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Dylan is an associate attorney in the Casualty Department, where he concentrates his practice on product liability, premises liability, and automobile liability matters.

He earned his juris doctor from Temple University Beasley School of Law, graduating cum laude. During law school, Dylan pursued various hands-on learning opportunities. He interned at a plaintiff’s firm, focusing on the Boy Scouts of America Bankruptcy Litigation. In his third year, he contributed to the Systemic Justice Project at the Stephen and Sandra Sheller Center for Social Justice, where he assisted clients in filing motions to waive court fees associated with their convictions and proposed a rule change to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to streamline court processes. Additionally, he held an externship with the City of Philadelphia's Tort Litigation unit.

Before law school, Dylan gained litigation experience as a legal practice assistant at a Philadelphia defense firm, supporting cases in patent, antitrust, and labor and employment law. He holds both a Bachelor and Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Drexel University.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2024)
    • Drexel University
      • M.S., 2020; B.S., 2020
    • Pennsylvania, 2024
    • Obtained summary judgment in a premises liability case pending the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The case involved an alleged trip-and-fall at a Chester County movie theater.  At the close of discovery, we filed a Rule 702 Motion challenging Plaintiffs’ expert and a Motion for Summary Judgment.  The Court granted both, finding that Plaintiffs’ expert did not satisfy the “reliability” or “fit” requirements of Rule 702; and finding that Plaintiffs could not prove that the defendants were on notice of an any allegedly hazardous condition.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of our client, a nonprofit organization, in a premises liability action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff allegedly fractured her leg after slipping and falling on an icy walkway outside the client’s community center. We argued that her claims were barred by a liability waiver she signed as part of her membership application. Although the plaintiff denied signing the waiver, the court ordered targeted discovery, and both parties retained handwriting experts. The court ultimately found that the defense had persuasively established the authenticity of the signature and that the plaintiff’s unsupported denials were insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Summary judgment was entered in favor of our client.
    • Assisted in securing a defense verdict in Delaware County after a four-day jury trial in a premises liability case against a local school. The plaintiff, a student, claimed an Achilles heel injury and Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS), despite medical evidence to the contrary. The defense, which included aggressive cross-examination of medical and liability experts, along with surveillance evidence, successfully demonstrated the plaintiff's return as an undefeated captain of the school’s tennis team. The case also featured a rejected $200,000 mediation offer before the plaintiff’s demand of $1 million. After 2.5 hours of deliberation, the jury ruled in favor of the school.
    • Successfully obtained an order granting a Petition to Open a Default Judgment in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, allowing the client to defend a motor vehicle liability claim involving a $17,945.25 judgment—much of which exceeded the policy limits. The ruling significantly reduced the risk of an excess verdict and preserved the client’s right to litigate the matter.

Results

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Successful Trial Outcome: Defense Prevails in Premises Liability Case

We secured a defense verdict in Delaware County after a four-day jury trial in a premises liability case against a local school. The plaintiff, a student, suffered an Achilles heel injury when cut by a door edge and claimed diminished leg function and Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS). Despite undergoing two surgeries, neither her surgeons nor treating physicians diagnosed CRPS. During trial, the defense highlighted that the student returned the following year as undefeated captain of the school’s tennis team, winning at the state level. The case involved aggressive cross-examination of medical and liability experts, along with surveillance evidence of the plaintiff. Before trial, the demand was $1 million, while the school offered $200,000 at mediation—an offer the plaintiff rejected, walking out and refusing further negotiations. After just 2.5 hours of deliberation, the jury ruled in the school’s favor.

Thought Leadership

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Defense Digest

Tsunami or Business as Usual: What Does the New Motorcycle Lemon Law Hold for Pennsylvania?

