General Liability

We secured dismissal of a lawsuit which alleged constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. He argued that the claim was not ripe because the plaintiff’s conviction had never been vacated or terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. Under the “favorable termination” requirement pronounced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1984), and later discussed in McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109 (2019), 42 U.S.C. §1983 cannot be used to pursue alleged constitutional violations unless and until the underlying criminal conviction was vacated or otherwise terminated.

We received a defense jury verdict before the Delaware Superior Court, New Castle County. Although liability was undisputed at trial, damages were disputed. The plaintiff sought damages for head, neck, back and left shoulder injuries. He had $350,000 in future medical bills and $78,000 in past medical bills that he could board. The plaintiff also had a $5 million lost wage claim that we were able to get dismissed prior to trial on a motion in limine.

We obtained a defendants’ verdict in New York Civil Court where we represented an appliance company and their employee, who was accused of stealing a Rolex watch. The client’s employee installed a light fixture in the plaintiff’s residence. After the installer left the residence, the 85-year-old plaintiff could not locate his $31,000 Rolex watch. He filed a claim with his homeowner’s carrier and received $500 because the watch was not scheduled. He also filed a police report. He then retained counsel and commenced suit against the defendants for conversion, breach of contract and negligent hiring. During dispositions of both the plaintiff and his wife, we elicited testimony that neither had any proof that the defendants stole his Rolex watch. He further elicited that no criminal charges were ever brought against the employee. We filed for summary judgment, denying the allegations, and included affidavits from the employee and the owner of the appliance company in which it was indicated that there were no prior complaints regarding the company and/or the installer. The motion was denied. At the trial conducted in June 2025, Chris again elicited testimony from the plaintiff that he had no proof that the installer stole his Rolex watch, nor did the plaintiff provide any proof that the installer’s employer engaged in negligent hiring, as there were no prior complaints regarding this employee. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, we again moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the plaintiff had not established his claim for damages or proven the allegations in the complaint. The motion was denied. Rather than hearing oral summations, the court directed the parties to submit written summations. In our written summation, we outlined dismissal of the case, arguing that any finding against the defendants for theft would be tantamount to accusing them of stealing when neither the police nor the district attorney found any probable cause to criminally charge them. The court dismissed the case in its entirety. 

We obtained reversal of a non-final order in a wrongful death case against a dive captain, dive master and the corporate entity dive companies. A woman drowned while scuba diving on a chartered tour. Following her death, the toxicology report revealed high levels of illicit drugs and alcohol. During the course of litigation, her estate moved for leave to amend their complaint to add a claim for gross negligence and punitive damages, claiming the defendants were grossly negligent for failing to use the buddy system and for allowing the decedent to dive when they knew or should have known she was intoxicated. The estate also claimed gross negligence against the dive master for allowing the decedent out of his eyesight for four to ten minutes during the dive, despite having identified the decedent as requiring “special assistance.” In support of their motion, the estate relied on the police statements, deposition testimony and an expert report. The defendants argued the evidence was insufficient to support the amendment and contended that none of the witnesses knew that the decedent was intoxicated before she dove. In granting the motion, the trial court did not make an affirmative finding that the estate had made a reasonable showing by evidence, which would provide a reasonable evidentiary basis to recover punitive damages. On appeal, the Fourth District agreed with our arguments and reversed on several grounds. First, the Fourth District concluded the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. Second, the court found the estate failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable basis for recovery of punitive damages against the dive captain and dive master. Third, the estate’s proposed amended complaint did not properly allege a claim against the corporate entity defendants. 

We successfully obtained a motion for summary judgment, dismissing our client from a negligence case. We represented a car service which was acting as a rental agent for Avis Rent-A-Car. Our client had repeatedly rented vehicles to the defendant/third-party defendant (renter) in the case. At the time of each rental, the renter would produce a valid driver’s license that was run through a system to confirm its validity. Several days after renting a vehicle to the renter, the renter was involved in a high-speed chase with the Nassau County Police Department. While being pursued by the police, the renter t-boned the plaintiff’s vehicle at an intersection. The plaintiff underwent three surgical procedures involving bleeds to her liver and one procedure to her lung, as well as sustaining a traumatic brain injury, collapsed lung and fractured ribs. After the completion of depositions, we moved for summary judgment to dismiss our client from the litigation as our client was not the owner of the vehicle, nor was there any proof submitted that there was anything mechanically wrong with the vehicle rented to the third-party defendant. We further argued the plaintiffs failed to prove our client’s actions in renting the vehicle could be deemed as a matter of law to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.   

