.

Donald L. Carmelite

Portrait of Donald L. Carmelite

Donald focuses his practice on the representation of police officers and public officials in state and federal court in all aspects of civil rights litigation including claims involving use of force, wrongful arrest, employment, and discrimination. Further, Don represents public entities in land use matters with an emphasis on claims made against building code officials.

In addition to the core areas of his practice, Don also handles a wide array of complex litigation involving liability for environmental, liquor/dram shop and professional claims.  He has additional experience representing real estate professionals in every type of claim arising from the sale of a property covered by E&O policies and has defended claims made against licensed Brokers and Agents in a property manager capacity for HOAs.  He also has years of experience defending motor vehicle and premises liability suits.

During his career, Don has served as first chair in over 10 jury trials and bench trials.  He also has extensive mediation experience.

Don is very dedicated to his community. He engages and supports youth sports organizations and Boy Scouts of America. Don is an involved member of Saint Andrews Episcopal Church in York, Pennsylvania, where he previously served as a member of Vestry (board of directors). He is also the past president of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, Harrisburg Chapter. 

Don received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Penn State University and his juris doctor from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  Thereafter, Don served as law clerk to the Honorable Michael L. Krancer at the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board.

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 1999)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.A., 1996)
    • Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • BV® Distinguished™ Rating by LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2011-2014)
    • Susquehanna Valley Select Lawyers™ (2014)
    • Cumberland County Bar Association
    • Dauphin County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Mobile Devices: Don't Let Good Reception Be Game Over, Dauphin County Bar Association, January 2018 and Cumberland County American Inns of Court, December 2017 
    • Personal Training For Client on All Aspects of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, March 2016
    • Political Subdivision Claims Act, School Claims Services LLC, December 12, 2014
    • Social Media in Litigation: Reloaded, a Closer Look at Using Social Media in Your Cases, Dauphin County Bar Association, Harrisburg, PA, June 24, 2014
    • How To Try a Case in State Court, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, Mechanicsburg, PA, June 16, 2014
    • Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, Real Property Exception, client seminar, February 2014
    • Basics of Litigation Involving State and Local Government, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, June 2013 
    • “Discovering, Authenticating & Utilizing Social Media in Litigation: Strategy Considerations,” co-author, Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2014
    • "Thumbs Up for Qualified Immunity," co-author, Defense Digest, 2011-03, Vol. 17, No. 1
    • "The Bar Is Set: A Liquor Licensee's Duty to Third Persons in a Civil Suit," Defense Digest, 2008-09, Vol. 14, No. 3
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a state court bench trial on a case of first impression involving claims for excessive construction permit fees made against a local municipality
    • Obtained summary judgment for a county adult probation officer in an excessive force claim
    • Obtained summary judgment for a county corrections officer for a civil rights claim involving an inmate's grievances.
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of a county and its wardens and correction officers in an 8th Amendment Conditions of Confinement claim
    • Obtained dismissal of inmate's statutory complaint against county DA for alleged misconduct
    • Obtained dismissal of Chief County Detective in a claim involving sexual abuse of a minor during a school sponsored event
    • Successfully defended PA Department of Labor & Industry investigation into child labor violations
    • Obtained dismissal, in favor of liquor licensee, of all claims in general negligence; reaffirming that the exclusive remedy for an injured person is statutorily found in the Dram Shop Act based upon service of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated patron
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of a police office and township in excessive use of force and failure to train claim
    • Obtained summary judgment, upheld by the Third Circuit, in favor of County Children and Youth Services Agency its social worker in parental rights claim
    • Obtained discontinuance in favor of county vo-tech for negligence claims precluded by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act
    • Obtained dismissal in favor of District Attorney in a Malicious Prosecution Claim
    • Obtained dismissal from EEOC of Township employee's age discrimination claim
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of county prison and corrections officers for claims of excessive use of force
    • Obtained discontinuance in favor of regional police department and its officers for claims of illegal search and seizure of personal property
    • No causation jury defense verdict in a claim where plaintiff was determined to be totally disabled by the Social Security Administration, through the use of surveillance video and plaintiff's social media postings

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.