June 1, 2025

Key Points:  Effective May 18, 2025, purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania may bring Lemon Law suits.  A nonconformity in a newly-purchased motorcycle must manifest “within a period of one year following the actual delivery of the motorcycle to the purchaser or during the term of the warranty, whichever may occur first.”  The applicable Lemon Law period for newly-purchased motorcycles in Pennsylvania will typically be one year. After multiple legislative attempts and years of effort, effective May 18, 2025, purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania may bring Lemon Law suits. Most recently reintroduced in the Pennsylvania State Senate by Republican State Senator Michele Brooks in January 2023, Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law now provides similar consumer protections to purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania as those afforded to purchasers of new cars. Receiving bipartisan support, the addition of motorcycles to Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law was signed into law by Governor Josh Shapiro in November 2024. Pennsylvania is far from the first state to allow buyers of new motorcycles to bring Lemon Law suits. Pennsylvania now joins Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as states that permit the filing of motorcycle Lemon Law suits. State Lemon Laws throughout the country, including Pennsylvania, are intended to supplement federal consumer protection remedies—such as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act and the Uniform Commercial Code—and to provide stronger protections for consumers. Under these state laws, consumers are given an avenue in civil court to enforce warranties issued by manufacturers of new motor vehicles.  In Pennsylvania, manufacturers have a duty to “repair or correct, at no cost to the purchaser, a nonconformity which substantially impairs the use, value or safety” of a new motor vehicle purchased for personal, family, or household use. 73 Pa.C.S. § 1954(a). If there is a nonconformity in a new motor vehicle within the first 12 months or 12,000 miles of ownership, whichever comes first, and the manufacturer fails to repair the nonconformity after more than three repair attempts, or if the vehicle is out of service by reason of any nonconformity for a cumulative total of 30 or more days, then the vehicle is a presumptive lemon. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1956. Under Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law, a purchaser of a new motor vehicle that is a presumptive lemon can demand a repurchase of the vehicle by the manufacturer or have the vehicle swapped with a vehicle of comparable value. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1955. As of May 18, 2025, purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania for personal, family, or household use can now make the same demand if there is a nonconformity in the newly-purchased motorcycle. A distinct difference, however, is that the nonconformity in the motorcycle must manifest “within a period of one year following the actual delivery of the motorcycle to the purchaser or during the term of the warranty, whichever may occur first.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1954. As most motorcycle manufacturers provide limited warranties for newly purchased motorcycles ranging from one to three years, the applicable Lemon Law period for newly purchased motorcycles in Pennsylvania will typically be one year. So what does this change to Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law mean for motorcycle manufacturers? Will motorcycle manufacturers be swept up in a tsunami of Pennsylvania Lemon Law suits now that the Commonwealth’s Lemon Law covers motorcycles? While it is too soon to say for sure, the answer is likely no.  Recent motorcycle registration data is instructive. In 2021, there were 8,575,569 motorcycles registered in the United States, but only 18,226 new motorcycles were purchased that same year, or 0.2% of all registered motorcycles. Eric Teoh, Motorcycles Registered in the United States, 2002–2021, 7 (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety) (March 2021). By way of stark contrast, there were 15,016,030 new cars and light trucks sold and leased in the United States in 2021. New and Used Passenger Car and Light Truck Sales and Leases, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, https://www.bts.gov/content/new-and-used-passenger-car-sales-and-leases-thousands-vehicles.  While the addition of motorcycles to Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law is worth highlighting and keeping an eye on, at this juncture, motorcycle manufacturers need not panic. Rather than lawsuits, perhaps motorcycle manufacturers should really be worried that they are not selling enough new motorcycles.   Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Result

$19 Million Medical Malpractice Verdict Overturned

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court vacated $10 million of a $19 million verdict in post-trial motions and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the remaining $9 million on appeal.

Result

$1.09 Billion Products Liability Verdict Overturned

In this products liability crashworthiness case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Philadelphia jury verdict of $1.09 billion, the largest verdict ever overturned by a PA appellate court.  The court ordered a new trial based on deficient jury instructions, clarified important aspects of crashworthiness law, and confirmed that so-called standard jury instructions may be incompatible with Pennsylvania law. 

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.

Result

Statutory Employer Immunity Upheld

In this construction accident case that resulted in a $5 million verdict, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Statutory Employer Doctrine, which immunizes general contractors and other contractors on construction sites when certain elements are satisfied.

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group