We successfully defended the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) in a wrongful death and survival case in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. The case involved the death of a pedestrian, Vincent Boykin, struck by a SEPTA bus, with the plaintiff, his father, disputing the Philadelphia Medical Examiner’s suicide ruling. The defense presented a forensic psychiatrist’s testimony confirming Mr. Boykin’s high suicide risk. Although SEPTA was found 40% negligent, the decedent’s 60% negligence barred recovery of damages.   

We achieved summary judgment for our client, a commercial plumber, in the Cape May County Superior Court. The plaintiff alleged water leakage in the parking garage of a beach resort hotel resulted from defective plumbing work by the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that improper connections between the plumber’s pipes and the drainage system caused the leaks. The defense motion for summary judgment demonstrated that the defendant’s scope of work was limited to garage plumbing, performed according to specifications and unrelated to the waterproofing membrane or drainage system design flaws identified as the cause of the leaks. The court granted summary judgment, holding that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff beyond the limited scope of their work and dismissed all claims. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.   

Marshall Dennehey’s trial and appellate attorneys were successful in their representation of a national home improvement retail corporation’s tool and truck rental division. Handling the case at both the trial and appellate levels, the defense was successful in convincing the New Jersey appellate court to affirm the trial court’s decision on July 23, 2024. At the trial level, the judge granted our motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the case. The plaintiff had rented a flatbed truck in 2018 to move a cabinet he had just purchased. He alleged that a store employee gave him a set of ramps to use in the truck, but while doing so, they moved and he fell, sustaining serious and permanent injury to his back. The plaintiff alleged he later returned to the store and was told that he had been given the wrong ramps. The panel said that the record included no actual evidence that the ramp did not fit the truck beyond the employee’s saying it was the wrong ramp, or that the ramp slipped because it was incompatible with the truck. Even in his testimony, the panel said the plaintiff did not actually identify any physical cause for the ramp to move. “The dearth of evidence establishing the manner and cause of the slip or slide of the ramp rendered it impossible for the jury to make a reasoned determination as to whether defendant’s purported negligence proximately caused plaintiff’s fall and injuries,” the panel said. The court, therefore, affirmed the case on appeal. 

We obtained a jury defense verdict in Cumberland County, New Jersey. We defended a major propane company where it was claimed that they provided negligent service to a stove which allegedly caused a trailer fire. The plaintiffs lost everything in the fire, including their pets. They also sustained serious and permanent burn injuries. Total medical bills were in excess of $1.5 million, and there was a $227,000 Medicare lien. The plaintiffs’ demand was $5 million. In less than two hours, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defense.

Our motion to dismiss was affirmed on appeal after the Ninth District Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff had sued a non sui juris entity by suing a county department in a personal injury suit. The plaintiff initially filed suit against the department, which was later dismissed without prejudice to allow more time to develop the plaintiff’s medical records. When he refiled his suit, he again named a county department as the defendant. We filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that a county department does not have the capacity to be sued. The plaintiff then filed a motion to amend the complaint and again named the county. In our motion to dismiss the amended complaint, we argued that the plaintiff was outside of the statute of limitations and that the change in defendant could not relate back to the originally filed suit. The plaintiff’s argument, that naming the department was merely a misnomer and that the amended complaint should relate back to the original filing, failed and the trial court dismissed the case. After oral argument, the appellate court affirmed the decision.

We secured summary judgment in a general liability case involving a dog bite. The plaintiff alleged a laceration to the face from a dog bite. The dog was owned by a co-defendant, not by our client, the landlord of the property where the bite occurred. There were no issues of material fact or proof to support a theory of liability under strict or ordinary negligence, and no behavioral signs of aggression were observed by the plaintiff or the property owner’s son who hosted the party where the plaintiff was bitten. We argued that the elements under both theories could not be met, and the judge agreed, granting summary judgment.

We secured a unanimous, precedential decision upholding a venue transfer from Philadelphia to Butler County under forum non conveniens, setting a new standard for defendants after a series of appellate reversals.

We successfully convinced the Pennsylvania Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s decision to sustain preliminary objections and dismiss a wrongful death case involving allegation of negligent transmission of COVID-19. The plaintiff alleged that his elderly parents contracted COVID-19 from employees of our client who were providing non-medical, in-home care services, and that his parents ultimately died from the disease. In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the action, the Superior Court held that no duty to prevent transmission of an illness exists under current Pennsylvania law, and that no new duty should be created under these circumstances.

