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Veronica is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice on employment-related claims, including, but not limited to allegations of discrimination, violation of employment-related statutes, wrongful discharge, and breach of contract.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Veronica worked as an Assistant District Attorney at the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office in the Family Protection Unit where she managed cases ranging from the investigation level to those preparing for trial and worked directly with law enforcement in gathering evidence to make charging decisions. Veronica also previously completed a legal internship at the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office, as well as the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

In 2024, Veronica received her juris doctor from Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law. During law school, she was a member of the National Trial Team and the Sports Law Hockey Negotiation Team.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 2024)
    • University of Scranton (B.A., magna cum laude, 2022)
    • Pennsylvania, 2024
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2025

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Employment Law

Montgomery County Creates Discrimination Complaint Portal

June 10, 2026

On June 1, 2026, the Montgomery County Human Rights Commission launched a new online reporting portal to streamline discrimination complaints. The portal allows residents to file complaints related to discrimination in housing, employment, or public accommodation. The goal was to create a clear path for residents to be heard. Jamila Winder, Chair of the Montgomery County Board of Commissioners, stated, “When someone in Montgomery County experiences discrimination, they shouldn’t have to figure it out alone or navigate a complex system for complaints.” In establishing the portal, Montgomery County is the first non-home rule county in Pennsylvania to create its own Human Relations Commission to handle discrimination complaints. The Commission is run by eight volunteer members serving initial two year terms. Any person who believes they have faced unlawful discrimination in Montgomery County within 120 days of an alleged incident can report it on the portal. Within 60 days, the Commission will review the complaint to determine if it has jurisdiction to hear the matter. If the complaint is something the Commission can hear, it will invite both parties to participate in mediation. The County explained in its press release the “mediation is confidential, optional, and intended to provide a fair and constructive opportunity to resolve disputes.” Importantly, the Commission may choose to refer cases to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. If there is a determination that unlawful discrimination occurred, corrective action, compensation, reasonable accommodations, or other remedies allowed under state law may be applied. Any final order by the Commission can be appealed to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. Employers and business owners should be aware of this new third avenue where in select cases people can report alleged discrimination. For more information, Montgomery County issued a press release about the new portal. https://www.montgomerycountypa.gov/news/montgomery-county-human-relations-commission-opens-complaint-process-discrimination-claims.

Defense Digest

Whispering Isn’t Enough for Harassment: Federal Court Sets a Boundary for Employers

March 1, 2026

Key Points: The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently held that there are limits to workplace harassment. The “severe and pervasive” standard cannot be stretched to cover a Title VII claim. To establish a protected activity, plaintiffs must show that a reasonable person would perceive the conduct described in the complaint as harassment and/or illegal. Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania limited the scope of workplace harassment. In Nyamu v. Merck & Co., 2025 WL 2599528, (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2025), the court ruled in favor of the defendant-employer. It granted summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for both retaliation and hostile work environment. The plaintiff, Peter Nyamu, brought claims against his employer, Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC, for creating a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment and retaliating against him for reporting the harassment. The plaintiff was employed as a biotechnician and worked in a sterile lab. The plaintiff claimed that during a staff meeting, his supervisor forgot to hand him one of the schedules he was passing out. Allegedly, after the meeting, the supervisor came close to the plaintiff and whispered in his ear, “I don’t know how I missed to give you a schedule because I use your voice to know where you are standing ... You have a voice that is very specific to me.” Notably, the plaintiff is of African descent, and he perceived this remark as condescending – due to his heavy accent. After the meeting, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint about his supervisor. The same year the incident at the staff meeting occurred, the plaintiff had failed six contamination tests, excluding him from working in a sterile area for one year as per policy. Under the policy, the plaintiff was able to request, and was later transferred to a department that did not involve entering a sterile area until his exclusion was lifted after a year. The transfer occurred after the plaintiff reported his supervisor’s conduct at the staff meeting. The defendant claimed the transfer was based on the exclusion policy, which the plaintiff was made aware of prior to logging his complaint, and he was placed back in his original unit once his exclusion ended. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by both the plaintiff and defendant. In deciding the motions, the court analyzed the standards for both a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment and retaliation. In most employment cases, summary judgment is uncommon and a high hurdle for defendants. Here, the plaintiff alleged that his supervisor’s comments were about his distinct voice – yet he brought a hostile work environment claim under sexual harassment only. Thus, the court could only examine the instance based on the totality of the circumstances in reference to the plaintiff’s sex. Under this type of claim, the plaintiff first had to show the sex discrimination was severe and pervasive. When analyzing this first prong of the claim, the court focused on the act of leaning in and whispering to a co-worker. It recognized that this act can be uncomfortable and interfere with one’s personal space. However, based on the facts presented, it did not find that the supervisor was making a sexual advance toward the plaintiff. The court ruled that, while the plaintiff may have felt uncomfortable, the singular act of whispering in this instance was not severe and pervasive enough to support a gender-based claim, especially because the allegations did not involve his sex. Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff also brought a retaliation claim, which was based on being transferred to another unit after he complained about the incident with his supervisor. Therefore, the court had to examine if the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity under Title VII. In Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2008), the Third Circuit held that if no reasonable person could believe the reported incident constituted unlawful discrimination, then the complaint is not considered a protected activity. In Nyamu v. Merck & Co., the District Court determined that the plaintiff’s supervisor whispering about his voice being distinct was not derogatory. In fact, the court further explained that this was an “isolated incident” and something one could reasonably determine was an attempt by the supervisor to be discrete. Ultimately, summary judgment was, again, granted in favor of the defendant. This was a key win for employers. The ruling strengthens the legal standard for claims of hostile work environment and retaliation, providing employers with a strong defense to claims involving only isolated, minor incidents. The court’s holding was consistent with previous interpretations of “severe and pervasive,” and confirmed that not every workplace complaint meets the reasonable person standard required to establish a protected activity. Veronica works in our King of Prussia, PA office. She can be reached at (610) 354-8261 or VRSansone@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages

In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages.  The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a).  Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.