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Defense Digest

Navigating New Jersey’s New Bad Faith Landscape for the Modern SIU

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022

October 1, 2022

by Matthew J. Burdalski

Key Points:

  • New Jersey’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act now imposes stringent and dangerously vague duties and requirements on New Jersey insurers and special investigators.
  • The passage of the Act brings New Jersey in line with several other states and jurisdictions in creating a statutory cause of action for bad faith in certain first-party claims.
  • When SIU investigates claims, best practices will be crucial in establishing good faith and avoiding the punitive consequences of violation of the Insurance Fair Conduct Act.

Earlier this year, Governor Phil Murphy signed into law Senate Bill 1559, now known as the New Jersey Insurance Fair Conduct Act (Act), that created a new statutory cause of action for bad faith in first-party insurance claims in the state of New Jersey. Prior to passage of the Act, bad faith claims in New Jersey were governed by the seminal case of Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993). There, the court found that, to establish bad faith, a claimant had to show the “absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of a policy and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.” Under Pickett, a denial of coverage could not be considered bad faith so long as there was a reasonable basis to support the denial. This provided claimants with a remedy for an insurer’s reckless and unreasonable actions, but it also allowed insurers to deny claims where there were reasonable questions or law or fact.

The passage of the Act significantly reduces the burden to establish bad faith in New Jersey. While the bill was initially drafted to cover all first-party claims, the final enacted version is limited to UM and UIM claims. The Act creates a private civil cause of action against an automobile insurer for:

  1. any unreasonable delay or unreasonable denial of a claim for payment of benefits under an insurance policy; or
  2. any violation of the provisions of section 4 of N.J.S.A. 17:29B (the New Jersey Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act or “UCSPA”).

Significantly, “Insurer” is defined under the Act as any individual, corporation, association, partnership, or other legal entity which issues, executes, renews or delivers an insurance policy in New Jersey, or which is responsible for determining claims made under the policy. Arguably, this could be interpreted to include individual claims handlers or investigators as insurers for the purposes of the Act.

Penalties for violation of the Act are severe. The Act provides that a successful plaintiff shall be entitled to: (1) actual damages caused by the violation of the Act, which shall include, but need not be limited to, actual trial verdicts that shall not exceed three times the applicable coverage amount; and (2) pre-and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorney’s fees, and reasonable litigation expenses. In short, treble damages plus fees and costs.

Frighteningly vague, the Act does not provide any guidance at all as to what might be considered an unreasonable delay or denial. Further, violations of the UCSPA were previously enforced only upon a showing that they were committed by an insurer with routine frequency. The Act has stripped that element, specifically stating that a claimant “shall not be required to prove that the insurer’s actions were of such a frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” In sum, one singular violation of the UCSPA could be used by a claimant to establish a violation of the Act by an insurer.

The UCSPA sets forth 15 specific examples of deceptive acts or practices that could constitute a violation of the Act if committed by an insurer. Relevant examples include: misrepresenting pertinent facts or policy provisions; failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims; refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information; failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time; and not attempting in good faith to effectuate fair settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear. Again, in the context of the Act, there is no requirement to show the above violations occur at such frequency to indicate a general business practice.

Similar statutes passed in other jurisdictions have been used to attempt to hold individual insurance employees personally liable for bad faith. In the matter of Keodalah v. Allstate Ins. Co., 449 P.3d 1040 (Wash. 2019), the Washington Supreme Court narrowly found that a similar bad faith bill did not create a cause of action against individual claims handlers. The Colorado Supreme Court also refused to hold individual insurance employees liable in Skillet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 505 P.3d 664 (Colo. 2022). These narrow decisions show that the plaintiff’s bar is willing and eager to push these vague statutes to their limits. The vagueness of the Act will likely invite comparable attempts by plaintiffs in New Jersey.

The New Jersey Insurance Fair Conduct Act is new, vague and harsh. The future landscape of the Act, its impact and implications are uncertain. What is certain is that claimants and the plaintiff’s bar will test the limits of the Act. The insurance industry, and SIU in particular, must be ready to adapt and meet the challenge.

*Matt is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office. He can be reached at 856.414.6035 or mjburdalski@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority. 

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.