The plaintiff pet owners brought claims of emotional/bystander distress and recklessness against the delivery service after personally witnessing the incident that tragically killed their family dog. We filed a Motion to Strike (equivalent of 12b(6) in State of Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport), citing appellate authority that, because dogs are personal property and bystander distress arises out of human-to-human relationships, plaintiffs were barred from alleging and recovering any kind of emotional distress damages. Only the fair market value purchase cost of the pet should be permitted. The plaintiffs cited recent trial court decisions allowing such claims and going against the grain of older appellate cases. After oral argument the court sided with the defense, agreeing that for important policy concerns the plaintiff cannot prevail because the plaintiffs were asking the court to legislate and make law beyond its authoritative powers.

We obtained a published decision in the New Jersey Appellate Division reversing the denial of a motion to dismiss because of a lack of duty. The plaintiff’s ex-husband drove through the gate at a large, high-rise apartment complex, waited for plaintiff to arrive, and then shot her in the face. Our client was the former management company which ceased its management obligations 17 days before the shooting, when a successor management company took over. The plaintiff argued that our client was negligent based on procedures for securing the lot it put in place when it managed the property. We sought summary judgment, arguing a lack of duty due to the expiration of a management contract. The Law Division judge denied that motion, asserting there were genuine issues of fact and that the jury had to decide whether a duty existed. We persuaded the Appellate Division to grant interlocutory appeal, and then we successfully argued for a reversal. First, the Appellate Division agreed with us that the trial judge erred by holding that the existence of a duty was a jury question and not a question for the court to decide as a matter of law. Second, the Appellate Division held that, since our client no longer had any rights or responsibilities over the security of the premises when the shooting happened, and because there was no indication that the successor management company or the owner of the property could not have changed the procedures which our client had put in place, the former management company owed no duty to the plaintiff and that summary judgment was therefore appropriate.

We convinced the Superior Court of Pennsylvania to unanimously reverse a Philadelphia trial court’s refusal to compel arbitration of a claim against a nationally recognized online coupon marketing platform. The plaintiff claimed the company was responsible for an alleged sexual assault during a massage that the plaintiff’s son purchased on the coupon platform and gifted to the plaintiff. The Superior Court ruled that the plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between her son and the company and she was, therefore, bound by the arbitration clause in the agreement.

We were successful in having a case dismissed on summary judgment in Brooklyn, New York. The plaintiff was a ticket agent for an international airline at LaGuardia airport. Our client was the cleaning service for the airport terminal. The plaintiff claimed she tripped and fell over a “worn/torn defective” floor mat behind the ticket counter. Depositions of the defendant indicated that they did not own, control, maintain or supervise the mats behind the airlines’ ticket counter. Summary judgment was filed in 2020. After two lengthy oral arguments in February 2022, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action.

We obtained dismissal of a six-figure claim in Philadelphia County via preliminary objections. The plaintiff homeowner sued a lighting designer for breach of contract, negligence for $23k in remediation costs, statutory remedies for treble damages and legal fees. The plaintiff alleged the lighting designer was a home improvement contractor who violated the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act (HICPA) and Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. The plaintiff omitted pertinent facts from the complaint. Using judicial notice, we presented facts from public records to show that the design services were performed in the construction of a new home. We argued that HICPA does not apply to new construction and that the gist of the action doctrine barred the contract claim. The court agreed, dismissed the statutory and contract claims, and remanded the $23k negligence claim to Common Pleas Court arbitration.

We prevailed on a motion for summary judgment related to the duty owed to a minor business invitee in an alleged wrongful death. The plaintiff, the personal representative of the estate of a minor, filed a wrongful death claim alleging the defendant daycare center breached its duty to exercise the reasonable care owed to the minor while he was under the care and supervision of the center. The plaintiff alleged the defendant center’s employees failed to render aid when the minor collapsed, including failing to train its employees, and failing to notify emergency personnel in a timely manner. We successfully argued that the defendant did not breach its duty to exercise reasonable medical care as its employees were CPR certified and immediately responded when an employee witnessed the incident. The mother of the minor arrived immediately after the collapse and held onto him until EMS arrived. The call to the EMS team was made within three minutes of the collapse and the employees reassessed the minor while he was in the mother’s arms and determined the minor was breathing. The minor was breathing until EMS arrived. Sadly, the minor passed away of natural causes. After reviewing the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and hearing our argument, the judge granted the motion for summary judgment, and the case was dismissed.

