liability cases because ordinary negligence is far easier for a plaintiff to prove against a premises owner. Pennsylvania courts hold that there is a substantive difference between gross negligence and negligence. Kibler v. Blue Knob Recreation, Inc., 184 A.3d 974, 985 (Pa. Super. 2018). This substantive difference typically results in only ordinary negligence being pleaded by a plaintiff against a property owner.

Defense Digest

Gross Enough? A Dive Into Gross Negligence in Pennsylvania Premises Liability Law

October 1, 2022

Key Points: The definition of what constitutes gross negligence under Pennsylvania case law is vague and difficult to apply to various factual scenarios. What constitutes gross negligence is often not at issue in premises liability cases. With more fitness and recreational facilities requiring customers to sign liability waivers excluding liability for negligence, gross negligence will become an issue as informed plaintiff attorneys will recognize that they need to plead gross negligence to avoid the waiver defense. In Pennsylvania, the topic of gross negligence is seldom considered in premises liability cases because ordinary negligence is far easier for an injured plaintiff to prove against an alleged negligent premises owner. Pennsylvania courts have held that there is a substantive difference between gross negligence and negligence. Kibler v. Blue Knob Recreation, Inc., 184 A.3d 974, 985 (Pa. Super. 2018). This substantive difference typically results in only ordinary negligence being pleaded by a plaintiff against a property owner. However, gross negligence comes into play when, prior to an alleged accident, the injured individual signs a valid liability waiver, which waivers are often used by fitness and recreation entities. A liability waiver will typically contain an exculpatory clause excluding the premises owner for liability for negligent conduct. Yet, “gross negligence” cannot be excluded, even by a valid liability waiver. When a liability waiver is involved, a plaintiff’s lawyer will typically plead both negligence and gross negligence. Such allegations could potentially negate the effect of the liability waiver and require that a judge or jury determine whether the premises owner’s conduct amounted to not only negligence, but also gross negligence. In determining what type of conduct constitutes gross negligence, the general consensus is that the alleged conduct must be more egregious than negligence, but it does not rise to intentional acts or conduct. Ratti v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 758 A.2d 695, 704 (Pa. Super. 2000). In practice, application of this broad definition in a wide variety of varying factual scenarios can prove difficult. In the premises liability context, in 2018, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was asked to determine whether gross negligence existed in a case involving an injured skier and a ski resort. In Kibler v. Blue Knob Recreation, Inc., 184 A.3d 974 (Pa. Super. 2018), the plaintiff-skier was injured when he ran over “trenches” in the snow that were caused by an all-terrain vehicle operated by a resort employee. While the plaintiff had signed a valid liability waiver relating to the negligence of the ski resort, the plaintiff argued that the ski resort’s conduct amounted to gross negligence. The Superior Court held that the ski resort’s conduct in creating the trenches did not amount to grossly negligent conduct. The Superior Court reasoned that, while this conduct was arguably negligent, it did not amount to gross negligence because the resort’s employees were, at most, careless in their actions. The Superior Court further found that “mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions” do not support a claim of gross negligence. While case law involving the application of the concept of gross negligence with regard to premises liability are few, this concept has also been applied by Pennsylvania courts to mental health facilities covered under the Mental Health Procedures Act (Act). This Act provides an exception to a blanket protection for treating mental health facilities when said facilities render grossly negligent treatment. For example, in Albright v. Abington Memorial Hospital, 696 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1997), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the defendant-hospital’s conduct, after a patient failed to appear for a scheduled appointment, did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law, even in light of the fact that the defendant-hospital was aware of the patient’s deteriorating mental condition, and even though it failed to have the patient committed. In Downey v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 817 A.2d 517 (Pa. Super. 2003), a similar decision was upheld when the defendant-hospital’s failure to supervise the plaintiff-decedent, despite her mental health issues, constituted nothing more than ordinary “carelessness, inadvertence, laxity or indifference,” and not gross negligence. The broad gross negligence definition will undoubtedly be put to the test in Pennsylvania courts. In a recent premises liability case involving a gym member and premises/gym owner, the Superior Court ruled that the gym member’s claims for negligence were excluded under a valid liability waiver and that the member failed to raise the claim of gross negligence in a timely manner, having raised the issue of gross negligence for the first time at the summary judgment stage. Toro v. Fitness Int’l LLC, 150 A.3d 968 (Pa.  Super. 2016). Given that the claims of negligence and gross negligence were substantively different, the Superior Court granted summary judgment in the premises/gym owner’s favor. Based upon the ruling of Toro, an informed plaintiff’s attorney will likely plead both negligence and gross negligence in any premises liability case involving a liability waiver in an effort to defeat it. The vague definition of gross negligence will, therefore, likely be the key topic in cases involving liability waivers at the summary judgment and trial stages. As more and more recreational and fitness entities are requiring customers to sign liability waivers before using their facilities, the issue of what kind conduct constitutes gross negligence will likely become more prevalent in premises liability lawsuits. *Jim is an associate in our Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, office. He can be reached at 412.803.1159 or jpcullen@mdwcg.com. Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Thought Leadership

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Congratulations to our 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Rising Stars: Elizabeth Ferguson, A.C. Nash, Taylor Naughton, Sophia Philor, Amara Rodriguez

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Florida Rising Stars

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Casey Alan Coyle Joins Marshall Dennehey's PA Appellate Practice as a Shareholder in Harrisburg and Philadelphia

News

Marshall Dennehey Expands Leading Pennsylvania Appellate Practice With Addition of Shareholder Casey Coyle

Result

Unanimous Verdict Obtained in a Medical Malpractice Matter in Bergen County, New Jersey

News

Veteran Trial Attorney Joseph M. Toddy Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department in Philadelphia