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Results

  • Jury Defense Verdict Secured in High-Profile Employment Law Case in New Jersey

    We obtained a jury defense verdict in a high-profile employment law case in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. We represented a prominent New Jersey teaching college in litigation involving claims of gender discrimination and retaliation brought by a former professor after the college elected not to renew her contract. The college maintained that its decision was based on documented performance concerns, including poor teaching evaluations and unprofessional conduct. The plaintiff asserted a novel “cat’s paw” theory of liability in what she claimed was an “Old Boys Club” at the college. During the six-day trial, the defense presented evidence regarding the college's review process, the representation of women in leadership positions, and compensation data for similarly situated faculty members. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the college on both claims.

    Jury Defense Verdict Secured in High-Profile Employment Law Case in New Jersey
  • Defense Verdict Obtained in Two Consolidated Matters Following a Five-Day Trial

    We obtained a defense verdict in two consolidated matters in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania following a five-day trial before Judge Gallagher. The first plaintiff alleged he was terminated in retaliation for filing a lawsuit and that he was subjected to racial discrimination during his employment. The second plaintiff alleged he was terminated in retaliation for supporting the wage and hour claims of the first plaintiff. After deliberating for approximately two hours, the jury answered “no” on the five theories asserted by the plaintiffs.

  • Obtained a “No Cause” Verdict in an Employment Case in New Jersey

    We recently obtained a “no cause” verdict in an employment case in the Superior Court of New Jersey. The plaintiff, an employee of a New Jersey State entity, asserted violations of the Contentious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). According to the plaintiff, after reporting purported deficiencies with an environmental permit, he was subject to a retaliatory and hostile work environment. We successfully argued that the plaintiff did not articulate a violation of law or public policy, nor did he prove that the various employment actions he received created a hostile work environment or were even caused by the alleged whistleblowing.

  • Putative Class Action Lawsuit Dismissed

    In a case where we represented a child care center, a federal district judge from the Western District of Pennsylvania granted our motion to dismiss with prejudice. The plaintiffs were nine minority employees who were involuntarily furloughed in the fall of 2020. They filed suit, alleging their employment was terminated in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Family Medical Leave Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the Wage Payment and Collection Law, and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act. The court agreed with the arguments made by the center, finding that the plaintiffs’ class claims were not timely exhausted. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ arguments that their charges gave notice of their putative class claims because each charge only focused on the individual complainant’s alleged personal disparate treatment. The court also found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to equitable tolling as they did not exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining essential information bearing on their claim. Accordingly, the court dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice, finding no need to address the other bases for dismissal or the center’s request to strike the class action allegations. 

  • New Jersey State University Successfully Defended in an Employment Discrimination Case

    We obtained a “no cause” verdict in an employment discrimination case for a New Jersey state university. The plaintiff, seeking back pay, front pay, emotional distress, attorney fees, punitive damages and costs, alleged she was terminated from her position as director of the university’s performing arts center due to her age, gender and/or in retaliation for reporting internal complaints of age/gender discrimination. We successfully argued that the plaintiff was not terminated for discriminatory/retaliatory reasons but, instead, was terminated as a result of mandatory COVID-19 closures necessitated by Executive Orders. 

  • Defense Obtains a Published New Jersey Appellate Division Decision Affirming that Perception of Having COVID-19 Does Not Constitute Perceived Disability Under NJLAD

    The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal our defense team obtained in a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) perceived disability claim, alleging COVID-19 to be a disability under this statute. This employment discrimination claim involved a matter of first impression in New Jersey and established that COVID-19 infection, without more, does not constitute a disability under the NJLAD. A former employee filed suit, asserting perceived disability discrimination under the NJLAD. The plaintiff alleged he was wrongfully terminated based upon his employer’s perception that he had COVID-19. We filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, asserting the complaint did not set forth a cause of action as COVID-19 is not a recognized disability under the NJLAD. The court granted our motion and agreed that COVID-19 is not a disability under the NJLAD and, therefore, could not be the predicate for a perceived discrimination case. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, finding the plaintiff’s COVID-19-perceived disability claim failed to plead a viable cause of action under the NJLAD.  

