General Liability

In Cooper, the Second District Court of Appeals addressed whether a transportation network company (TNC) owes a duty of care to a driver harmed while using its platform. The plaintiff argued that a TNC owes a duty to its drivers based on its control over the rideshare platform, its safety policies, and its role in matching drivers with riders. The court, however, analyzed duty through traditional Ohio negligence principles governing entities that engage independent contractors, emphasizing that a hiring entity is generally not liable for injuries arising from the contractor’s work absent specific exceptions.

Central to the court’s reasoning was the “active participation” doctrine, which limits when a company who hires an independent contractor assumes a duty of care. Under Ohio law, active participation requires more than general oversight, arising only when the hiring entity directs the injury-causing activity, gives or denies permission for the critical act, or retains control over a key variable in the work. Applying this framework, the court rejected the argument that Lyft’s operation of its platform—such as allowing users to create accounts or assigning ride requests—constituted active participation.

The court also clarified that a TNC’s general safety measures, policies, and monitoring capabilities do not, standing alone, create a duty. Consistent with longstanding precedent, retaining authority to enforce safety standards or coordinate activity does not rise to active participation. The decision is particularly relevant because it suggests that platform-based controls—such as algorithmic dispatch, account verification, or general safety rules—are analogous to supervisory functions traditionally insufficient to impose a duty on a company hiring independent contractors. Thus, even where a TNC has superior knowledge or implements safety-related systems, those features must be tied directly to the injury-producing act to establish duty.

Finally, Cooper reinforces the importance of the independent-contractor relationship in limiting negligence liability for TNCs. By treating drivers as independent contractors, it restricts when a hiring entity owes a duty for injuries arising from the contractor’s work. The ruling signals that, absent evidence of control over the specific conduct causing harm, courts are unlikely to expand duty based solely on a TNC’s platform design or contractual safety commitments. For negligence claims against TNCs, generally, Cooper underscores that liability will turn not on the existence of platform-level control in the abstract, but on whether the company meaningfully controlled—or actively participated in—the precise risk that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury.