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Hellen is an associate in the firm's Casualty Department where she handles all areas of general liability, premises liability, automobile liability, personal injury protection (PIP) and civil rights litigation. She has experience in a wide range of matters including motor vehicle accidents, slip and falls, civil rights and sexual assault claims.

Hellen began her career with a local boutique firm. Through this position, she obtained critical training in matters involving affirmative and defense personal injury, complex and business litigation and class actions. Thereafter, Hellen worked in public service, where she specialized in the defense of motor vehicle and slip and fall, civil rights and sexual assault matters. In that position, she successfully prevailed on several motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment and participated in intensive discovery, arbitration, mediation and settlement hearings. 

Hellen received her juris doctor in 2020 from Rutgers Law School where she was recognized with the Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes Prize, which is awarded to the graduating student who has achieved the best record in the New Jersey Practice course. She graduated summa cum laude in 2015 from Kean University with a Bachelor of Arts and Sciences in Political Science. Hellen also graduated in 2008 from Essex County College with an Associate in Science in Paralegal Studies.

While pursuing her J.D. and undergraduate degrees, for over a decade, Hellen simultaneously worked full-time as a paralegal and conflicts analyst for other firms in the tri-state area focused on class actions, personal injury, and employment litigation.

Hellen is admitted to practice in New Jersey and New York and in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 2020)
    • Kean University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2015)
    • Essex County College (A.S., 2008)
      • Paralegal Studies
    • New Jersey, 2020
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2021
    • New York, 2022
    • Portuguese (proficient)
    • Spanish (proficient)
    • Christian Legal Society, Rutgers Law School, 2016-2020
    • Moot Court Board Member, Rutgers Law School, 2018-2020
  • Secured a summary judgment in a general liability action arising from a collision between a casino patron and an unidentified individual operating an electric scooter allegedly owned and rented by our client. Plaintiff alleged that the scooter operator reversed into her. She successfully argued that there were no genuine issues of material fact and no evidence to support a theory of liability under ordinary negligence. Specifically, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case by failing to demonstrate that a duty of care existed between plaintiff and the electric scooter rental entity, or that the entity had actual or constructive notice that the scooter was defectively designed or otherwise defective in any manner. Plaintiff also failed to produce any expert testimony or liability expert report in support of her claims. The motion for summary judgment was granted unopposed in favor of the electric scooter rental entity. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Court had not been afforded the opportunity to review discovery not specifically requested by plaintiff during the discovery period, which had not been produced. The Court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, finding that plaintiff failed to satisfy the standard required for reconsideration of a final order. The Court reiterated that plaintiff failed to establish that the electric scooter rental entity breached any duty of care and failed to produce a liability expert to opine on the alleged hazardous condition.

    Successfully defended a public entity and public employee in litigation arising out of a motor vehicle accident where liability was clearly established on the grounds that plaintiff's expert narrative report constituted a net opinion for failure to provide a comparative analysis of plaintiff's prior medical history and surgeries and a causal connection between her pre-accident and post-accident conditions.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.