  • Successful Defense of Employer Alleged to Have Violated the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act

    The plaintiff sought employment as a fork lift operator in a manufacturing facility. He was extended a conditional offer of employment, contingent on passing a pre-employment drug test. His drug test showed a positive indication for the presence of marijuana, and his offer was rescinded. The plaintiff claimed that he notified the facility that he held a valid Medical Marijuana Identification Card, yet our client still rescinded its offer in violation of the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act. The Act prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a person solely on the basis of that person’s status as a certified medical marijuana user. In response to the complaint, we filed preliminary objections arguing that the employment offer was expressly contingent upon passing a drug test. We also argued that fork lift operation is, by its very nature, an inherently dangerous job that, if done carelessly or under the influence of a narcotic, could result in injury or death to the plaintiff or others on the premises. The court held that the Medical Marijuana Act’s provisions do not require an employer to hire a medical marijuana user as a forklift operator and taking on a substantial risk of liability for injury to persons. Additionally, the court found that a medical marijuana user does not have a right to be hired by a prospective employer who, prior to such hiring, determines that the position for which the prospective employee would be hired would require his or her performance of tasks an employer deems life-threatening to the employee or any of its employees. The demurer was sustained, and the complaint was dismissed.

  • Dismissal of Perceived Disability Claim Alleging COVID-19 is a Disability Under the NJLAD Statute

    Our defense team successfully obtained dismissal of a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) perceived disability claim, alleging COVID-19 to be a disability under this statute. This employment discrimination claim involved a matter of first impression in New Jersey. A former employee filed suit asserting perceived disability discrimination under the NJLAD. The plaintiff alleged he was wrongfully terminated based upon his employer’s perception that he had COVID-19. We filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, asserting the complaint did not set forth a cause of action as COVID-19 is not a recognized disability under the NJLAD. The court granted our motion and agreed that COVID-19 is not a disability under the NJLAD and, therefore, could not be the predicate for a perceived discrimination case. 

  • Dismissal of Employment Claims for Negligent Hiring/Supervision

    The plaintiff brought claims for negligent hiring/supervision, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of mental distress arising from an incident where she was allegedly lured to a residential apartment building in New York City under false pretenses and sexually assaulted by the desk security guard in a back room of the lobby. The guard involved was duly licensed and had no criminal history. At trial, he was criminally convicted and sentenced to prison. The plaintiff contended that the guard’s employer was negligent in its hiring of the guard and that it failed to properly supervise his actions at the building, particularly in light of the fact that during the criminal trial, some evidence surfaced that the guard may have committed a similar assault three days earlier while working at another building for a different company. After more than four years of discovery, we moved for summary judgment on behalf of the guard’s employer and the building owners/managers, which was granted, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims in their entirety.

  • Successful Defense of New Jersey Law Against Discrimination Claims

    In this employment law lawsuit, the plaintiff was a former employee who filed suit against our non-profit agency client, asserting claims of gender discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and retaliation in violation of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act. This matter involved a long and contested period of discovery, including extensive discovery demands, complex e-discovery and extensive motion practice. During the course of discovery, we were successful in obtaining a motion for reconsideration concerning the production of e-discovery data and other documentation lacking in relevance and proportionality to the matter. We thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment as to both counts in the plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination on the basis of gender, as the plaintiff failed to present any evidence demonstrating discrimination or mistreatment on the basis of gender. We further argued that the plaintiff failed to establish a claim of retaliation under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act because the plaintiff failed to establish any nexus between the termination and the filing of a workers’ compensation claim. Our motion for summary judgment was granted in its entirety, with the court finding that the plaintiff was terminated for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

  • Successful Defense of Local Municipality in Employment Law Matter

    Several police cadets were not allowed to take the state licensing exam after the municipality learned that those cadets had been cheating to complete academy requirements. The cadets were referred for disciplinary charges and then terminated. They brought suit, alleging due process violations for allegedly holding sham post-disciplinary hearings, predetermining termination, and not allowing them access to the evidence against them. Select plaintiffs also alleged racial discrimination. The plaintiffs' entire suit was dismissed on summary judgment when the Northern District of Ohio found that the plaintiffs had not completed their probationary period and, thus, did not have a property interest in their employment with the municipality. The court further found that the municipality's decision to terminate the employees for failure to take the state test was a reasonable decision and did not violate their substantive due process rights. Finally, the plaintiffs were unable to present any evidence to support a racial discrimination claim.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.