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Case Law Alerts

Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal Explores “Cat’s Paw” Liability Theory in an Employment Law Whistleblower Retaliation Context

City of Hallandale Beach v. Rosemond, 4D2022-2642, 2024 WL 2836937 (Fla. 4th DCA June 5, 2024)

July 1, 2024

by Holly M. Hamilton

A former city employee filed a lawsuit against the defendant pursuant to section 112.3187(4)(a)-(b), Florida Statutes, where he alleged the City Commission’s termination of his employment violated Florida’s Whistleblower’s Act, (the pertinent part which says a government entity “shall not dismiss, discipline, or take any other adverse personnel action against an employee for disclosing information pursuant to the provisions of this section” and “shall not take any adverse action that affects the rights or interests of a person in retaliation for the person’s disclosure of information under this section”). At trial, the jury found in the employee’s favor after the judge denied the City’s motion for directed verdict. The basis of the City’s motion for directed verdict was that a plaintiff cannot prove improper animus for whistleblowing unless the plaintiff can prove intent to retaliate by a majority of the decision-makers. The employee argued the City has liability under the “cat’s paw” liability theory (derived from an old French fable): an employer (the cat) rubber stamps a discriminatory decision (goes into a fire and burns its proverbial paws) while a biased subordinate with no decision-making powers (conniving monkey) escapes unscathed with chestnuts. The Fourth District reversed the trial court and determined that the City had no liability under the cat’s paw theory here because the City Commission’s voting structure does not include a subordinate who lacks decision-making power as all three of the City’s Commissioners are decision-makers. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.