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Defense Digest

Whispering Isn’t Enough for Harassment: Federal Court Sets a Boundary for Employers

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2026

March 1, 2026

by Veronica R. Sansone

Key Points:

  • The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently held that there are limits to workplace harassment.
  • The “severe and pervasive” standard cannot be stretched to cover a Title VII claim.
  • To establish a protected activity, plaintiffs must show that a reasonable person would perceive the conduct described in the complaint as harassment and/or illegal.

Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania limited the scope of workplace harassment. In Nyamu v. Merck & Co., 2025 WL 2599528, (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2025), the court ruled in favor of the defendant-employer. It granted summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for both retaliation and hostile work environment.

The plaintiff, Peter Nyamu, brought claims against his employer, Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC, for creating a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment and retaliating against him for reporting the harassment. The plaintiff was employed as a biotechnician and worked in a sterile lab. The plaintiff claimed that during a staff meeting, his supervisor forgot to hand him one of the schedules he was passing out. Allegedly, after the meeting, the supervisor came close to the plaintiff and whispered in his ear, “I don’t know how I missed to give you a schedule because I use your voice to know where you are standing ... You have a voice that is very specific to me.” Notably, the plaintiff is of African descent, and he perceived this remark as condescending – due to his heavy accent. After the meeting, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint about his supervisor.

The same year the incident at the staff meeting occurred, the plaintiff had failed six contamination tests, excluding him from working in a sterile area for one year as per policy. Under the policy, the plaintiff was able to request, and was later transferred to a department that did not involve entering a sterile area until his exclusion was lifted after a year. The transfer occurred after the plaintiff reported his supervisor’s conduct at the staff meeting. The defendant claimed the transfer was based on the exclusion policy, which the plaintiff was made aware of prior to logging his complaint, and he was placed back in his original unit once his exclusion ended.

Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by both the plaintiff and defendant. In deciding the motions, the court analyzed the standards for both a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment and retaliation. In most employment cases, summary judgment is uncommon and a high hurdle for defendants.

Here, the plaintiff alleged that his supervisor’s comments were about his distinct voice – yet he brought a hostile work environment claim under sexual harassment only. Thus, the court could only examine the instance based on the totality of the circumstances in reference to the plaintiff’s sex.

Under this type of claim, the plaintiff first had to show the sex discrimination was severe and pervasive. When analyzing this first prong of the claim, the court focused on the act of leaning in and whispering to a co-worker. It recognized that this act can be uncomfortable and interfere with one’s personal space. However, based on the facts presented, it did not find that the supervisor was making a sexual advance toward the plaintiff. The court ruled that, while the plaintiff may have felt uncomfortable, the singular act of whispering in this instance was not severe and pervasive enough to support a gender-based claim, especially because the allegations did not involve his sex. Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

The plaintiff also brought a retaliation claim, which was based on being transferred to another unit after he complained about the incident with his supervisor. Therefore, the court had to examine if the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity under Title VII.

In Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2008), the Third Circuit held that if no reasonable person could believe the reported incident constituted unlawful discrimination, then the complaint is not considered a protected activity. In Nyamu v. Merck & Co., the District Court determined that the plaintiff’s supervisor whispering about his voice being distinct was not derogatory. In fact, the court further explained that this was an “isolated incident” and something one could reasonably determine was an attempt by the supervisor to be discrete. Ultimately, summary judgment was, again, granted in favor of the defendant.

This was a key win for employers. The ruling strengthens the legal standard for claims of hostile work environment and retaliation, providing employers with a strong defense to claims involving only isolated, minor incidents. The court’s holding was consistent with previous interpretations of “severe and pervasive,” and confirmed that not every workplace complaint meets the reasonable person standard required to establish a protected activity.

Veronica works in our King of Prussia, PA office. She can be reached at (610) 354-8261 or VRSansone@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.