Carolyn Bogart was successful in opposing a plaintiff’s appeal against our client, a former fraternity member and social guest. In 2014, the plaintiff was a 20-year-old college student and fraternity member attending a university in New Jersey. After consuming his own alcohol, he fell asleep in a dorm room that was the location of an on-campus party. In the early morning hours, he left the dorm room and proceeded to drive his vehicle, which was unknown to anyone in attendance, as all of the party attendees had either left the party or were asleep when he left. He injured himself in a one-car accident, resulting in a traumatic brain injury and disfigurement claim. In 2016, he filed a lawsuit naming all party attendees and fellow brothers in his fraternity, as well as the university and its employees. Following over 30 depositions, summary judgment was granted to all defendants. The appeal was filed in 2019, and a reported decision issued on March 25, 2021, affirming the underlying Superior Court decision as to our client. The appeal raised questions concerning the scope of the duty owed to an adult not old enough to drink legally, but who nonetheless drank to excess. The appellate panel ruled that the Social Host Liability Act did not apply because it governs liability for third party injuries resulting from the service of alcohol to an of-age adult.

We obtained a summary judgment on behalf of a worker who was injured at a fracking site. The injury occurred when a hose came off of an above-ground storage tank and struck him in the head, resulting in sustained serious and permanent injuries. The plaintiff claimed the general contractor was liable for his injuries because it actively participated on the work site and controlled the unsafe condition which caused the injuries. We moved for summary judgment, arguing that the general contractor relinquished complete control over the site to a sub-contractor and, thus, had no control over any unsafe condition which caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of our client.

Walter Klekotka (Mount Laurel, NJ) and Walter Kawalec (Mount Laurel, NJ) were successful in defending a grant of summary judgment in the New Jersey Appellate Division that resulted in a published opinion. Our clients were the owner and manager of an apartment complex for seniors. The plaintiff/resident had returned from walking her dog and alleged she received injuries entering the elevator. She had allowed the dog to enter first when the doors began to close. She alleged injuries occurred when the right door struck her arm and when she used her left arm and the left side of her body to slow the doors from closing while she leapt into the elevator. She sued our clients and the company hired to maintain the elevator, but she was unable to establish any proof of negligence. The trial judge dismissed the case, declining to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in part, because the plaintiff could not establish the third element of the doctrine: that the injury did not result from the plaintiff’s own voluntary act or neglect. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Appellate Division should eliminate this third element. The Appellate Division, in a published opinion, concluded that the third element is a well-established law in New Jersey and only the New Jersey Supreme Court could eliminate it, and that court has shown no inclination to do so. Because the plaintiff could not demonstrate the third prong, res ipsa was not applicable, and the failure of the plaintiff to establish negligence resulted in summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.

The verdict came within 30 minutes of deliberation in a five-day Bradford County PA fire-loss subrogation trial. Social distancing protocols were in place: all participants had their temperatures taken before entering the courthouse; jury selection took place at a local school auditorium; everyone in the courtroom was required to wear masks or face shields; and the jurors were spread out to the gallery section of the courtroom instead of the jury box. Witnesses could appear via Zoom. Two witnesses were flawlessly broadcasted to the courtroom with help from the firm’s Allentown and Mount Laurel offices.

We successfully defended a significant dog mauling case against a landlord defendant. ​The plaintiff was fortunate to have survived the attack and suffered severe permanent physical and emotional trauma. The parties stipulated to damages of $1.75 million and submitted the case to binding arbitration on liability only. The case rested entirely on the credibility of the landlord who claimed that he had no knowledge that the tenant had a dog on the property. The law requires that the landlord know that the dog is present on the leased property and has actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. There was a lot of evidence that the dog had exhibited very aggressive behavior to anyone it came into contact with prior to the event. The plaintiff argued that the landlord had to know of the presence of the dog and its dangerous propensities given the number of times the landlord visited the property. The arbitrator found in favor of the plaintiff and against the tenant only.

We obtained a defense verdict in a three-day jury trial  in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. ​The 81-year-old plaintiff, who was staying at her daughter's home, alleged that she slipped and fell on water in the basement of the rental property and injured her hip. The property was owned by our clients. The plaintiff's daughter and son-in-law claimed they repeatedly complained to our clients of leaks from the ceiling in the basement, without response. They were in the midst of eviction proceedings with our clients for failure to pay rent for several months when the fall occurred. Our clients denied any knowledge of the leaking problem alleged by the tenants, though they did admit that they were aware of leaks in other areas which they attempted to fix. The jury deliberated for 2 ½ hours, had two questions, and asked for the negligence charge to be read back to them. They then returned a finding of no negligence. There was a nuisance value settlement offer made prior to trial, which was rejected.

We obtained summary judgment in favor of our homeowner clients in a case involving an alleged “attack” by our client’s dog. ​As the plaintiff walked past the client's property on a public sidewalk, the dog ran out to the edge of the sidewalk barking loudly. The plaintiff became "startled" and stepped back, falling into the street and sustaining a seriously displaced left distal radius fracture that required open reduction and internal fixation. Upon review of the summary judgment motion, the court found no evidence that the dog was a "dangerous dog" or that the dog had ever left the confines of the insured's property. Interestingly, the court ruled that the dog's barking and charging the sidewalk did not represent a breach of duty by the homeowner to the public on the sidewalk under the applicable statutory and case law.

We secured the dismissal of a New York no-fault/personal injury protection (PIP) lost wages suit that carried a potential judgment of more than $1.37 million. The suit commenced in 2014, and over several years, the plaintiff was not cooperative in providing requested information. In 2018, the defense served a 90-day notice on the plaintiff, which advised that we would move for dismissal if the plaintiff did not take action or file a notice of trial within 90 days. The Rockland County Supreme Court Judge recognized that there was no activity in the case for years, but was apprehensive about dismissing the case on the spot. He scheduled an additional hearing and required the plaintiff and new counsel, if retained, to appear to discuss the case status and activity. When they did not appear, Scott successfully moved for dismissal.

We successfully tried a premises liability action to a defense verdict in favor of a resident’s association in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, and also successfully defended against the plaintiff’s appeal. ​The plaintiff, who was a community resident (formerly married to a unit owner but not an owner herself), claimed that she tripped and fell on a tree branch on common area steps at night as a result of a burned out PECO-owned lamp, and that the Association failed to ensure that the light was fixed. The plaintiff had asked for either invitee status or a hybrid charge on duty, but the court agreed with the defense that she was able to use the common areas by permission, not by invitation, making her a licensee only. This resulted in the duty owed being only to make the property as safe as it appeared. The defense presented multiple instances of notice to PECO of the burned-out light, and the plaintiff conceded the defense contention that it could not change the bulb itself because PECO owned the lamp. The plaintiff also conceded that she had been aware of the light being out for some time. The jury unanimously found in favor of the Association and, on appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment on the jury verdict, finding that the trial court did not err by charging the jury that the plaintiff was entitled only to the care due to a licensee on the property, and not an invitee.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a rock climbing center. ​The plaintiff, a certified climber, was injured when she fell from a 25-foot rock-climbing wall at our client's facility. After reaching the summit of the wall, she pushed off to begin repelling down, only to realize that she forgot to connect to the auto-belay system. She fell to the ground and fractured both ankles and underwent open reduction internal fixation surgery. She had previously visited the client's facility approximately 35 times and had executed a liability waiver on each occasion, including the date of the accident. We moved for summary judgment to dismiss her complaint based upon the fact that the liability waiver was enforceable. The plaintiff argued that the liability waiver was only enforceable as to her claims of ordinary negligence, and that the issue of whether the defendant was grossly negligent was a triable issue of fact. However, we successfully argued that no reasonable jury could find that the client was grossly negligent based on the client's testimony of the safety procedures, protocols and equipment in place at the rock-climbing center. Accordingly, the court granted our motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, in its entirety, against our client.

We obtained summary judgment in the Supreme Court of Rockland County, New York. The plaintiff slipped and fell while walking to her mailbox during a severe winter storm in January 2016. The plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against her homeowners association and its snow removal contractor. We moved for summary judgment on behalf of the defendants, asserting that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the storm-in-progress doctrine. In opposition to our motion, the plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to adequately salt the premises, that the defendants were aware of the icy conditions, and that the storm had ended prior to the plaintiff’s accident. In granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court found the defendants established that there was a storm in progress at the time of the plaintiff’s accident and that their efforts to prevent ice accumulation and remove snow did not create a hazardous condition. According to the court, the plaintiff’s testimony was self-serving, contradictory and a feigned attempt to create a material issue of fact as to when the storm came to an end.