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Defense Digest

Caution: The Potential Quagmire of Unwanted Arbitration Clauses Are Often Buried in the Details

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023

December 1, 2023

Key Points:

  • Consider including third parties or remote parties to a complaint.
  • Arbitration clauses can appear in various contracts, including product warranties.
  • The potential dangers of agency relationships in construction.

Most parties follow a simple rule—if you don’t want to arbitrate, don’t agree to an arbitration provision as the means to resolve your dispute. More and more, arbitration provisions for dispute resolution are avoided as arbitration has become both costly and lengthy—the opposite of what had been intended. However, there are times and instances when you may not have a choice about arbitration because the choice has already been made. This is especially true in the context of construction. In construction matters, there are often complicated relationships between parties—owners, contractors, and subcontractors, materialmen, etc.—which establish duties and responsibilities that flow up and down the chain. 

One example that is often ignored or overlooked is an arbitration provision in a warranty from a manufacturer of a product. If you are procuring the product to incorporate into your project, you may be agreeing to the terms of an express warranty. Manufacturers do not typically negotiate their product warranties on a case-by-case basis, and arbitration provisions in a warranty or contract with other parties may attach without warning. 

One such instance was the recent case of SICIS North America, Inc. v. Sadie’s Hideaway, LLC, 368 So.3d 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), where a property owner elected to sue a tile manufacturer, SICIS North America, and the general contractor, Galvas Construction, Inc. The owner alleged that the exterior tiles installed at its project were defective. The tiles were procured from SICIS by Galvas for the owner. The owner sued Galvas under various theories and sued SICIS for breaches of warranty and negligence. Galvas, in turn, asserted a cross-claim for indemnification against SICIS. 

This scenario represents a typical construction litigation case that we might all find ourselves involved with. However, in Sadie’s Hideaway, since there was an arbitration provision in the warranty documents and Galvas’ indemnification claim arose from that transaction, SICIS moved to compel the owner’s claim and Galvas’ cross-claim to arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court set forth the proper analysis relating to a motion to compel arbitration: “[T]he three elements for courts to consider in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration are: (1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitrate was waived,” citing CEFCO v. Odom, 278 So.3d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

The appellate court ultimately reversed and stated:

First, because [the owner] was suing [SICIS] based upon the written warranty, it was bound by the arbitration provision contained in [Galvas’] agreement with [SICIS]. As the Florida Supreme Court has explained, ‘[W]hen a plaintiff sues under a contract to which the plaintiff is not a party . . . we will ordinarily enforce an arbitration clause contained in that contract, absent some other valid defense. ...’ [The owner] had no valid defense against arbitration, a fact which it apparently realized when it voluntarily dismissed its express warranty claim after the notice of appeal and initial brief were filed.

Second, the trial court erred in not compelling arbitration based upon the agency relationship that existed between [the owner] and [Galvas]. The essential elements of an actual agency relationship are: (1) acknowledgement by the principal that the agent will act for him; (2) the agent’s acceptance of the undertaking; and (3) control by the principal over the actions of the agent. 

SICIS North America, 368 So.3d at 1055 (internal citations omitted).

The appellate court further held that the evidence established that the owner authorized Galvas to act as its agent when purchasing the tiles from SICIS. Because Galvas’ purchase of the tiles was within the scope of work that the owner hired it to do, it was unnecessary for the owner to expressly authorize Galvas to enter into the arbitration agreement with SICIS. As such, the court held that the owner is bound by the agreement between SICIS and Galvas by virtue of the owner’s agency relationship with Galvas.

Ultimately, the owner did not need to sue SICIS. It could have just sued Galvas for the alleged defective tiles. Suing SICIS in this case was the owner’s choice, and in doing so, it complicated its claims between itself, Galvas, and SICIS, such that the arbitration clause in the warranty was ultimately held to apply to some of the owner’s claims—an arbitration provision the owner never agreed to. As a result, the owner and Galvas are tasked with arbitrating claims against a manufacturer under a warranty. 

The lesson is that, prior to bringing suit or a counterclaim or cross-claim, you should thoroughly evaluate the claims asserted, especially those against distant or removed parties. In doing so, you will not unwillingly stroll into an arbitration quagmire.


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.